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Conscience and War

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

CONSCIENCE is just moral consciousness, one's self judging conduct as right or wrong, and character as good or bad. Broadly speaking, good character comes from right conduct, and tends toward further right conduct. Bad character is similarly related to wrong conduct.

Conduct is the use of means to realize ends. To be fully right, conduct must be right outwardly, or objectively, and it must be right inwardly, or subjectively. Conduct is right outwardly when its consequences are the best possible for everybody concerned. To be thus objectively right it must use the best available means to realize the highest and greatest possible total well-being of all who are to be affected by it. To be right inwardly, conduct must be conscientious and intelligent. It must intend to use the best available means to realize the highest and greatest well-being of humanity, present and future, and it must have learned both to appreciate true values in their right proportion and relation to each other and to recognize and know how to use the most effective ways and means of producing the most valuable effects. In other words, in order to be subjectively right our conduct must be more than conscientious; it must be motivated by universal good will and by the highest and most reasonable ideals of personal life, and it must be guided as fully as may be by scientific knowledge of cause-and-effect relations in the world in general and in the human world in particular.

From these definitions it follows that the more reason there is to believe that any particular act is right inwardly, the more reason there is to believe that it will be right outwardly, that its consequences will be good. Moreover and more specifically, action directed intelligently toward the true good of all concerned will presumably make for harmony, whereas selfishness, especially as regards material goods, is notoriously a principle of strife and trouble. The highest values, such as those of knowledge, culture, and goodness, are non-competitive, and the pursuit of them may be expected to make for universal and permanent peace. The only limitation here is that, as Professor William McDougall has pointed out, our science to-day is lopsided; the over-development of the physical sciences has led to results in economic, industrial and international relations with the difficulties of which our under-developed social sciences are as yet but poorly prepared to cope.

If, then, the well-being of man requires that conduct be right, and if it is of fundamental importance that conduct be made right inwardly, it goes almost without saying that there must be freedom of conscience. Men must be free to judge, both as to the value of ends and as to the usefulness of means. There must be freedom, too, at least to begin to use the means judged to be the best available for realizing ends appreciated as being the highest and best, as well as other ends found to be permissible in the light of what is appreciated as highest and best for everybody concerned. There will be a difference of opinion, of course, as to what is "permissible" and what is "highest and best"; but while the government, in the name of the majority, may restrain the individual when his conscientious action clearly threatens the safety and well-being of society, the greatest care should be exercised to withstand the temptation to tyranny. For instance, while a government may sometimes be justified morally as well as legally in using force, as by imprisonment, to prevent an individual from doing what he would do conscientiously if freedom of action were left him, it is difficult to see how any government can have the moral right to require anyone to do any deed which he cannot perform without a violation of his own moral consciousness. Requiring the conscientious objector to kill his fellow men would be a case in point.

Finally, if there be a God worthy of our worship and trust, it follows that conduct which is right outwardly and inwardly must be according to his will, and the way to find out what God's will is, is to find out through cultured appreciation the relative value of ends and through scientific observation, supplemented where necessary by experiment, the relative effectiveness of the various available ways and means. If anyone has a "hunch" as to what God's will is, let him not fail to test his subjective impression in the light of the criteria just indicated.

These ethical principles apply to group-action as well as to individual conduct. I have never been able to discover why it should not be the duty of the state, as it certainly is that of the individual, to act for the highest and greatest welfare of all concerned, future generations included as well as those now living. The state undoubtedly has special duties to itself and its own citizens, just as the individual has special duties to himself and his family, or as the local community has to itself and its individual members; but it is no more right for the state to seek its own prosperity at the expense of the highest well-being of the rest of the world than it is the duty of the individual to seek wealth for himself and his family at the expense of the highest well-being of the community or the nation. If

"Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself" applies in the one instance, it applies equally in the other.

This principle of the greatest good to all concerned, in spite of its being ethically so obvious, has not found common acceptance among political philosophers. From Macchiavelli to Hegel and Treitschke they have held that the ethics of the state in its international relations is, must be, and ought to be fundamentally different from the ethics of the individual. During the World War I invited an eminent professor of International Law to address a group of theological professors on the subject of Christian ethics and international relations. He declined on the ground that while there were certain moral principles recognized by the nations in dealing one with another, these were not the principles of Christian morality. May not this fact, in so far as it is a fact, have something to do with the trouble the world is in to-day? The Golden Rule has application to the acts of nations as truly as to those of individuals. Selfishness leads to unfairness, and unfairness to hatred and conflict in the broader as well as in the narrower sphere.

Is there any state in the world to-day which can be said to have definitely adopted as its guide in international relations this obvious ethical principle of the greatest and highest good of all concerned and especially of the future of humanity? And even if governments were honestly to give this principle public endorsement, would they and future administrations always strive faithfully to be true to it? And even if they did, would they always use good judgment as to what true well-being is and how best the well-being of humanity may be secured? In each instance the obvious answer must be No, or at least, Most probably not.

In any case we know that these three questions cannot be answered in the affirmative, and this being the case is it not obvious that we do not know enough about future conditions, or about what the state will do in those unknown future conditions, to justify the citizen or the would-be citizen in giving to the state of which he is or would be a member an absolute pledge of obedience to his government, particularly in the matter of being ready to kill at that government's command? There is a place for national loyalty and allegiance; no one should refuse or shirk the duty of helping his nation to do whatever in any given situation it ought to do, and to this end the citizen may morally pledge and no doubt ought to be ready to pledge his true and loyal allegiance. But no one has the right to pledge his loyalty or allegiance to any government, except as it may be "under God," or, in other words, consistently with what is morally right or for the true well-

being of mankind. It would seem that no one knows enough about the future to make it morally possible for him to promise absolute obedience to the government in such matters as the bearing of arms in any and every future situation in which this may be demanded by those in authority.

It is for a very similar reason that I hesitate to pledge myself to an absolute or unconditional pacifism. I have a good deal of respect for absolute pacifism when it is the expression of the guess that the most effective way of working for the future peace of the world is to make an absolute declaration beforehand that under no possible circumstances will one bear arms or support the bearing of arms. But I have never been able to feel sure that under no possible future circumstances will the use of military or naval force be necessary for the welfare of humanity. For the adequate protection of society it seems to be necessary sometimes for our police to make use of force, even at the risk of physical injury to evilly disposed individuals; and it is difficult to be sure that never under any possible circumstances will it be right to use military or naval force for police purposes within the nation or in international relations. May it not be reasonably contended, especially in the light of the consequences up to date, that the cabinet of Premier Ramsay Macdonald was morally justified in dispatching troops a few years ago to Palestine to keep the Arabs from slaughtering the relatively defenseless Jews? And can we be sure that a similar situation, in which the use of armed force for police purposes would be morally justified, might not occur again? It seems to me that we cannot. There are some who would agree as to the necessity of such police action and who nevertheless feel free to call themselves pacifists for the reason that, as they say, police action, even when exercised by army or navy, is not war. Theoretically it may seem easy enough to make the distinction, but can we be sure that there will never be such armed resistance to such police action as would make the result practically indistinguishable from war? Here again it seems to me that we cannot. It is for these reasons that it seems to me that it would be unwise and therefore wrong to promise beforehand that never under any possible circumstances would we support or, if necessary, participate in the use of armed force in national or international affairs.

There are great dangers, indeed, in connection with the use of armed force, even for what may seem to be necessary police purposes, when used by one nation against or within the domain of another. Selfish motives are almost certain to be unduly influential. We can see this in the action of Japan in Manchuria and Shanghai, and perhaps even in the intervention

of the United States a few years ago in Mexico and again in Nicaragua. Such danger in connection with the use of armed force for police purposes would tend to be reduced to a minimum if the action could be taken under the direction of a competent international body responsibly organized and given authority to maintain the peace of the world.

This is why the proposal recently made by France to the Disarmament Conference at Geneva is of special interest, even if the chances that it may be taken seriously by the nations in the very near future do not appear to be great. But whether it be sooner or later it is almost a certainty that some such international police force as that proposed by Tardieu as the spokesman of France will some day have to be adopted by the nations, internationally organized for the maintenance of the peace of the world.

There are some who, like Chancellor Bruening, of Germany, object that we must have national disarmament before international armament can become effective. In this connection it is interesting to consider the proposal made by Litvinoff in the name of Russia, that instead of organizing an international army, navy, and air-force, the nations should proceed at once to total disarmament. The proposals of France and Russia seem to be at opposite poles, but may it not be that the essential thing in each needs to be supplemented by the essential thing in the other? It may well be that, as Russia says, an international police force would not be effective unless the nations disarm, and that as France insists, drastic disarmament must seem dangerous in the absence of any international police protection. Why not adopt, then, a program for national disarmament and plans for an international police force at one and the same time? Other changes may have to be made, such as a revision of the Treaty of Versailles, and the universal acceptance of either compulsory arbitration or the jurisdiction of a World Court, together with an agreement as to the definition of the aggressor. But these will be matters of detail in the working out of a practical plan for keeping the peace internationally along lines that have proved so efficacious within national bounds.

The general idea of an international police force is not without friends outside of France. One might mention a former Assistant Secretary of the United States Treasury, Mr. Oscar T. Crosby, and the well-known psychologist, Professor William McDougall. United States Senator Walsh, of Montana, expressed himself as glad to learn that the plan was being talked of, although fearing that the world has not yet progressed far enough to make its adoption a practical possibility. Most significant of all, perhaps, is what that outstanding English advocate of world peace,

Lord Robert Cecil, than whom no one, perhaps, is in a better position to form a judgment on the subject or to formulate a plan, is reported to have said at a recent meeting in Vienna:

The object in view is clear. We are aiming at a real reduction of armaments to the level of police purposes. . . . They are only to exist to repress disorders and lawlessness by international authority. They are to bear the same relation to the Community of Nations as the National Police Forces do to the National Governments.

But the main reliance for the maintenance of peaceful relations between the nations must not be upon any such organization of armed forces for the exercise of police functions in international relations; rather must it be on international good will and truly scientific ways of giving that good will effective expression. What the world most needs is to find and follow international leadership wise enough to be interested in the highest well-being of all mankind and sufficiently grounded in economic, political, and general social science to know how to work in the most effective way in the direction of that goal.

In the meantime how shall those friends of peace be guided who feel that they cannot morally promise either that they will support their government in any and every future war, or that they will never under any possible circumstances support the use of armed force for police purposes in international relations? How, for instance, in the present situation should a Chinese act who is wholeheartedly devoted both to the cause of peace and to the welfare of China, though not as against the welfare of the world? The question is not an easy one. But a few guiding principles may be suggested.

There is a vast difference between a just cause and a just cause *for war*. It does not necessarily follow, because China has a just cause for complaint against Japan, that she is or would be morally justified in declaring war or committing acts of war against Japan. A war may be morally unjustified for any one of several reasons. (1) Its cause may be unjust; or (2) while its cause may be just all possible ways of securing justice without going to war may not have been exhausted; or (3) it may be improbable that justice will be secured by war; or (4) it may be better to suffer many an injustice rather than to cause the injustice and other dread consequences that would be involved in going to war. In fact, modern war being what it is, a tremendous burden of proof must rest upon any individual who advocates or any government which undertakes in our day the waging of even a so-called "defensive" war.

Christianity and Recent Tendencies in American Sociology

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

IN 1929 a Roman Catholic scholar, with the approval of the authorities of the Catholic University of America, and under the official *imprimatur* of his church, declared: "The principles that underlie sociology are by necessity subversive of revealed religion. These two interpretations of life have nothing in common, save that they both undertake to explain life and evaluate its origin, meaning and purpose."¹ He would probably find no occasion to alter his judgment of American sociology to-day. The flood of sociological books of distinctly pagan character or tendencies has not lessened. It is, of course, not to be expected that any modern scientific thought could be wholly acceptable to the authorities of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially not to the Catholic scholar just quoted, who lumps all non-Catholic American sociologists together in one universal condemnation.

However, no student of social thought can fail to note the change which has come over American sociology since the time of Lester F. Ward. If Ward were to return to the American scene, he would have to rub his eyes to recognize in American sociology that to which he gave his life to found and promote. To be sure, Ward was pagan enough in his way; but he had faith in the human mind, in human intelligence, and in the possibility of planned progress and of control by intelligence—in brief, in intelligent social values and social purposes—which is to-day altogether absent in some American sociology. There is now no use of ignoring the fact that some schools of American sociological thinkers have divorced sociology entirely from social religion and social ethics, a development alien to the spirit of sociology a generation back, whether it was Christian or pagan in its tendencies.

It is perhaps invidious to select certain recent publications as proof for the above assertions; for many other books would serve equally well as the three which I shall select to illustrate what I mean. The first of these is a little book of posthumous *Fugitive Papers*,² by Russell Gordon Smith, a former student and instructor of Columbia University. These "Papers" might be considered only the tribute of admiring friends to a brilliant and

¹ Hemelt, *Final Moral Values in Sociology*, p. 116. Quoted by Case in *Social Process and Human Progress*, p. 59.

² Published by Columbia University Press, 1930.

lovable personality, prematurely snatched away by death, if it were not for the fact that the late Professor Franklin H. Giddings in the foreword of the book says: "This book is the best introduction to Sociology that has ever been written." Such a sentence is a challenge to sociological thinkers everywhere and one naturally seeks at once to discover what peculiar merit the book has to deserve such high approval.

It must be confessed that the book has a fascinating style and is filled with passages of melancholy beauty, which remind one of the best in pagan literature, whether ancient or modern. But it is also filled with inconsistencies and crudities, and is totally lacking in that very quantitative approach to social problems which Professor Giddings so strongly championed the latter years of his life. The book is, in fact, philosophical and ethical in its way, but its philosophy and ethics are not well thought out. Perhaps the keynote of the book is struck in such sentences as, "For beauty and divinity are one, and all which partakes of loveliness is divine." "It matters little whether a thing be true or good or useful; it matters only that it be beautiful." "In a world wherein all things seem to shift and change and then utterly to fade away, as twilight shadows on an ancient tapestry, there abideth always beauty, laughter, love—these three, the Blessed Trinity of aristocratic and pagan minds." As these words indicate, the whole outlook of the book is pagan, one might almost say, Greek. The book ends with the admonition that through the worship of this "Blessed Trinity"—whatever they concretely may mean—man should keep burning the living fire of fortitude.

In an earlier chapter on "Youth and the Moral Code" the author tells us that "the current moral code in America, especially as it relates to sex, is a survival of primitive supernaturalism and apostolic bigotry. It is perpetuated by the stupidity of parents, and rigidly maintained by Puritan neurotics. . . . It was conceived in the hatred of the elders for that youthful charm and beauty which they had irrecoverably lost, and dedicated to the proposition that the sexual impulse is not only sinful but that, officially, it does not exist at all. Against the stone wall of our present moral code, youth is broken and wasted. So long as it endures we shall have bitterness and restlessness and revolt."

In a still earlier chapter on "The Problem of Social Control" we begin to get some little light on the reasoning processes of Russell Gordon Smith. He pours contemptuous criticism on the work of earlier American sociologists upon this problem, especially upon Professor Edward A. Ross's book, *Social Control*. He tells us that "Professor Ross's book might not inade-

quately be described as a money-making medium for the pyrotechnic display of parti-colored rhetoric." By implication at least he implies that Professor Ross's master, Lester F. Ward, is to be judged as but little higher. Whatever the defects of Professor Ross's book, it seems to me that it is totally undeserving of any such rating as Doctor Smith gives it. Equally unjust, I think, is his rating of all the older sociologists when, lumping them all together, he says, "Human society, as described by the classical sociologists, was a Platonic idea, a conceptual idealization, having about as much correspondence to the fire and sparkle, the dirt and tears and blood of real life, as Kant's *Ding an sich* has to a pregnant skunk."

But at the very beginning of the book a deep skepticism of all rational processes makes clear the basis for the crudity of the book's philosophy. Science, the author tells us, "seeks to describe as simply and clearly as possible the impressions which the phenomenal world makes upon normal human senses; to summate these impressions in descriptive formulæ, or laws." This is the essence of science, and it is therefore "limited." This position should land the author in the camp of the behaviorists; but he avoids this conclusion and contents himself with agnosticism as regards all social values. "Life has no meaning," he tells us, "save the meaning one gives it, no value save the value one puts upon it." And this is the book which is given the astonishing commendation as "the best introduction to sociology that has ever been written!"

The second book, *Societal Evolution*,³ is the revision of an older book, published by Professor A. G. Keller, of Yale University, under the same title in 1915. The revision does not represent any departure from the conclusions which its author set forth in 1915. On the contrary, it is distinctly the purpose of the author to corroborate and strengthen the thesis which he set forth in 1915, that social evolution is necessarily in the main automatic, and very little subject to any rational or intelligent control. The wishes, the purposes, and ideals of men have little significance in societal evolution. The only exception to this doctrine is that the maintenance mores of society, that is to say, its technology and economic systems, are subject to rational improvement. The evolution of institutions is affected, therefore, by changes made in the economic systems, but scarcely at all by the intelligent plans and purposes of men. This is, of course, perilously near to Marx's doctrine of economic determinism. It is, indeed, a modification of that well-known doctrine, but this does not disturb Professor Keller.

³ Published by The Macmillan Company, 1931.

Professor Keller comes very near to subscribing to the doctrine of the late Professor W. G. Sumner, of Yale, who was one of the pioneer teachers of sociology in this country, that "There is no progressive evolution in the folk-ways." As was just indicated, Professor Keller would modify this wholesale denial of progress so far as it concerns the material life of society. He says, "If, starting out with the idea that evolution means 'progress,' one seeks for evidence of 'progressive evolution' in the mores, he is likely to wind up his search with the conclusion that progress is to be demonstrated only in the maintenance-range." He is inclined, however, to deny that progress is, or can be made, a subject of scientific research. "Progress is," he says, "movement toward what some individual or group 'thinks' is the 'right' direction." "This is no kind of a criterion for science to go by," he concludes. It is only in the material life of society that rational testing and verifications are possible. "Conceivably society could live on for a long time under almost any religion or marriage-system, without seeing it subjected to visible and conclusive test." Carefully examining, he believes, the evidence for rational changes in human society, especially in religious, moral, political, and domestic institutions, he concludes: "The rational element is, at present, merely a feeder to the automatic process." This conclusion, however, is even more strongly given in the general impression of the book. Though Professor Keller is not a behaviorist, yet he believes that human social evolution is almost entirely controlled by the blind automatic forces of nature, and that the very idea of rationally planned, intelligently controlled social progress is a delusion. However, like Spencer, Keller seems to believe that the natural process is essentially benevolent. At least he asserts in the appendix of the book that "the vast impersonal forces have always wrought out what is, in the end, expedient and rational." How all of this squares with the program and work of the Institute of Human Relations at Yale University surely deserves to be set forth and explained by someone.

Very different from either of the above books, yet exhibiting the same negative trend, is the pronouncement of a younger group of American sociologists set forth in *Trends in American Sociology*.⁴ In general, this group of sociologists have been greatly influenced by the development of behaviorism in psychology, though not all of them are by any means consistent behaviorists. All are, however, strongly of the opinion that sociology is a natural science and must employ, so far as it can, the methods which have been successful in the physical sciences. This position is clearly

⁴ Published by Harper & Brothers, 1929.

stated in the preface of the book when the authors say, "Sociology is a natural science, and hence must study human associational activities in the spirit and by the methods of natural science."

They do not tell us exactly what they mean by "natural science." All sociologists would, of course, agree that sociology is a natural science in the sense that it deals with real processes and does not question the reality of its subject matter. However, "natural" is a tricky word, celebrated in philosophy for its ambiguity. But it is plain from reading the book that most of its contributors mean by "natural science" a science fundamentally like physics, chemistry, or biology. More especially, they mean to accept the general theory of knowledge followed by the workers in those sciences; namely, that scientific knowledge comes from the generalization of sense data and can come in no other way. For example, Professor Read Bain, one of the most conspicuous contributors of the book, tells us that "theory that is not based upon logical inferences from sense-experience is not sound theory. It must do what it claims to do, namely, give a logical explanation, or summarization, of sense-experience." Professor Bain follows this premise to the end, and is, of course, a sociological behaviorist. Professor Lundberg, who edits the book, in the final chapter on "The Logic of Sociology and Social Research" asserts over and over again that the methods of the natural sciences as they have been traditionally understood should be the methods employed by sociology, with such modifications, of course, as a more complex and less easily controllable subject matter demand. To all intents and purposes, sociology is thus merged with the physical sciences.

Sociology is thus stripped of any ethical purpose or implication. "Sociologists as scientists are not concerned with what uses may be made of their findings," Professor Bain tells us. "They are like chemists in this respect. Mechanisms of human behavior may be used to poison the public mind in war time, as poison gas and explosives may be used to destroy life and property." Moreover, "Sociology as a science may derive valid generalizations regarding human behavior, but has no final word as to what is progress." Thus, "the new sociology" glories in posing as an unsocialized, but "pure" science. It has escaped all thralldom to conceptions of human welfare. It is going to study the mechanisms of social behavior without any valuation of these mechanisms as socially desirable or undesirable. "Sociology is a natural science," Professor Bain affirms; and he adds, "as such it is non-utilitarian, non-normative, and no more 'important' than any other natural science."

The naïveté with which the above American social thinkers accept the theory of knowledge which has been pragmatically developed in the physical sciences is astonishing. Apparently, one and all would agree with Bertrand Russell that the perfection of scientific method is to be found in the physical sciences, and that that method is the only way of attaining to scientific knowledge. Logically, they should say with Lord Russell that "scientific method comes into the world full-fledged with Galileo," and even that "Galileo possessed the scientific method in its completeness."⁸ If one ventures to suggest that nothing in the realm of intelligence comes into the world "full-fledged," and that scientific method, so far from being in a state of completion, is even now in a state of confusion, then one is forthwith excommunicated from the group of truly scientific thinkers! The triumphs of physical science seem to have so hypnotized these American sociologists that they cannot recognize any departure from physical science traditions as even permissible. Surely they are developing an orthodoxy!

It would, of course, be a great mistake to judge American sociologists generally by the examples which we have taken for purposes of discussion, or even to suggest that American sociologists generally accept such a crude methodology. As a matter of fact, the mass of American sociologists are still very far from accepting the dogma that sociology is an observational, experimental science, which, like the physical sciences, becomes scientific in proportion as it accumulates exact measurements of objective reality. This word "objective," by the way, seems to be one of the chief stumbling blocks in sociological thinking among American sociologists. A generation ago, Professors Small and Giddings began to demand that sociology become an objective science, and that sociologists think objectively. An examination of their writings, however, shows clearly enough that they did not mean by this that sociological thinking should be entirely in terms of external, observational phenomena. Both Professors Small and Giddings made free use of subjective factors in their sociological interpretations. What they meant by "objective thinking" was impersonal, detached thinking, thinking, in a word, which is not colored by one's subjectivity or personality. They considered the desires, wishes, interests, beliefs, and ideas of individuals in society as "objective" as any other social phenomena. Moreover, both would have agreed with Ward that the end of acquiring sociological knowledge was human welfare. This attitude was shared by practically all American sociologists at the beginning of the twentieth century. Professor

⁸ Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, pp. 20, 21. W. W. Norton & Co., 1931.

Charles Horton Cooley, of the University of Michigan, rapped most vigorously those who would introduce physical science methods in the social sciences in his well-known paper "The Roots of Social Knowledge." Professor Cooley went so far as to discriminate radically between our knowledge of physical nature, and our knowledge of human society, showing that they were different in kind. Professor Ross, of the University of Wisconsin, has also staunchly upheld the right of the sociologist to study social relations on their inner, or mental side, and also the position that there is no necessary impairment of scientific validity when we study social facts and conditions with a view to promoting human welfare.

It is encouraging to find that a large number of the more recent American sociological writers still hold to these views. Succeeding Professor Giddings in the chair of Sociology at Columbia University is Professor R. M. MacIver, who has on several occasions pointed out the fallacy of regarding sociology as a "natural" science. In his most recent book, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*,^{*} he says: "Sometimes one feels that sociology would prosper more, especially in America, if its practitioners forgot to think of it as a science. The physical sciences deal with quantities, numbers, and ratios, or at least with phenomena which it expresses in these terms. Sociology, in the minds of many of its students, achieves its end in so far as it does likewise. They want to act like scientists, forgetting that their business is not to put the veil of imitation between them and their object of study, but to understand that object in any way in which it admits of understanding. . . . Not a single *social* phenomenon would exist were it not for the creative experience of social beings such as we are ourselves. Here we have a principle at once of causation and of explanation which is unknown to the 'natural sciences.' Society is a system of social relationships, and we know these relations in the same manner that we enter into them, directly, qualitatively. To endeavor to understand them *merely* by counting, measuring, and manipulating them is as vain as to apply the same principles to understanding of a picture or a poem."

As one would expect from such a philosophical position, Professor MacIver would give a large place to religion in the social process. He would give an even larger place to ethical values. He says, moreover, "There is no necessary opposition between the scientific and the ethical attitude, for the one is directed to the comprehension of what is, and the other seeks to determine our relation to what is in such a way that what is and what is good shall so far as practicable coincide." "We cannot," he says,

^{*}Published by The Macmillan Company, 1931.

"adopt the simpler solution of the physical sciences by keeping outside the realm of ethical valuations altogether. In a very important way these valuations, socially conditioned as they are, enter into the subject matter of sociology. Subjective themselves, they determine the objective phenomena of society. . . . Our facts differ *toto caelo* from physical facts, and that is why we cannot dismiss valuations—or such concepts as progress—as lightly as can the physical sciences."

Even more outspoken, if that is possible, is Professor C. M. Case, of the University of Southern California, in his last book, *Social Process and Human Progress*.⁷ Rightly, Professor Case says, "Only those working in the field can realize how completely sociological thinking has come under the dominion of *behavioristic* psychology in recent years." Perhaps the keynote of Professor Case's sociology is that he would substitute the *Gestalt* psychology, with its emphasis upon "*wholes* in human experience," for behavioristic psychology as the background of sociology. This emphasis, as Professor Case recognizes, is not wholly new in sociology, because something akin to the *Gestalt* psychology has long been recognized by the ablest of American social thinkers. The *Gestalt* psychology, however, proves to be a convenient foil to behaviorism, and is therefore welcomed by those sociologists who are not content with the rigid natural science view of their subject matter.

Professor Case would give a very large place to the religious factor in human society. In opposition to the Roman Catholic scholar, cited at the beginning of this paper, he says, that while we cannot begin sociology with the existence of God as a dogma of revealed religion not subject to question, the acknowledgment of God is a necessary postulate for the complete interpretation of personal and social experience. Science, he says in effect, makes it impossible for us to start with any such assumption, but science is not opposed to the discovery of evidence which leads in the direction of this conclusion.

The argument of Professor Case is that while the social sciences must for the present probably be tentative and groping, yet they will become less groping when men become of full social age. Conscious, purposeful, collective action will become more and more possible as scientific enlightenment proceeds. Social progress can be, therefore, planned and intelligent, as Lester F. Ward proclaimed.

Perhaps no American sociological thinker has taken up the problem of these divergent points of view in American sociology with such clear

⁷ Published by Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931.

scientific methods as has Professor Hornell Hart in his new book, *The Technique of Social Progress*.⁸ The very title of the book suggests at once that Professor Hart does not run away from the difficult problems raised by the first three books which we have discussed in this paper. He faces them, and proposes a scientific method of solution. Instead of dismissing the concept of "progress" as outside of the field of science, he claims that progress can be made a scientific concept, and even that philosophies of social progress can become scientific. The implication is, of course, that all social philosophy can become scientific. He proposes, therefore, that instead of dodging the questions which arouse the partisanship of men, such as private property, democracy, race relations, monogamy, and Christianity, these questions should be investigated scientifically. He believes that they can be as soon as we make out the technique of social progress. While Doctor Hart apparently does not hold to the dogma that scientific method is complete and fully established, yet he proposes to apply to the difficult problems involved in social values all the scientific method at his command, including psychology, history, case study, statistics, and any methods of measurement which promise results. The aim of sociology thus becomes, so to speak, nothing less than to make men's ethical valuations capable of having a scientific basis. The book is a very wonderful piece of constructive work in sociology, and while it would be premature to say that the methods of investigation and research which Doctor Hart advocates are sure to be validated by future sociology, yet they seem most promising, and even suggest the possibility of settling upon a scientific basis many of the most perplexing sociological problems.

Finally, we should mention a new book which has just appeared on *Social Aims in a Changing World*,⁹ by Professor Walter G. Beach, of Stanford University. Professor Beach, while Professor of Sociology in Stanford University, is careful not to call his book "Sociology," possibly because of the intolerance of some of his sociological colleagues in other institutions. Strictly, it is in the field of social ethics, but nevertheless, the book may be considered a typical product of the more liberal thought of American sociologists. He tells us that if the sociologist, in his fear lest he be called a philosopher instead of a scientist, avoids the problem of social self-direction, he may end in finding that he has run away from his intellectual chance to live. He emphasizes also that sociology demands a continual analysis of community trends in terms of purposes or aims and values.

⁸ Published by Henry Holt & Co., 1931.

⁹ Published by Stanford University Press, 1932.

Social values become thus one of the chief concerns of sociological analysis. Hence, ethics and religion must receive careful consideration in a scientific study of human communities. "The history of mankind," he tells us, "and its behavior reveals clearly the fact that religion has always been one of the chief agencies which hold a society together. And while it has also often been a condition obstructing necessary change and so leading to social decay, it has been equally at times a vital moving power for the overthrow of evil and for social reconstruction in the face of degenerating forces."

The conspicuous mark of all of the last four books discussed is their emphasis upon the rôle of spiritual values in human society. On the other hand, it would be fair to say that the conspicuous mark of the first three books discussed is the absence of any such emphasis. Evidently, the same struggle is going on in American sociology which is going on in the human world at large. Our human world is divided over this question of spiritual values and their significance for human life. Perhaps we should not be too greatly disturbed to find that sociological thinkers are also divided. We have witnessed a whole civilization deliberately attempting to dispense with spiritual values—the civilization of Russia. This is not, however, a question of communism *versus* capitalism; for many capitalistic nations have also come perilously near to dispensing with spiritual values. Rather, we are witnessing the greatest struggle of the ages coming to a climax in our time, the struggle between the material and the spiritual aspects of life.

It is not generally appreciated by the laity that this struggle is peculiarly going on in the social sciences, and more especially in sociology. Probably, the issue of the struggle in the social sciences will do more than anything else to determine the future character of the world's civilization. The church and religious people ought, therefore, to take an interest in this struggle in the academic world. Their reaction could do much to secure the broadening, the humanizing, and the socializing of the social sciences. Perhaps science will be about the last thing in our culture to be humanized and socialized. But this is not impossible, if those who are working for a humanized and socialized social science are supported in their efforts by popular approval. Now, the public scarcely discriminates between social scientists who have no human interest and those who are not ashamed to acknowledge that they are working for human welfare. The Christian Church has a great stake in this struggle, and it can no longer afford to ignore it.

Trends in Contemporary Theism

HENRY P. VAN DUSEN

IT is increasingly recognized, I suppose, that we are witnessing the end of an era not merely in affairs of business and finance but in religion as well. And not least in the specific matter of religious thought. Each man will read contemporary tendencies and forecast coming developments somewhat under the influence of personal conviction and hope. But any detached observer must, I think, note at least these five trends in the theistic thought of to-day.

I. The Passing of Humanism

Clearly the most striking is the waning importance of nontheistic Humanism. By no means does this imply that its popular influence is or will soon be on the wane, although there is not a little evidence in that direction also. Popular recognition of the passing of temporary by-currents of thought is always tardy. But there are clear indications that Humanism, as a serious intellectual alternative to theistic religion, has already passed its zenith. At least three reasons would seem to be responsible for its decline:

(a) American Humanism was not really a new movement. It was a recrudescence in slightly modernized (largely American) dress of nineteenth-century Positivism. In basic presuppositions, the two positions were one. Humanism's intellectual ancestry was in Feuerbach and Comte and its most able exponents freely acknowledged their indebtedness to these Continental thinkers. But, long before the close of the nineteenth century, Positivism had been subjected to careful criticism and proven to rest on faulty premises. To cite a single example, readers of the early essays of Baron Von Hügel will find there an exhaustive and eminently fair examination and a convincing refutation of the position. (It is perhaps a commentary upon American intellectual provincialism that a movement which had long since ceased to challenge the best European thought should take such hold upon our theology.) Humanism was guilty of two serious fallacies of interpretation. Fixing attention too narrowly on the beginnings of religion and neglecting its mature developments, it tended to interpret religion mainly in terms of its crude origins in the dim ancestry of the race and the childhood of the individual. The result was the identification of religion as a form of belief and practice which many people could not

recognize as what they had always known religion to be. Secondly, recognizing that the human mind in its interpretation of the world always colors objective truth with the tints which it wishes were present, Humanism tended to label the mind's interpretations *wholly* projection, a rendering of reality in terms of our desires instead of in terms of the facts. But mature experiences cannot be judged by their primitive ancestry. And the mind in its interpretation of Reality is in touch with Something; it is of no avail to deny the existence of that Something merely because the mind never reports its contact with that Something with absolute accuracy.

(b) Humanism carried at its heart a logical inconsistency which sooner or later was bound to appear and render its conclusions suspect. It was the attempt to join two ultimately irreconcilable views—a naturalistic and unduly pessimistic interpretation of nature and a romantic and unduly optimistic interpretation of human nature. This inconsistency was developed with compelling clarity in Professor Horton's *Theism and the Modern Mood*. "What is called humanism to-day is a curiously involved mixture of two logics, naturalistic in its view of the physical universe, humanistic in its exaltation of human values, hesitating between a proud self-sufficiency reminiscent of the eighteenth century and a cosmic nostalgia reminiscent of the seventeenth."¹ But man is organic to the cosmos, both historically, since the human race is the child of nature and has emerged from the prehuman physical universe, and more immediately and vitally in the sense that we are dependent upon that cosmos at every moment of experience, not merely for the continuance of life itself but also for the creation and preservation of our values. Such inconsistency could not long endure. As Professor Horton prophesied, it was inevitable that the humanists should drift either in the direction of thoroughgoing pessimism or toward a qualified theism. Precisely this two-fold movement is now clearly apparent.

(c) Perhaps even more influential in moving contemporary thought beyond Humanism have been developments within scientific theory. Just at the moment when the humanists were persuading us that we can have no certainty of what, if anything, lies behind nature and that such knowledge, even if possible, would be unimportant for religion, Jeans, Whitehead, Eddington, and many others were reporting very definite findings about our "cosmic background." Whether the God whose existence they report is all that personal religion requires is another matter. At least lay thinking is becoming increasingly permeated with the realization that we

¹ *Theism and the Modern Mood*, p. 39.

need not be agnostic about Ultimate Reality; and that our study of nature points us to God. The basic premise of Humanism is invalid.

II. The Decline of Liberalism

A feature of the contemporary religious mood hardly less marked is the growing dissatisfaction with liberal theology. By Liberalism is meant the progressive schools of thought which have sought to mediate between extreme Modernism on the one hand and Traditionalism verging on Fundamentalism on the other hand. Its concern has been to bring theology thoroughly into line with the findings and spirit of modern science but with no sacrifice of evangelical fervor and personal religious vitality. Its great crusade centered on the acceptance of the modern view of the Bible and the scientific interpretation of the universe. Its watchword has been the preservation of "abiding experiences in changing categories." It has furnished the religious leadership for most of our universities and great metropolitan churches. Most of the larger seminaries outside of the definitely fundamentalist camp have claimed its interpretation of Christianity as their own. There is no more significant sign on the present horizon than its declining influence. Wherever ministers meet together there are references to the sickness of Liberalism, its failure to stem the ebbing tide of religious loyalty, its inadequacy for the present day; and expressions of this kind seem to meet general acquiescence. Moderates in religion are as shy of the label "liberal" to-day as they were of that of "modernist" a few years back. There seems to be a growing feeling that Liberalism has served its purpose, but is now outmoded.

In part this turning from Liberalism is an expression of the prevailing temper of the hour—distrust of all assumptions of the post-war decade, need for a more "solid," "meaty" theology than Liberalism can offer. More than had been realized, Liberalism was a defensive and temporary strategy, thrust forth for the achievement of certain indispensable but secondary goals. Its goals—the critical view of the Bible, the harmonization of religion with science, the right to freedom of thought and interpretation, faith in man and man's achievements, the emphasis upon personal experiment and internal authority—have been won. Its battlecries no longer stir response. It has no particularly significant message for our times.

But the more serious charge against Liberalism is, that, with the most sincere motives in the world, it has betrayed the cause of true religion. In seeking to save theology from annihilation by the accepted thought-

forms of the secular world, it has itself become a pallid reflection of the secular philosophy. It has tacitly accepted for religion the status of one of the incidental interests of life. It has proposed what might be called a "minimum interpretation" of religion. Increasingly it has spoken of "religion" rather than Christianity or any specific form of religion; of religion without distinct reference to the necessity or certainty of God, as a "way of life" or "philosophy of life"; of Jesus as the best of men, or one among the best of men; of prayer as synonymous with worship or aspiration. In its solicitude to domesticate religion within the fabric of modern thought, religion has become hardly distinguishable from ethics, worship from æsthetic experience, the religious life from the finest ethical life, religion itself from any other high interest of life. Of even more serious consequence has been the favorite logic of liberal apologetic. Taking its method from what it understood to be accepted scientific procedure, its approach to God has been by way of tedious and methodical inductive argument. Clear the mind of all prior assumptions, begin with a mind free from convictions, assemble all available evidence, and laboriously erect a logical proof for God. Now it has been frequently pointed out that this method has certain insuperable shortcomings for living religion. For one thing, the average lay thinker seldom has either equipment or perseverance to follow the process through to its end; he does not get to God. More important, it usually leads at best to a tentative intellectual postulate of the probable existence of God. Its great weakness is not that an argument for God cannot successfully be developed that way; quite probably it can. Its great weakness is that it sets the whole task of apologetic in a false perspective; God becomes the last term of an arduous and technical intellectual inquiry instead of the first fact of a vital religious experience. And for the typical liberal layman, God is at most a vague Principle of Order and Intelligence behind the world of nature. In one of the most striking passages in his *Science and the Modern World*, Professor Whitehead points out that in the nineteenth century the influence which saved religious thought from falling completely under the dominance of mechanistic scientific assumptions (now discarded) was not the defense of religious apologists but the intuitive protest of the poets. They knew in their bones that the science of the day was wrong. They felt "that something had been left out, and that what had been left out comprised everything that was most important."² All too generally the philosophers and theologians bowed a servile knee to scientific dogma or sought some facile reconciliation.

² See "The Sickness of Liberal Religion," *World Tomorrow*, August, 1931.

They were so concerned to make their theology respectable among the dominant thought-forms of their time that they falsified the true facts of religion. The apologetics of Liberalism in the twentieth century falls under the same condemnation, it is widely suggested.

Now whether the strategy of Liberalism has meant gain or loss or partially gain and partially loss is beside the scope of our present discussion. The main point is that we are beginning to see a marked and rather sharp pendulum swing away from Liberalism. Those who welcome the change would describe it as a turning toward a far more definite, vigorous, living, truly Christian theology; a swing toward what might be termed a "maximum interpretation of religion."

III. A Scientific Theism

Alongside these two rather negative features of the contemporary scene should be placed three, far more positive in character. The first is the development of what we may call a "scientific theism."

By this is not meant a theism developed in accordance with "scientific method" for which Professor Wieman has been pleading, but rather a theism built directly from the findings of the sciences. It is common knowledge that for many the most convincing support for belief in God in recent years has come from the declarations of eminent scientists. To be sure, few beyond the ranks of the technically trained can grasp the thought of the scientists or judge of their competence to give theological findings. But the impression is widely disseminated that a large number of the leading minds in physics, mathematics and biology have lately been placing their names to positive theistic affirmations; and the faith of not a few theologians as well as the great rank and file of the laity has been enormously strengthened thereby. Eddington, Jeans, Thomson, Mather, Millikan, Pupin, Whitehead, Einstein; and still the list lengthens.

It has been too little noted, that while all of these men put the weight of their opinion definitely behind belief in God, they divide into two groups on the question of the importance of *strictly scientific* evidence for theistic belief. For example, the editor of the exceedingly valuable symposium of scientific opinion, *Has Science Discovered God?*, has failed to notice that his sixteen distinguished contributors differ sharply on this preliminary issue. But that is the central question—should science *be expected* to discover God? A considerable number of scientists, notably Sir James Jeans, Professor Millikan, and Professor Mather, give their attention to definite light on the nature of God which may be had from scientific

inquiry. Certainly the most interesting and possibly the most important suggestion from this group is Jeans's definition of God as a "Pure Mathematician." But a hardly less influential section of the scientists are quite positive that science at best can lead to no more than the conception of an impersonal Cosmic Intelligence; the God of personal religion must be sought by other and equally valid avenues—through our experience of values, mystical and otherwise. The burden of their purpose is not to establish such a God through science but to show that science should recognize the evidence from nonscientific sources. This is the pith of Professor Eddington's contribution, and he appears to be supported in it by Professors J. Arthur Thomson and Pupin among others.

We have already hinted that there is not a little dispute as to the importance of the religious opinions of the scientists. Many are inclined to dismiss them as without value, the unjustified speculations of men who are speaking beyond the confines of their authority. This would seem to be a quite mistaken superciliousness. Whatever the final resolution of the controversy among the scientists themselves cited above, it is increasingly certain that findings *within* the proper sphere of scientific authority point irrefutably to the reality of a cosmic Intelligence and Power. The cosmological and perhaps the teleological arguments are in the way to respectable rehabilitation. Even if science can never carry thought clear through to a personal God, its present contribution is no mean gain. For one thing, it would seem to make humanistic agnosticism untenable by invalidating its basic premise. It may do more. If the structure of the universe shows us God, we may achieve a final release from the dichotomy which has cursed modern thought since Kant, the unbridgeable chasm between the world of nature and the world of values, in which light on God is to be sought *only* through values.

IV. *The Trend Toward a Finite God*

No account of contemporary theism would be well balanced without vigorous attention to the increasing advocacy of a finite God. It is all the more interesting because a movement in that direction is taking place from several different quarters—from those formerly regarded as agnostic philosophers on the one hand, and from the ranks of orthodox theists on the other hand. Professor Brightman, representative of the latter group, has been the most vigorous in insisting that the conception of the Absolute or an omnipotent Deity should be surrendered. His defense of his theory of "The Given" in the last issue of *RELIGION IN LIFE* developed the motives

behind his position and the detailed conclusions to which he has been led with admirable clarity. In brief, the factors of evil in the world, factors apparently outside the purpose of God and to some degree beyond his control, force Professor Brightman to propose a Deity who is definitely limited by conditions within his own nature which are not of his own creation or consent and over which he is winning a gradual and progressive mastery. "God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of other persons and by restrictions within his own nature."³ The Given which limits the full realization of God's will is "a passive element which enters into every one of God's conscious states, as sensation, instinct, and impulse enters into ours, and constitutes a problem for him."⁴ It is "all that is eternal and uncreated in the divine nature, other than the actual will of God."⁵ Not a few avowedly Christian thinkers find their minds going along with Professor Brightman; some suggest that he does not go far enough.

But even more interesting is the trend toward a finite God from the opposite direction. At the moment when nontheistic Humanism seemed in the full flood of influence, several important nontheistic philosophers were putting forth tentative feelers in the direction of a very definite theism. It will suffice to instance two. Few books of the past several years have so delighted men of all schools, theists and agnostics, humanists and orthodox, as Professor Montague's charming little *Belief Unbound*. Professor Brightman rightly claims Professor Montague's idea of God as almost identical with his own. God is "an infinite, all-inclusive cosmic life, whose will to good is single, pure and finite, one force among many in that chaos of existence which God finds within himself and which is the world he would perfect." Again, God's will is "a will of finite power working within the confines of an infinitely extended and all-inclusive mind"; and God himself is "a *self* struggling to inform and assimilate the recalcitrant members of his own organism or the recalcitrant thoughts of his own intellect."⁶ The limitation of God, therefore, is not in the purpose of his will which is regarded as altogether good, but in its power. He struggles with intractable factors within his own nature which are not of his volition. Somewhat less attention has been directed to the equally interesting views of Professor Overstreet of the College of the City of New York. Taking his start more from the findings of science and spe-

³ E. S. Brightman, *The Problem of God*, p. 113.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Religion in Life*, Vol. I, Number 1, p. 134.

⁶ W. P. Montague, *Belief Unbound*, pp. 91, 84.

cifically from the conception of emergent or creative evolution, he too works to the conclusion of a struggling and creative God and finds his mind in essential accord with Professor Montague. God is "the quickening vitality of the universe . . . in infinite degree the everlasting creative life which moves toward wholeness . . . the God operative within ourselves."⁷

To the same general movement we may add the influence of Professor Wieman, who, for a number of years past, has been urging the definition of God as an "aspect" of nature or Ultimate Reality, but not as an Omnipotent Deity. It would appear that the considerations behind his position are akin to those which have influenced Professor Brightman and that the resulting conception of God would share the characteristic of finiteness.⁸ Then we discover Professor Walter Horton saying that he has found his own mind more nearly in accord with Professor Montague's theism than any other with which he is familiar. Finally, we should note the marked trend within the ranks of Humanism toward belief in a limited God. Professor Ames, an early prophet of the movement and one of its steady advocates, may be regarded as typical. His earlier writings presented the idea of God as merely the projection and personification of man's highest ideals, without cosmic status. But in his latest book, he seems to have moved far beyond his original position; indeed he is at pains to indicate its inadequacy. "The idea of God may thus be seen to express more than the mere projection of human ideals, for that expression still carries with it the old dualism between an alien cosmos and man's little world of interests and values. No doubt the ideals arise in human experience, but they are not on that account to be discredited by saying that they are merely human. They are as real as the body or the rock on which the body rests, and they are as much a part of the cosmos."⁹ Such an interpretation of God has much in common with Professor Wieman's and possibly with that of Professor Overstreet and Professor Montague. In thus attributing cosmic reality, even of a qualified sort, to God, we may believe that Professor Ames is taking the path which the more reflective of the humanists will increasingly follow.

The importance of the drift toward a finite God can hardly be exaggerated. It becomes clear that among those on the left wing of reli-

⁷ H. A. Overstreet, *The Enduring Quest*, pp. 264-5.

⁸ Professor Brightman is at special pains to disassociate his views from those of Professor Wieman, whose God is impersonal; but on the issue here considered, limitation in divine power, they are agreed.

⁹ E. S. Ames, *Religion*, p. 173.

gious thought the problem of God's omnipotence will more and more hold the center of discussion during the coming period. The finite God is replacing Humanism as the most living alternative to a full theism. If religious controversy in the past half-dozen years has turned on the issue, "Is there a God?" the heart of interest in the years just ahead is destined to focus on the question, "Is God omnipotent?"

V. *A Renascent Supernaturalism*

Finally we confront the most arresting and baffling single characteristic of the contemporary religious mind—what someone has referred to as a "nostalgia for the Supernatural." It is met in most vivid and extreme example in the European theology of Karl Barth and his associates. The excessive supernaturalism and anti-rationalism of the Theology of Crisis has led many to dismiss the whole tendency with a shrug and a clever label. To do so simply reveals the obtuseness of the critics; for Barth is voicing in exaggerated phrase a protest and a sentiment deep within the religious feeling of America as well as Europe. Many who cannot understand, let alone accept, the strange, self-contradictory dialectic theology know that it is trying to say something which they themselves have long dimly felt. Their response to it is, "This thing has hold of some very important truth; but it is badly stated." They sense reality in the religious message behind it. Indeed, whenever the Barthians speak not as theologians but as preachers, they touch inner convictions. They strike to life chords of longing and aspiration already faintly vibrant.

Of the Theology of Crisis itself, a word or two will suffice.¹⁰ The past few months have given us a rather embarrassing abundance of books and pamphlets about it. Among them have been the three most important discussions of the movement in English—the most persuasive interpretation of it by a recent adherent,¹¹ the cleverest and most uncompromising exposition of its theology by one of its acknowledged spokesmen,¹² and the ablest critique yet published on this side of the Atlantic.¹³ Even the theological layman who wishes to understand this strange and strangely powerful development or to catch the temper of which it is representative need no longer be baffled by its paradoxical dialectic and its unfamiliar concepts. Through these three small volumes it is clearly revealed. From these studies certain conclusions emerge:

¹⁰ See the admirable brief comment by Professor Rall in *Religion in Life*, Winter Number, p. 65f.

¹¹ *The Significance of Karl Barth*, by John McConnachie.

¹² *The Word and the World*, by Emil Brunner.

¹³ *Karl Barth*, by Wilhelm Pauck.

(a) The Theology of Crisis is most effective at two points—in its critique of the prevailing Liberalism, and in its positive religious appeal. It has taken the measure of so-called modern thought; and while its indictment, like everything else in its teaching, is exaggerated, the main points are unanswerable. Of its religious message we have already spoken.

(b) It is unlikely that this theology in its present expression will ever take strong hold in America. It has failed notably to do so thus far, despite its success in voicing widespread dissatisfaction with prevailing teaching. Its failure may be put to at least two shortcomings. The first is the vocabulary and thought-forms in which it comes to us. With all its professed anti-rationalism, Barthianism has caught up into itself some of the worst features of the German rationalistic mood—those features which render Continental philosophical and theological writing so unattractive to the American mind. It is preoccupied with theological minutæ and, in some instances, irrelevancies. It attaches a quite exaggerated value to dialectic as such. A not unfair characterization would describe it as a rationalistic protest against rationalism. Moreover, this feature of its teaching seems to be lamentably on the increase since Barth himself left the pulpit for the classroom and set himself the task of reducing his message to doctrine. The inner throb of its message may strike a responsive chord, but its language is quite unintelligible to the average American Christian. Let us hope it always remains so. But its more serious weakness is that, as theology, it is definitely bad theology. And it is not fully Christian. It is only partially true either to the central genius of Christianity or to the classic formulations of that genius in the thought of the church.

(c) The significance of the Theology of Crisis is to be estimated less as a direct contribution to thought than as a weather-vane to the winds of thought. We have already suggested that it is only one sign of an important tendency. Other evidences of the same tendency may be discovered in the growing strength of Anglicanism, in the widening appeal of the first-century Christian fellowship, in an increasing attention to the thought of the great Roman Catholic layman, Baron von Hügel; yes, even in a wistful questioning whether the Roman Catholic embodiment of form and authority may not have much to commend it, however unacceptable its specific dogmas may be. If it is improbable that the Theology of Crisis will exert a determinative influence on American theology, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the next important development of theistic thought will come to birth through it, or through something very nearly akin to it.

VI. *What Next?*

The foregoing does not profess to be an exhaustive report of the contemporary scene. For example, there has been no mention of that very important school of thought for which Professor Wieman has been the most arresting spokesman in the period just closing—the advocacy of a scientific theism—a school which gave promise of developing a genuinely original and characteristically American theology. The present writer finds it exceedingly difficult to estimate the importance of this position just now, or its probable weight upon coming developments. He has the impression that, like Humanism and Liberalism, it has served an invaluable purpose, has made its major contribution, and has fallen somewhat into eclipse. But it is merely an impression, from very scanty evidence.

What of the future? The task of prophecy is at once more difficult and more precarious than that of analysis. Further, the future is more than usually uncertain, for we are definitely standing near the end of an era. But from our analysis certain conclusions are clearly warranted.

The general character of contemporary theistic thought is positive; its temper is conservative. This fact is witnessed by the waning of Humanism and Liberalism on the one hand, by the hankering after authority and a reviving supernaturalism on the other hand. But in this respect, religious thought merely reflects the prevailing temper of the day. Modernism was bred in the post-war decade. It was born of the same revolt which gave us "normalcy," jazz, the splendid crop of young intellectuals, and the amazing ascendancy of the *American Mercury*—a revolt which has received classic portraiture in Frederick Lewis Allen's *Only Yesterday*. It was the theology of the "jazz age." But the post-war decade is dead. The depression hastened its close, but the depression only speeded a process already well developed and condemned it to interment in the Potter's Field instead of a respectable burial. As Allen so well suggests, the controlling theological tendencies of the period are also obsolete.

We have already predicted that the focal issue in the coming period will be not so much, "Is there a God?" but rather, "What is God like?" More specifically this central concern may well take shape in two questions: "What is the relation of Deity to the order of nature? Is God in any sense Absolute?" and "How, other than through natural law, is God related to human life?" The first issue is that of a finite God; it is forced by the problem of evil. The second issue is in the area of the supernatural; it is forced by the needs of personal living.

There are three further possible developments which might be expected in a time like this but of which there is as yet little, if any, evidence. The first would be a marked drift toward the comfortable and impressive authority of Roman Catholicism, perhaps especially among the intellectuals—a movement comparable to that which has carried Noyes, Belloc, Chesterton and not a few others into the lay leadership of the Roman Church in Britain. The second would be a return to a moderate Scholasticism; for a day which is dissatisfied with prevalent categories and thoroughly disillusioned about its own power to construct new systems would seem destined to turn to the mind of Aquinas for a starting-point if not for a definitive theology. (Such a classical tendency is already noted in Protestant thought in Europe.) The third would be a revival of emphasis upon Christology and a definitely Christological theism. In recent years interest in Christology has been dormant. It has been a theological topic studiously avoided partly because attention was preoccupied with the more elementary issues of theism, partly because there was no question concerning which Liberalism has been so uncertain. The liberal solution of the problem has been an unrecognized dichotomy between practice and the obvious implications of its theoretical position. Devotionally the Christological attitude of the liberals has been orthodox; intellectually it has been Unitarian. The solution is insincere as well as untenable. It would seem almost inevitable that the whole setting of events would force Christology to the fore once more.

One further consideration requires mention. It may be that restatement in theology must wait on revival in religion. For a good many years now we have been hearing repeated predictions of imminent spiritual reawakening. Thus far it has been unfulfilled prophecy. But it is always within the range of the possible that a very great revival may be born of the pressure of spiritual need. If it is to come, attempts to forecast theistic trends are largely futile; they will be determined by the movement within living religion. It is the custom of religious experience to override the limitations set by the theistic thought of its day, launch forth on seas strictly forbidden by its more cautious companion, and attain new discoveries to which theology comes but late. Liberal theism to-day will not support a vibrant, living, contagious faith. But faith never acknowledges its dependence upon theism. It is possible that we shall see no solution of the intellectual perplexities which now beset us, no new and significant developments in theistic thought until faith leads forth the way to fresh discoveries. Then, as always, will theology gladly follow with lagging footsteps.

A Revised Marriage Canon

HOWARD CHANDLER ROBBINS

IN the Protestant Episcopal Church legislative power belongs to the General Convention, which meets once in three years, the latest meeting having been in Denver, Colorado, in September, 1931. The General Convention consists of the House of Bishops and the House of Deputies, the former including all the bishops, the latter consisting of clerical and lay deputies from every diocese and missionary jurisdiction. Neither house can legislate independently, consequently the revised Marriage Canon, which was adopted by the General Convention in September and went into effect on the first of January, represents concurrent action on the part of bishops, clerical deputies, and lay deputies, the two latter also voting separately and by orders.

The canon in question has been nicknamed "The Canon on Divorce." This is a misnomer. Divorces are granted by the state, not by the church. The Protestant Episcopal Church is aware of the growing evil of divorce, but it has no power to legislate in the matter. What it does do is to refuse to solemnize the remarriage of a person who has been divorced from a partner who is still living, except in the case of the innocent party in a divorce granted for adultery. This provision has not been changed. The legislation which excited popular interest was of a different sort, and dealt with the communicant status of "any person who has been married otherwise than as the Word of God and discipline of this church allow." Under the old canon it was provided that if such a person were desirous of being admitted to the sacraments, the minister, before receiving such person to these ordinances, should refer the case to the bishop for his goodly judgment thereupon, and there was no appeal from this decision. Under the new provision, a court of appeal is provided. "Any persons who have been married by civil authority, or otherwise than as this church provides, may apply to the bishop or to the ecclesiastical court of their domicile for the recognition of communicant status or for the right to apply for holy baptism or confirmation. After due inquiry into all the facts relevant thereto, judgment shall be given in writing to the petitioners," and "in case of a favorable decision, a minister of this church may, at his discretion, bless the parties to the union." In other words, without in any way lowering its standard of marriage, the Protestant Episcopal Church has determined to administer the law of Christ in the spirit of Christ, dealing with each

case individually and upon its merits. In the words of Bishop Page, "With Christ's spirit of love and forgiveness in mind it is impossible to believe that the failure of men and women to make a success of the marriage bond is the one sin that may not be forgiven by the church."

The section of the revised canon which deals with impediments to a valid marriage has been misunderstood. No attempt has been made to "beat the devil of divorce around the bush of annulment." There are certain circumstances which from time immemorial have been recognized both in civil and ecclesiastical law as making a valid marriage impossible. Among these may be mentioned the degrees of blood relationship which make a marriage incestuous, mistaken identity, undisclosed impotence, insanity, and loathsome disease. If, after a marriage has been annulled or dissolved by civil authority, it can be proved that such "impediment" existed from the beginning, the marriage which has already been dissolved or annulled by civil law may then be declared null by the church, leaving the parties free to marry on the ground that there has been no previous marriage. The canon is conservative in enumerating causes of annulment; all the causes are natural, and none are ecclesiastical. This is in contrast with the canon laws of other ancient communions, which list many impediments and which sometimes go so far as to declare interconfessional marriages null and void, as in the case of some marriages of Eastern Orthodox with Roman Catholic, or of Roman Catholic with Protestant.

But the most important provisions of the revised Marriage Canon are not those which deal with the communicant status of persons who have been divorced and remarried, or with impediments to valid marriage. Its most important provisions are those which provide for instruction before marriage, and for the exercise of a ministry of reconciliation in cases where husband and wife have become estranged.

These provisions are contained in Sections I and IV of the new Marriage Canon. Section I reads as follows: "Ministers of this Church shall, within their cures, give instruction, both publicly and privately, on the nature of holy matrimony, its responsibilities, and the mutual love and forbearance which it requires." This obligation resting upon ministers of the Protestant Episcopal Church is again emphasized by the provision that "no minister of this Church shall solemnize any marriage before he has instructed the contracting parties as to the nature of holy matrimony, its responsibilities, and the means of grace which God has provided through His Church." And Section IV reads as follows: "If one party to a marriage so grievously offend the other that the security or permanence of

the home is imperiled it shall be the duty of the offended party to lay the matter before a minister of the Church; and it shall be the duty of such minister to labor that the parties may be reconciled."

These two provisions, for instruction before marriage, and for efforts to effect reconciliation when the security or permanence of the home is imperiled, were regarded by the Commission on Marriage and Divorce which proposed them as being of primary and fundamental importance. Their primary interest was not in dissolved marriages and broken homes, but in the preparation of young people for marriage, and in their instruction on the nature of marriage and the mutual love and forbearance which it requires. Their first concern was for homes still in the making, and for other homes endangered by dissension where what is needed is not the tragic dissolution of divorce but the reconciling ministry of a faithful and sympathetic pastor.

It is, of course, evident to every realist that the adoption of these provisions by the General Convention of the Protestant Episcopal Church and their legislative enactment does not automatically ensure their application. The best of laws remains a dead letter until public opinion requires its enforcement. Furthermore, it is one thing to charge the minister with the responsibility of instructing young people on the nature of marriage and quite another thing to be sure that the instruction which he gives is sound, adequate and helpful. The teachers must first themselves be taught, in theological seminaries or elsewhere. Then, too, in their pastoral work, how much is required of ministers who attempt the difficult and intimate task of reconciling the estranged husband and wife; how comprehensive a knowledge of the situation, how deep an insight into character, how much in the way of disinterestedness, tact, intuition, sympathy, compassion! It is easy to be a blunderer, whose well-intentioned intervention does more harm than good. The new Marriage Canon is not a panacea, and what will be accomplished by it depends upon many factors. Yet it looks in the right direction; it assumes responsibilities which for too long have been disregarded; and it relates the church to one of the most important social problems of our times, the problem of the security and permanence of the home.

Beyond this specific legislation, the new Marriage Canon is of importance in that it lays renewed and weighty emphasis upon the spiritual significance of the family. The implication of the legislation is that the family is a religious institution as well as a biological fact, and that it fulfills a moral and spiritual as well as a biological function, not only pro-

viding for the transmission of physical life, but also making possible a continuity of moral and spiritual experience.

This view of the family as an institution of religion is prominent in the Scriptures of both the Old and New Testaments. In the Old Testament it is basic, being the basis of the hopefulness of the Hebrew prophets and the source of their profound conviction that sooner or later the righteous will of God will be done on earth as it is in heaven, and that his word will not return unto him void.

The Psalmist prayed for goodly children, children of young parents, because he saw a work to be done to which his own generation was unequal, and looked to an oncoming generation to possess greater virility, and to do the work and reach the distant goal. So also with the prophets. They were always picturing their country as a nation whose goal lay in the distant future, a husbandman, but with his vineyard still unplanted; a herald, but with his message not yet delivered. So there rose from the pages of their prophecies one of the noblest strains to which the ear of man has listened, a strain of mingled penitence and triumph. There was penitence because the nation had not yet executed its mission. It had not yet conquered heathenism and established the kingdom of God. And then there was triumph, because the faith of the prophets centered its hope and expectation in the future. It centered them in the children. They were to save the situation. They were to be trained in the Law and inspired by the vision of the Holy City until their hearts were flaming with the beauty of it, and every lower passion and every selfish, thwarting aim was consumed in the heat of their soul's desire.

This, then, is the process by which hope purifies men and makes possible the program of the human race, farther and farther from the condition of animals, and nearer and nearer to that of free spiritual beings. Hope fills young parents with enthusiasm, and they become stronger, braver, more patient—better lovers, better neighbors, and better citizens because of this hope. Then the memory of the faith of their parents, the memory of what was once so lovingly and so confidently expected of them, turns out to be an inspiration and an incentive for the children.

We have seen both these influences at work, and possibly know them in personal experience. It is children who furnish the incentive to progress, each family determining that its own young shall be better, shall be wiser, shall be stronger, shall have advantages in life which the parents themselves have not always enjoyed. The responsibility for their children

often keeps men and women at work when they would be indolent without it. Often it keeps families united when self-indulgence threatens to divide them. And then, forth from these homes go children whose lives have been improved by the faith and expectation of those who sent them forth. If there be any virtue in them, if there be any cause for praise, if there be any triumph over obstacles and hindrances, that which made virtue, praise and triumph possible for the child was in most instances the hopefulness of its parents.

These loving hopes of parents often have fallen pathetically short of that which was expected, and yet they are not empty and barren. Not always in particular cases, but surely in the general scheme of things it may be said that hope such as this "maketh not ashamed." The hope of parents for their children works in the large for the betterment of man. It makes men earnest in the work of education. It holds them for their children's sake to a measure of idealism that might otherwise be wanting; and it holds children for their parents' sakes to the faith and the religion of their fathers.

This doctrine of the importance of the family finds support not only in the experience of Israel, but also in the broader field of anthropology. No one can read such a book as Edward Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*, without realizing that the history of human marriage is the story of the evolution of the family as the true social unit and the basis of civilization. After every other conceivable relationship of the sexes has been tried and found wanting, monogamous marriage has been found to be the highest and socially the most valuable union of the sexes, because in monogamous marriage the interests of the child are made safe. If one uses the word natural in its full and deep sense, with regard for the voice of nature and the verdict of experience, one may assert that monogamy is the only natural form of marriage. "Marriage is not an artificial creation but an institution based on deep-rooted sentiments, conjugal and paternal." When man and woman come together to assume the relation of husband and wife, their marriage is more than a private relation between individuals. It creates a living social organism, the organism of the family, which is the very basis of the existing social order. The relation ceases to be a matter of contract, and becomes a status created by contract. Marriage and its dissolution must not be considered from a narrow and individualistic point of view. Marriage and its dissolution are acts formative of or destructive of the family.

We should think of marriage and the home in America in these larger

terms, implied in the Scriptures of both the Old and New Testaments. In so thinking of them the synagogue and the church will find that they are dealing with a common and fundamental problem, offering an opportunity for fruitful co-operation. It is to religion that we must look for the strongest sanctions of marriage. Our young people should be trained from childhood to take religious views of the responsibilities of marriage and of parenthood, such as will enable them to undertake these responsibilities with serious and high-minded purpose. Through religion they should be set free as far as is humanly possible from self-will and selfish individualism; they should be made faithful as far as in them lies to the great, basic loyalties of human life.

For it is loyalty, rather than the pursuit of personal happiness or the gratification of personal desire—loyalty inspired and strengthened and directed by personal religion—that furnishes the best basis for marriage and the home, and incidentally holds the best hope of happiness as well as of their permanence. Too many people nowadays are making happiness the first and perhaps even the sole consideration. That aim defeats its own purpose. Happiness is like health; those who seek it too anxiously are generally the last to find it. Happiness and health are both by-products of adaptation to environment; they elude those who pursue them and come unsought to those who put duty and loyalty first. Behind the great, upward thrust which led to the institution of the family there was at all times a generous and sometimes sacrificial thing; parental devotion. Parental love has tempered, chastened, disciplined and purified the relations of men and women. It has been their common love for their children, and their common care of them, that has made them in some measure patient, faithful, and self-forgetful. In this, the most intimate and exacting of all human relationships, Isaiah's words have been fulfilled, that a little child shall lead them.

This is an austere and lofty conception of marriage, and no doubt it minimizes unduly the element of happiness to be found in all marriages where love is present and endures. But it is a wholesome corrective to the rampant individualism which so often finds expression nowadays in wrecking home and happiness together. Moreover, it comes to us with the authority of religion re-enforced by the authority of human experience over immeasurable lapses of time. There is something which fires the imagination in the thought of the cosmic processes of experiment which led to this conclusion, as we remember the dark forests of primitive superstition, the storms of unbridled selfishness, the slow disciplines of gen-

erations, through which humanity has pressed on to this great, idealistic conception of monogamous marriage, one man and one woman plighting troth and faithfully keeping it till death do them part. With realization of its vast significance, young people will be more careful not to enter into marriage unadvisedly or lightly. They will be the more careful, being in it, to be patient, loyal, self-controlled, and ready to make the necessary adjustments. There is truth as well as humor in Mr. Chesterton's delightful paradox that incompatibility is the only basis for a happy marriage. A union without difference of taste and temperament may be purchasing its serenity at the heavy cost of dullness. Marriage is a great adventure, beset with difficulties and dangers, but not more so than is life generally. And if undertaken in love and pursued in purity and in fidelity it leads to some of the deepest and most blessed experiences that human life can afford.

The Ethic of Jesus and the Social Problem

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

SINCE Walter Rauschenbusch aroused the American church to the urgency of the social problem and its relation to the ethical ideals of the gospel it has been rather generally assumed that it is possible to abstract an adequate social ethic for the reconstruction of society from the social teachings of Jesus. Dozens of books have been written to prove that Jesus' ideals of brotherhood represented an outline of the ideal society, that his law of service offered an alternative to the competitive impulse in modern society, that guidance for the adjustment of every political and economic problem could be found in his words, and that nothing but a little logic would serve to draw out the "social implications" of his teachings.

Most of this energy has been vainly spent and has served to create as much confusion as light. There is indeed a very rigorous ethical ideal in the gospel of Jesus, but there is no social ethic in the ordinary sense of the word in it, precisely because the ethical ideal is too rigorous and perfect to lend itself to application in the economic and political problems of our day. This does not mean that the ethic of Jesus has no light to give to a modern Christian who faces the perplexing economic and political issues of a technological civilization. It means only that confusion will be avoided if a rigorous distinction is made between a perfectionist and absolute ethic and the necessities of a social situation.

The ethic of Jesus was, to begin with, a personal ethic. It was not individual in the sense that he believed in individual perfection abstracted from a social situation. He saw that wealth tempted to covetousness and that poverty prompted the virtue of humility. He spoke of the kingdom and not of salvation, and the kingdom meant an ideal social relationship, even though he might emphasize that it proceeded from internal spiritual forces. His ethic was an ethic of love and it therefore implied social relationships. But it was an individual ethic in the sense that his chief interest was in the quality of life of an individual. He regarded as a temptation the suggestion that he become a political leader or that he develop the political implications of the messianic idea, and he resisted the effort to make him king. He was not particularly interested in the Jewish people's aspirations toward freedom from Rome, and skillfully evaded the effort to make him

take sides in that political problem. He accepted monarchy on the one hand and slavery on the other, though he called attention to the difference between the ideal of his kingdom, which measured greatness by service, and the kind of greatness which the "kings of the gentiles" attained.

His lack of concern for social and political issues is, however, not as important from the perspective of this problem as the kind of ethical ideal which he actually developed. In terms of individual life his ethical ideal was one of complete disinterestedness, religiously motivated. No one was to seek his own. The man who asked him to persuade his brother to divide an inheritance with him was rudely rebuked. Evil was not to be resisted, the borrower was to be given more than he asked for without hope of return. A special premium was placed upon actions which could not be rewarded. In other words, the prudential motive was treated with utmost severity. There are, of course, words in the teachings of Jesus which are not as rigorous as this. He promised rewards. Some of these words belong to a humanist strain in his teachings in which he merely makes a shrewd analysis of the effect of certain actions. The severe judge will be judged severely. The proud man will be abased and the humble man exalted. Here the social rewards of social attitudes are recognized. Other offers of reward occur, but with one or two exceptions they can be placed in the category of ultimate rewards—"in the resurrection of the just," of "treasures in heaven," of favor with God. On the whole, they do not seriously qualify his main position that moral action must be motivated purely by obedience to God, emulation of God's attributes and gratitude for the forgiving grace of God. An ulterior motive (desire for social approval, for instance) for a worthy action would destroy the virtue of the action and would result only in the attainment of the object of the ulterior motive—"verily, they have their reward."

Jesus did not deny that disinterested action would result in rewards; "all these things" would be added, and the man who forgot himself completely would find himself most truly. Here is the recognition of the basic ethical paradox that the highest result of an action can never be its desired result. It must be a by-product. If it is desired the purity of the action is destroyed. If I love to be loved or to be socially approved I will not be loved or approved in the same way as if my fellowmen caught in me a glimpse of pure disinterestedness. Obviously the only way to achieve such pure disinterestedness is to have actions motivated purely by religious motives. But this very emphasis upon religious motives lifts the ethic of Jesus above the area of social ethics. We are asked to love our

enemies, not because the social consequence of such love will be to make friends of the enemies, but because God loves with that kind of impartiality. We are demanded to forgive those who have wronged us, not because a forgiving spirit will prove redemptive in the lives of the fallen, but because God forgives our sins. Here we have an ethic in other words which we can neither disavow nor perfectly achieve. We cannot disavow it because it is a fact that the prudential motive destroys the purity of every ethical action. We have a right to view the social and personal consequences of an action in retrospect, but if we view it in prospect we have something less than the best. So powerful is the drive of self-interest in life, however, that this ideal is as difficult to achieve as it is to disavow. It remains therefore as an ideal which convicts every moral achievement of imperfection but it is always a little beyond the realm of actual human history.

Though Jesus was as indifferent to the social consequences of pure disinterestedness as he was critical of concern for the personal consequences, it is not difficult to draw conclusions in regard to the social ideal implied by such disinterestedness. In practical terms it means a combination of anarchism and communism dominated by the spirit of love. Such perfect love as he demands would obviate the necessity of coercion on the one hand because men would refrain from transgressing upon their neighbors' rights, and on the other hand because such transgression would be accepted and forgiven if it did occur. That is anarchism in other words. It would mean communism because the privileges of each would be potentially the privileges of all. Where love is perfect the distinctions between mine and thine disappear. The social ideal of Jesus is as perfect and as impossible of attainment as is his personal ideal. But again it is an ideal which cannot be renounced completely. Whatever justice men attain in the society in which they live is always an imperfect justice. The careful limitation and definition of rights which Stoicism gave to the world as a social ideal always develop into injustice in actual life because every person views rights not from an absolute but from a biased perspective. The result is a society in which the perspective of the strong dictates the conceptions of justice by which the total community operates and necessitates social conflict through the assertion of the rights of the weak before the injustice is corrected. Justice, in other words, which is only justice is less than justice. Only imaginative justice, that is, love, which begins by espousing the rights of the other rather than self, can achieve a modicum of fairness.

Whether we view the ethical teachings of Jesus from the perspective

of the individual or of society we discover an unattainable ideal but a very useful one. It is an ideal never attained in history or in life, but one which gives us an absolute standard by which to judge both personal and social righteousness. It is a standard by comparison with which all human attainments fall short and it may offer us the explanation of Jesus' words, "Why callest thou me good; no one is good save God." Perhaps it ought to be added that an attempt to follow this ideal in a world which is, particularly in its group relationships, hardly human and certainly not divine, will inevitably lead us to where it led Jesus, to the cross.

Valuable as this kind of perfectionism is, it certainly offers no basis for a social ethic which deals responsibly with a growing society. Those of us who believe in the complete reorganization of modern society are not wrong in using the ideal of Jesus as a vantage point from which to condemn the present social order, but I think we are in error when we try to draw from the teachings of Jesus any warrant for the social policies which we find necessary to attain to any modicum of justice. We may be right in believing that we are striving for a justice which approximates the Christian ideal more closely than the present social order, but we are wrong when we talk about achieving a "Christian social order." The Barthians are quite right, I think, in protesting against the easy identification of the kingdom of God with every movement of social reform and social radicalism which has prevailed in American Christianity in particular and in liberal Protestantism in general. Those of us who dissociate ourselves from the easy optimism of modern liberalism and who believe that a just society is not going to be built by a little more education and a few more sermons on love have particular reason to reorient our thinking in this matter so that we will not come forward with a social ethic involving the use of force and coercion and political pressure of every kind and claim the authority of Jesus for it.

Our confusion is, of course, no worse than that of the conventional teachers of Christian ethics and theology who have a rather complacent attitude toward the present economic society and criticize us for violating the ethic of Jesus in our espousal of the class struggle, for instance. Our confusion is, in fact, not quite as bad as theirs. They have used every kind of exegetical device to prove that the teachings of Jesus are not incompatible with participation in nationalistic wars or, if they have been a little more clearheaded, they have found ethical justification for their actions by proving that the ethic of Jesus does not provide for the responsibilities of politics and economics, and therefore leaves them free to choose

a political strategy which is most consonant with their conception of the moral goodwill which they believe Jesus to idealize. The critics of the former type have no ground to stand upon at all when they accuse radical Christians of violating the ethic of Jesus; for participation in a nonviolent strike action, to choose an obvious example, is certainly not more incompatible with the ethic of Jesus than participation in an international conflict. Critics of the latter type have cut the ground for criticism from under their own feet. They admit that any responsible relationship to political and economic affairs involves compromise and they ought to have a difficult time proving that the assertion of national interest or the protection of national rights is more compatible with the perfectionist ideal of pure disinterestedness than the assertion of class interests and the protection of class rights.

But the confusion of our critics does not absolve us of the necessity of clear thought for ourselves. The struggle for social justice in the present economic order involves the assertion of rights, the rights of the disinherited, and the use of coercion. Both are incompatible with the pure love ethic found in the Gospels. How then do we justify the strategy of the "class struggle"? We simply cannot do so in purely Christian terms. There is in the absolute sense no such thing as "Christian socialism." We must justify ourselves by considerations of the social situation which we face and the human resources which are available for its solution. What we discover in the social situation is that human life in its group interests moves pretty much upon the basis of the economic interests of various groups. We realize that intelligence and spiritual and moral idealism may qualify economic interest but they do not destroy it. Whatever may be possible for individuals, we see no possibility of a group voluntarily divesting itself of its special privileges in society. Nor do we see a possibility of pure disinterestedness and the spirit of forgiveness on the part of an underprivileged group shaming a dominant group into an attitude of social justice. Such a strategy might possibly work in intimate personal relationships but it does not work in the larger group relations. The Negro has been forgiving in his subordinate position in society for a long time but he has not persuaded the white man to grant him larger privileges in society. Whatever place the industrial worker has won in society has been won by the assertion of his rights through his trade union organizations. Even the most imaginative urban dwellers lack the imagination to envisage the needs of the farmer. The farmer has been forced to exert political pressure for the attainment of even such minimum justice

as he is granted in the present economic organization of our country. No one who looks realistically at the social scene can fail to discover that economic, racial, and national groups stand on a moral level considerably lower than that of the most sensitive individuals. They are not easily persuaded to a voluntary sacrifice of privileges and an attitude of pure nonresistance on the part of those who suffer from their exactions does not produce the spirit of repentance among them. Intelligence, which may create a spirit of justice among individuals by persuading them to grant to their fellows what they claim for themselves, is generally not acute enough to function in a similar fashion in group relations. More frequently it does no more than to create rational sanctifications for special group interests. Only rarely does intellectual force rise high enough to create a perspective from which group prejudices and biases have been banished. The relations between groups are so indirect that the consequences of our actions in the life of another group are not easily discerned and we therefore continue in unethical conduct without the restraint upon our conscience which intimate personal relations create. Very few white men have any conception of the havoc which is wrought in the souls and upon the bodies of Negroes by prevailing race prejudices; and there is not one American in a million who knows what our reparations policy means for starving workers of Germany. This unhappy group seems under the necessity of asserting its interests not only against the rest of the world but against the more comfortable middle classes of their own country.

The social struggle involves a violation of a pure ethic of love not only in the assertion of rights but in the inevitable use of coercion. Here again one need but state the obvious; but the obvious is usually not recognized by academic moralists. No society can exist without the use of coercion, though every intelligent society will try to reduce coercion to a minimum and rely upon the factor of mutual consent to give stability to its institutions. Yet it can never trust all of its citizens to accept necessary social arrangements voluntarily. It will use police force against recalcitrant and anti-social minorities, and it will use the threat of political force against a complacent and indifferent group of citizens which could never be relied upon to initiate adequate social policies upon its own accord. No government can wait upon voluntary action on the part of the privileged members of a community for an adequate inheritance or income tax. It will use the political force created by the votes of the disinherited and less privileged to initiate and enforce taxation policies, designed to equalize privileges. Privileged groups may accept such legislation without violent

revolt but they will probably argue against its justice until the day of their death. An intelligent society will constantly strive toward the goal of a more equal justice by initiating a more rigorous policy just as soon as a previous and more tentative one has been accepted and absorbed into the social standards of the community. If this is not done by gradual process, with the unrealized goal of essential equality beckoning each generation to surpass the approximations of justice achieved in the past, the inequalities of the social order, always increasing through natural process, are bound to grow until an outraged sense of justice (probably spurred by actual physical want on the part of the least privileged members of a community) will produce a violent revolt. In such nations as Germany, for instance, it is really an open question whether any political measures can achieve the desired end of social justice quickly enough to prevent violent revolution.

The necessity of this kind of coercion, based upon the assertion of interest on the part of the less privileged, is such a clear lesson of history that one hesitates to belabor the point and would refrain from doing so were it not for the fact that half of the academic treatises on social ethics and Christian ethics were written as if no such necessity existed. In this respect secular moralists are frequently as naïve as religious ones. In the one case it is expected that a change in educational technique will eliminate the drive of self-interest which determines economic life and in the other case there is a naïve confidence in the possibility of changing human nature by religious conversion or religious inspiration. It is the thesis of the radical wing of Christian social theorists, whether in England, Germany or America, that nothing accomplished by either education or religious suasion will be able to abolish the social struggle. We believe that such hopes are corrupted by the sentimentalities of the comfortable classes and are caused by their lack of understanding of the realities of an industrial civilization. In what sense, then, may we call ourselves Christian or how do we hope to insinuate Christian and ethical values into the social struggle? The simplest answer is that we believe that the highest ethical and spiritual insight may mitigate the social struggle on the one hand and may transcend it on the other.

We believe that it makes some difference whether a privileged group makes a stubborn and uncompromising defense of its special privileges or whether it has some degree of social imagination and tries to view its privileges in the light of the total situation of a community. Education ought to create some of that social imagination, and in so far as it does, it

will mitigate the class struggle or the social struggle between races. The religious contribution to the same end may consist of various elements. Real religion produces the spirit of humility and repentance. It destroys moral conceit. Moral conceit is precisely what makes privileged groups so stubborn in the defense of their privileges. The human animal is just moral enough to be unable to act immorally with vigor if he cannot find a moral justification for his actions. If the Christian Church used the ethical ideal of Jesus, the ideal of pure disinterestedness, more rigorously, and if the modern pulpit made a more astute analysis of human motives in the light of this ideal, many of the rationalizations which now support the anti-social policies and attitudes of privileged and powerful people would be destroyed. At least they might be qualified. One of the most unfortunate facts about our contemporary moral situation is that the church has ceased to convict men of selfishness at the precise moment in history when human greed is more obvious and more dangerous than at any previous time. Nowhere has the liberal church played more false to its generation than in its optimistic and romantic interpretation of human nature, just when an industrial civilization revealed the drive of self-interest in all its anti-social power. The part of the Christian Church which has tried to convict the generation of sin knows too little about the problems of modern life to convict men of their significant sins. Thus religion has on the whole produced moral complacency rather than the spirit of repentance. The number of men who are sufficiently sensitized by religion actually to renounce their privileges must always remain small. But it ought not to be impossible for the church to create enough contrition and consciousness of human selfishness to prompt men to a more willing acceptance of and less stubborn resistance against social policies which aim at the restriction of power and privilege. If we dealt realistically with the facts of human nature we might be able to create an attitude of complacency toward increasing social restraint, based upon the realization that few, if any, of us are wise enough to restrain our expansive desires voluntarily in a degree sufficient for the needs of our highly interdependent society. If there were a better understanding of human nature in the church to-day, an understanding which we could acquire by the study of psychology and economics but which we might appropriate just as easily from the insights of great religion, there would be fewer Christian captains of industry who lived under the illusion that they were good enough and wise enough to hold irresponsible power and exercise it for the good of the community. They would know that the very possession of irresponsible power tempts to its

selfish use and that the benevolent pretensions of despotism rest either on unconscious self-deception or conscious hypocrisy.

True religion could mitigate the cruelties of the social struggle by its creation of the spirit of love as well as the spirit of repentance. The love ideal which Jesus incarnates may be too pure to be realized in life but it offers us nevertheless an ideal toward which the religious spirit may strive. All rational idealism creates a conflict between the mind and the impulses, as in Stoicism and Kantian morality. The mind conceives ideals of justice which it tries to force upon recalcitrant selfish impulses. Real religion transmutes the social impulses until they transcend the limits set them by nature (family, race, group, etc.) and include the whole human community. Real religious imagination is able, furthermore, to create an attitude of trust and faith toward human beings, in which the potentialities rather than the immediate realities are emphasized. Through such imagination the needs of the social foe are appreciated, his inadequacies are understood in the light of his situation, and his possibilities for higher and more moral action are recognized. Only the religious spirit which surveys the human scene from the perspective of its presuppositions about the character of life is thus able to disregard present facts and appeal to ultimate possibilities. The fact that in Jesus the spirit of love flowed out in emulation of God's love, without regard to social consequences, cannot blind the eye to the social consequences of a religiously inspired love. If modern religion were really producing it, it would mitigate the evils of the social struggle. It would, to emphasize the obvious once more, not abolish the social struggle, because it would not approximate perfection in sufficiently numerous instances. The fight for justice in society will always be a fight. But wherever the spirit of justice grows imaginative and is transmuted into love, a love in which the interests of the other are espoused, the struggle is transcended by just that much.

It is the fashion among many Christian idealists to criticize the political movements of the disinherited for the spirit of hatred which they generate. The church, so it is said, would espouse their cause much more readily if the spirit of love were manifest in it. What the church fails to realize is that its responsibility is chiefly for the moral and spiritual attitudes of the privileged rather than the disinherited; for it is the former who makes professions of Christian idealism. If the church wants to insinuate the spirit of love into the social struggle it ought to begin with the privileged groups not only because it has greater responsibility for them but because those who hold entrenched positions in the social struggle are obviously

under the greater obligation to be imaginative in gauging the needs and discounting the limitations of those who suffer from social injustice. The perfectionist ethic of Jesus allows for no such distinctions; for it demands that love be poured forth whether or not we suffer from injustice. But no one can avow such an ethic from the vantage point of privilege and security. If the portion of society which benefits from social inequality and which is endangered by a rising tide of social discontent, attempts to counsel love, forgiveness and patience to the discontented it will convict itself of hypocrisy, except it is able first of all to reveal fruits of the Spirit, which it commends, in its own life. Even if it were to reveal some fruits, but too meager to justify a more trusting and a less vehement attitude on the part of the underprivileged, its moral ideals would be regarded as pretensions. The race situation in the South offers interesting commentary upon this point. The fine work which the interracial commission has done has failed to preserve the respect of the more eager young Negroes for it because they feel that through its efforts of conciliation white men have yielded only inconsequential social advantages in order that they may hold their major ones. The most perfect love may not ask for social justification but any love within the capacity of ordinary men and groups does. The disinherited will have their spirits corrupted by hatred and their policies tainted with violence except they are able to detect some genuinely ethical elements in the policies of the privileged and entrenched social groups. If the spirit of love is to qualify and mitigate the social struggle the groups which profess to believe in the efficacy of love and who, at the same time, have favored positions in society are clearly under obligation to introduce this Christian element in society. They may be quite sure that any solid ethical achievement among them would result in practically immediate ethical reactions of trust and faith among those who are trying to advance socially. Only the faith and trust of the advancing group will not and ought never rise to the point where purely voluntary action toward equality is expected. A degree of ethical insight on the part of the whole community will not abolish the necessity of social conflict, but it may prevent violence and reduce the hatred which must inevitably arise when the disinherited are faced not only with the stubborn greed of the powerful and comfortable social classes but also with the protection of their privileges by the covert use of force and their hypocritical pretension of virtue.

A Christian ethical idealism which espouses the cause of proletarian groups and identifies itself with their political movements is, in short, as pure as any Christian movement which assumes a responsible attitude

toward society. The compromises which it makes with the pure Christian ethic are inevitable compromises which everyone must make who deals with the social problem from the perspective of society rather than that of the individual. It might claim, in addition, to appropriate the Christian ethical ideal more closely than a type of thought which fears contamination in the social struggle. For the social struggle is a reality in society and we will be contaminated by it except we get out of society. The ascetic may possibly have a vantage point from which to criticize the ethical purity of Christian socialism or Christian radicalism. Those who stay in society have not. If our critics were less confused about the moral and social realities of modern society they would know that neutrality in a social struggle between entrenched and advancing social classes really means alliance with the entrenched position. In the social struggle we are either on the side of privilege or need. No ethical perfectionism can save us from that choice.

The Recovery of the Soul

HERBERT ALDEN YOUTZ

Our Realistic Civilization

DOES American civilization contain the elements of permanence? Does our Western culture justify optimism for the future? To many thoughtful men and women there are ominous portents in the life of to-day. These can be read in our dominant interests, in our characteristic ideals of life, in the things we value most and for which we sacrifice. For, after all, it is a nation's philosophy of life's values that determines its destiny. Is our efficient civilization keyed to the production of permanent values? There are prophets who feel that disaster awaits us if we do not heed the plain signs of the times, and radically change our course. Our cultural philosophy is unsound. There are premonitions that civilization is cracking.

The universal financial panic and the frantic efforts to conceal our dismay and to bring about normalcy are symptoms of moral failure, a dizzy slipping of spiritual foundations that threatens to engulf civilization in chaos. There are mental and moral ideals which have been neglected. There are signs of structural weakness and decay. The moral soul of our civilization is failing.

For we are a race of realists. We have left the Victorian Age of idealism behind us. We are hard-boiled. We dare to look grim reality in the face and challenge the gods of Things as they Are to treat us rough. We have no illusions. This is the modern temper. Nietzsche is our hero prophet; Jesus was a weakling. We only ask to be led to Reality. We ask no pity, no tenderness, above all no idealistic sympathy. We are deceived by no sentiment. We affect to be supermen strong enough to endure whatever can happen to us. If we fall we shall go down crying for more! Science is our gospel. We trust nothing but Facts!

And yet this heroic pose is not convincing. It reflects logical juggling rather than experience of reality. The history of philosophy is strewn with the graves of logical systems which failed to reckon with experience. Meanwhile men are deeply longing for a philosophy which sympathetically understands life's experiences and is able to bring inner peace. Realism is the philosophy that led us into the Great War; is it too much to hope that Idealism may establish the Great Peace?

The debate between idealism and realism is as old as the history of

reflective thought. The contest began with Plato and Aristotle. It is an irrepressible conflict which must be fought anew by every man and every generation. Shall we be controlled by what is or by what ought to be? Shall we live for the invisible or for the visible? Shall we live by faith or by science? The debate of philosophies reveals a tragic dilemma, the most significant issue that men and civilizations ever face.

The Rise of Personality

The issue of the debate rests upon our estimate of personality. Is a person a machine or a creative agent? In order to appreciate the dimensions of personality and the significance of the personal world, it is profitable to review the story of human origins.

The origin of the human race in the natural world is an event which in significance and mystery transcends all other biological facts. The appearance of personality is a revolutionary fact. For the law of all organic development is that the individual obeys the law of the species. But the law of human growth reverses this organic principle. The human individual transcends the control of the species, invents new patterns of growth, transforms the character of the species itself and builds a new world of experience. A man rises from the plane of instinctive behavior to the plane of purposive conduct, from the plane of automatic response to environment to the plane of responsibility. He discovers the authority of a gradually emerging inner ideal as the guide to understanding and mastery. This inner tribunal of insight and conduct transcends all external authorities. The depth and breadth of human life is measured by the fullness and richness of this interior experience which constitutes a man's psychic nature. This active, creative idealizing power to deal with life is the characteristic mark of personality, the new fact of the human species.¹ This is the secret of a man's ability to appreciate truth, goodness, and beauty, and to make the adventurous search for life's values and meanings. This is the beginning of nobility and character. In the cultivation and discipline of these idealizing powers fullness of life is gained. In the neglect of these powers life sinks to organic, mechanical dimensions. In the organization and unification of experience under the authority of these inner sanctions a man achieves self-consciousness, self-control, self-possession, freedom.

A modern social theorist describes the dramatic birth of personality thus: "The only full and final object of all endeavor upon earth is the

¹ Cf. Sabatier's *Religions of Authority and the Religion of the Spirit*. Introduction.

development of the human soul. . . . Something of unprecedented greatness can and must take place: something that in the life of a people corresponds to the awakening manhood in the individual. In every conscious existence there comes a moment when the living being is no longer determined but begins to determine himself; when he takes over responsibility from the surrounding powers, in order to shoulder it for himself; when he no longer accepts the forces that guide him, but creates them; when he no longer receives but freely chooses the values, ideals, aims and authorities whose validity he will admit; when he begets out of his own being the relations with the divine which he means to serve."²

This mind-world of inner experience cannot be identified with the organic world in which a man finds himself without falsifying experience itself. The rise of the individual above the species marks an epochal change of nature. It is the beginning of a new order of life, the psychical or spiritual. Inner control takes on increasing significance. A biological species is evolving into a race of idealizing persons. Automatic, organic processes are evolving into autonomous, purposive activities of mind. Instinctive conformity to mechanical forces is evolving into interior powers of deliberative self-control. The organic determinism of the species is supplemented by a higher energy—the reflective self-determinism of the individual person. The organic unit becomes an organizer with transcendent psychic energies. All of the characteristic data of personal life imply an energizing center, a responsible spiritual ego, who thinks, organizes and unifies. Personality is a unique fact which forbids classification in an organic scheme. The deepest evidence of the reality of this unique psychical entity is the witness of self-consciousness, the inner witness of experience. Testimony to the creative idealizing energies of the psychic factor are found in every sphere of human activity.

The World of Values

These idealizing activities of the mind constitute the technique by means of which we deal with reality in every sphere of understanding. Science projects its ideals of unity and system upon the pluralistic world of experience, and brings the facts into harmony with the patterns of the mind. It formulates hypotheses and by experimentation verifies or corrects its hypotheses. It invents ethers and atoms and protons, invisible entities, to account for the perceived phenomena and their behavior. Beyond

² Walther Rathenau, whose idealistic social philosophy was the inspiration of Stresemann. Cf. *The New Society*.

the seen and the known it affirms an unseen world of reality on the authority of its inner ideals. Science builds upon assumptions and formulates theories whose sole warrant is the mind's ideal demands for rational unity, completeness and system. Confidence in scientific truth rests upon confidence in our mental activities. All our truth comes through our generalizing, idealizing powers of mind.

But the mind holds other clues to truth than those furnished by natural science. Like Admiral Byrd, steering for the unknown pole, we are able from new altitudes of experience to chart new mountain ranges of truth, new territories of reality. Our experiences of beauty and goodness and worth and meaning also become clues to an ideal world of spiritual values. Our ethical and religious and æsthetic consciousness brings us into deeper contact with the heart of reality than does our scientific consciousness.

Thus the eager human spirit goes ever deeper into life, laying hold of new forms of truth, discovering new worlds of reality, guided always by the mind's living ideals. In all these spheres of life, mankind is daily creating a dramatic experience of order and law and beauty, of worth and love, of duty and character. We believe that thus we are dealing with the deepest nature of the world: and we make this dramatic pattern of life authoritative over life and society. The world that ought to be becomes the authoritative pattern for the life that now is. In this moral drama of experience men rise above the sense world of description and dwell in a world of appreciation. They transcend the world of organic relations and live in the ideal world of spiritual fellowship and co-operation. They build spiritual civilizations, new social orders, new kingdoms of God, founded upon justice and peace and love. And it is as citizens of this world of the mind that mankind finds its deepest energies, its fullest satisfactions and joys, and the supreme motives for achievement.

The supreme moral adventure is the quest for human worth, the building of a new world of worthwhile men. Religion, too, follows the vision of the worth and meaning of life as a whole, and affirms a kingdom of God encompassing and sustaining the life of humanity. This vision is leading the race upward—the lure of a new earth that is building in which shall dwell a new humanity.

But can we trust the authority of our ideals? Shall we rather trust the realities of organism and mechanism? Shall we live by our faiths or by sight? Shall we live by the authority of our ideals or by the authority of the "facts," by what is or by what ought to be? Shall we be idealists or realists? Here is the tragic motive at the heart of the great decision

in every man's life. To inject skepticism here seems like treason to the race.

The Falsification of Experience

This idealistic estimate of human experience is discredited to-day by a widely prevalent realistic type of philosophy. The Modern Temper, formed in dealing with the organic world of mechanically working forces, discredits the reality of conscious personal energies. It affirms that psychical forces are illusory or that they are reducible to mechanical forms. Personality and its data must be reduced to scientific dimensions of automatically working processes of cause and effect. The human world must be regarded simply as an aspect of cosmic determinism. A personal act is no more significant than any cosmic process.

The consequence of this prevalent mood is skepticism of human values and distrust of autonomous personal energies. This is the mood of naturalism or scientific monism, the denial of the significance of the personal world, the reduction of the moral and religious consciousness to illusion and futility.

The tyranny of this obsession of philosophic method is the chief cause of the spiritual insecurity of society to-day. The dogmatism of a one-sided method is producing chronic blindness to the truths that set men free. For this type of philosophy not only falsifies experience, but it destroys the very foundations of belief by destroying our confidence in experience itself.

The consequence of the literal application of naturalistic thinking to human life is to dehumanize it. It denies and destroys all those aspects which make life human in order to make the human data fit the categories of determinism. The application of these mechanistic categories logically destroys all rational life as well as the ethical and religious life, and creates skepticism of human effort. Consciousness makes no difference in the course of events; intelligence has no control. "Mechanical science thus leads to fatalism; to the extinction of all stimulus to effort, of all man's attempts to guide the course of events." "Ideas, ideals, purposes, beliefs—all that is mental—are left without function in the scheme of things." Thus does H. S. Jennings, eminent biologist, protest against "that monstrous absurdity that has so long been a reproach to biological science; the doctrine that ideas, ideals, purposes have no effect on behavior."³

In the fields of psychology and the social sciences this method of dis-

³ Cf. *Science*, January 14, 1927.

regarding the testimony of conscious experience and explaining human life solely in terms of organic determinism is frequently employed. The result is psychological methods which are avowedly zoological, physiological, behavioristic interpretations based solely on the methods of organic biology. Social theories too are quite commonly controlled by the mechanistic assumption of Comte or Marx, that society is purely a social organism to be controlled "scientifically."

This philosophy of human life has been widely popularized in current literature and authoritatively broadcast as "the scientific" account of human life which supersedes all idealistic interpretation. A typical recent essay⁴ starts out with the assumption that "Science" has superseded all other methods of understanding. Science alone deals with reality. It proceeds to show that most of the ideals of the race fail to qualify by the scientific test, and must be abandoned as superstitions. Religion, morality, romantic love are now seen to be illusions which science has dispelled. They do not deal with reality, but are protective devices which we fabricate by our imagination to make the hard mechanical realities of life endurable. They are color devices produced by our fears. So all illusions of worth and meaning and love must be discounted as fallacies in a world where science has emancipated us from superstition. Our precious traditions of honor and nobility, our legacy of lofty purposes and motives and achievement, heroic self-sacrifice, the call of the prophets—these are empty illusions of grandeur that have no relation to reality. They cannot stand the white light of science. That millions of men have lived *as though* the drama of human life really meant something—this is the tragic fallacy!

If we must drink poison it is simply splendid to drink it dignifiedly and superbly, speaking of philosophy as did Socrates! But the difficulty with these poisonous doctrines of materialism is that the philosophers go on living as though their doctrines were not true, while their unsuspecting friends trustfully imbibe the poison falsely labelled "Science." This type of thinking is producing a civilization "disillusioned" of the convictions which make human life great and progressive and triumphant. Can a naturalistic philosophy which undermines and destroys the higher life of society be a true philosophy? Shall the test of the truth of our philosophies of life be the logic of a limited method or the kind of life which they produce? Any doctrine which debauches our consciousness of moral values and destroys our ideals of the worth of personality, falsifies the testimony of consciousness and degrades humanity.

⁴ *The Modern Temper*, by Joseph Wood Krutch.

The Disintegration of Morality

The subtle fallacy that is shaping our contemporary thought is the assumption that science holds the key to the deepest understanding of personal life. The most ominous portent of coming disaster is that we are gradually exchanging our trust in the idealizing moral energies of the mind for trust in mechanically working organism. Our philosophies of human responsibility and moral creativeness are giving way before the naturalistic doctrines of determinism. The present social crisis grows out of a degraded estimate of the dimensions of the personal soul and the discrediting of the testimony of the moral consciousness. We are abandoning hard-won spiritual achievements of the race and retreating upon the organic basis of life. Is not this skepticism of humanity a betrayal of the moral consciousness of mankind!

Our major ethical problems to-day reveal the paralyzing influence of the naturalistic culture. You cannot build a spiritual civilization upon a debased estimate of personality and humanity. It is hypocrisy to use the language of the spiritual life, if we deny the dynamic reality of spiritual ideals. We may not invoke the soul and at the same time deny the soul. Society is always quick to detect insincerity. Unbelief is moral paralysis, and that is our mortal malady. The symptoms of it lie all about us.

Human life is cheap; violence and murder and crime abound. Reverence for personality and the worth of men are motives that do not function in the naturalistic consciousness.

Marriage is no longer sacred, divorces are common. "Love is a sort of obscene joke." Sexual relations are promiscuously exploited. Licentiousness supplies the thrill of much modern fiction and drama. For we are a sophisticated age and know that the organic functions of life constitute its real meaning!

There is colossal corruption in politics and in the courts and in city administration. Can you expect honor and justice in a society which has a debased estimate of human relations, which is "teaching its conscience to trot in the rut of events"?⁵

There is incredible callousness in industry and selfishness in business relations. But if human values are illusions, what are our motives for conserving these values?

There is the problem of war. Is not the militarist philosophy of force

⁵ Cf. Stuart P. Sherman's *On Contemporary Literature*.

the inevitable expression of a naturalistic estimate of humanity, an economic estimate of society?

In short, we are engaged in building an economic civilization. Profit and not worth is fast becoming our goal and our god. Our ethical ideas are those of competition, barter and gain. We are controlled by an economic morality.⁶ For example, drink and drugs are the great destroyers of humanity, whose casualties are more frightful than those of war. Our age is dealing with the evil as a political and economic issue with little sense of the moral problem involved, the problem of human worth and waste.

One cannot doubt that the mood of naturalism is hardening our civilization, justifying the brutal, dulling the high sense of responsibility, reverence, respect, justice and the higher human sentiments. If our idealisms are illusions and our moral consciousness a futility, if our dreams of worth and honor are only dreams, then they have no authority over life. Men are swayed by their beliefs. Corrupt or paralyze their beliefs and you demoralize conduct. This is an age of moral disintegration. Our philosophies are corrupting the conscience.

The gross immoralities of society are not as terrifying as is our increasing moral insensibility and blindness. The inwardness of our spiritual insight is too often overlooked. If the light that is in us becomes darkness, how great is that darkness! If we confuse and destroy the inward moral judgments of worth, we are tampering with the motives which give human life significance and nobility. If our moral culture fails us, we are losing the soul of humanity. This means lapse into secularism, a civilization which "makes lust and law alike to take away the blame"! The repudiation of morality means the ruin of civilization.

Salvation by Faith

Our philosophies are lacking in moral insight and moral earnestness. For a thousand years the church was under the tyranny of the rationalisms of the philosophers. It has come to-day under the tyranny of a new rationalism, the rationalism of science. We are living in a mood of explanation and criticism. Much of our educational theory assumes that analysis and explanation constitute the highest task of the mind. In this mood, the life of the spirit does not flourish. In this atmosphere the great spiritual values of mankind are neglected or have an arid and starved existence. This seems to be the root of the threatened

⁶ Cf. Harry Ward's arraignment of *Our Economic Morality*.

debacle of society. We are not living with the whole of our lives. We are facing spiritual starvation. There are depths of experience, profound resources of personal energies that are not functioning. The recovery of this fullness of life is the remedy for our shallow, devastating culture. The great need is for a re-evaluation of personality in terms of its deeper regenerative energies.

There is an old-fashioned remedy for regenerating the failing life of society—Salvation by Faith. As a tonic and bread of life to resuscitate and sustain the human spirit, the therapeutic value of faith has been the characteristic message of all major prophets of the race. They have sought to arouse in men visions of faith—trust in their moral ideals.

Faith was one of the great words of Jesus. In the New Testament sense, faith means trust in the deeper, idealizing powers of personality, the awakening of the profounder experiences that motivate and energize heroic action. It is in action that men find their dynamic philosophy of life and the victory that overcomes the world. It is in mobilizing the inner riches of the spirit, that we can meet the threatening spiritual bankruptcy of the times.

The effective answer to the prevailing skepticism can be found only in cultivating those human experiences in which every great age has found its highest sense of reality and truth. The affirmation of a profounder moral experience is the only final answer to the skeptical philosophy—the facing of theory with an irreducible fact. A faith in humanity which cannot be overthrown is the only defense against a doctrine that nature is the only reality. Just as science operates with the presupposition of the indefeasible experience of the reality with which it is concerned, so must any convincing spiritual philosophy of life operate on the foundation of an indefeasible experience of spiritual reality. The supine plight of civilization to-day is due primarily to the failure of the churches and moral leadership to deal with reality. Leadership which deals chiefly with the authority of the spiritual realities of the past and quotes shibboleths and formulas that have lost all meaning and convincing power must turn frankly to the experimental method. Churches must become spiritual laboratories. Naturalism can be refuted only on the basis of compelling moral experiences. No popular modernizer of methods and technique in the conduct of church services or in religious education can restore living faith. That is a matter of leading men through the higher levels of moral experience to the reality of God. In the religious experience of life's values is born a confident belief which logic does not found and which it cannot overturn.

The major premise of all enduring philosophy and of all great living is trust in life itself—the loyal acceptance of life. The enterprise of living—living fully and greatly—is the supreme human vocation. All philosophy and all education must be judged ultimately by their effect upon the fullness of human life and experience. Philosophy itself is instrumental to life. The common denominator of all worthy human effort must be the practical aim to produce a better humanity. This is our imperative spiritual stewardship. This is the standard of all moral measurement of conduct—*Does it bless society?* No science or art or philosophy is wholly worthy which violates this moral axiom upon which life rests. A theory or a deed which impoverishes or wastes life must be ultimately adjudged as false. Life must be accepted as a trust to be invested, an opportunity for achieving human values, not as a field for the exploitation of logic. Faith in life conditions all explanations of life. It is in our profounder experiences of faith that we discover the worth of men, their sonship to God, the brotherhood of humanity. It is in living by faith that men are saved.

Religion as a Social Control

GEORGE H. BETTS

THE part of religion in the control of human conduct is a problem as old as human nature, whose final solution will not be reached until man has finished his evolution. This problem is urgently pressing at the present time. The whole world is in a state of confusion, turmoil, and revolution. We are to-day reaping the whirlwind of incredible stupidity, blindness, and greed on the part of many nations. Fear, misery and desperation threaten the very sanity of civilization.

In our own country we have suffered incalculably in our spiritual morale. We have cast off moral sanctions which were the fruit of long social experience. We have come to tolerate and complacently take for granted the breakdown of moral codes that will require generations to rebuild. The Wickersham Report does not make good reading. Our prisons are overcrowded, much of our judicial and police system is known to be corrupt. Big and little business, seeking unfair privilege, makes a business of undertaking to buy legislatures and courts. Racketeers prey on legitimate enterprise, crime flourishes unrebuked in our cities.

Now this is all an old story, a dark picture. My purpose is to call attention to what such conditions mean for the young, for whom this abnormal situation is the social matrix in which they must develop. In the large, there is no escaping the influence of social environment. In the mass, the individual is at the mercy of the society into which he is born. The young of this generation have more intellectual stimulus, better training of mental and manual skills, more mechanical devices within their control than any other generation that has ever lived. But I have a notion that never before in the history of civilization was it so difficult to develop sound character as it is to-day.

I thought of that the other day as I stood looking at the 2,500 boys at the Pontiac Reformatory. What a tragic waste of man-power, of opportunity, of happiness! It would take a closer observer than myself to see in most of these boys anything different from thousands of other boys in our schools and on our streets. A little farther back in their lives, at least, these boys were no different. The germ plasm from which they came was the same, their bodies, their brains and their intelligence represent an average of our population. But something went wrong in their environment and training. Their ideals were not reached, their ambition was not

directed, their loyalties were not commanded by great purposes and persons. It is not these boys who have failed, but their families, their schools, their churches, society—we who in the aggregate have had them in charge. We have not applied to them the right forces of social control.

So we might take the 200,000 boys and girls in reform schools throughout the country and the same principle holds. The tens of thousands of boys and girls in our cities and towns and the country who have in them infinite capacities either for good or evil are now taking their impress from their social environment and teaching as clay takes its form from the potter who shapes it on the wheel. It is so also with the twenty-five million boys and girls who go to our schools and who constitute the assets and liabilities of society in the years that lie next ahead. What can we do for them, what is the responsibility of this group for their outcome? Using the words of our topic, how can we make religion do its part as a social control in their lives?

In speaking of religion and its control we should distinguish between two broad aspects—*institutionalized* religion and *personal* religion. Institutionalized religion expresses itself through churches, sects, ecclesiastical organizations. Personal religion has to do with the inner experience and outward conduct of the individual in his daily contacts with his group.

These two aspects are of course vitally related, but the total problem is far too broad for a single discussion. I shall therefore speak primarily of personal religion, leaving for another occasion the social control exercised by institutionalized religion. The only true social control, after all, is a control which works through enlightened free individuals whose motives are reached by the source of control.

No recent observer or worker in the field of religious education has failed to be impressed by the distinct change of emphasis designed to make religion a more effective force in conduct and character. This demand finds expression not only in educational theory, but in the curriculum, in instruction and in current religious publications, conferences and conventions.

This new emphasis that demands a character outcome from religion springs from many causes. One is the general breakdown of moral sanctions and the growing prevalence of lawlessness and crime. Another is the shift from the old orthodoxy in religion with a change of stress from salvation for a future life to concern for the life that now is. A third cause is the influence and example of the public school with its rapidly developing program of character education. Then there is under way also a changing

concept of the meaning and nature of religion, which is making out of it a manner of living rather than a set of forms and observances.

Many are the factors which enter into the shaping of a life, and many are the forms of control which direct its development. The *home* is the greatest factor of all. The Wickersham Commission shows that of over 18,000 young delinquents committed to penal institutions in a six months' period less than one out of four was living at home when the crime was committed, and that of this homeless group 72 per cent were under seventeen years of age and 26 per cent under fourteen. At Pontiac Reformatory and Saint Charles School in Illinois are over 3,000 boys who have made a bad start in life. Of this group over half come from broken homes.

After the home comes the school as a formative influence on those who remain with it long enough to receive its impress. But even with our compulsory education laws many evade the school. The other day I stood looking over a roomful of boys in the Reformatory who ought to have been completing the high school, but who were actually doing the work of the fourth grade. Some failure had occurred in social controls farther back and they had lost out, not only in education but in character.

Acting also on every life is that great elusive and relentless force that the Germans call the *Zeitgeist*, the spirit of the times, the integrated and living total of all the influences that flood in upon the individual from the social environment. This includes the ruling social code, the passions and prejudices, the effective ideals and ideas which reflect the throbbing life of the day. From such varied influences young life takes much of its quality and tone.

Traditionally religion has been given a foremost place among the powerful influences which combine to shape character. Most of us believe that religion, in spite of all its past failures, can be a great and powerful instrument for the conditioning of human conduct and the upbuilding of life. I subscribe most heartily to that belief; and yet I must reluctantly add that I fear we are not at the present time making of religion the constructive and transforming power it might be. We are not, I think, making religion an effective social control in America. I am forced to this conclusion by several inescapable lines of evidence.

1. First is the testimony of many well-informed churchmen. I recently asked 1,000 ministers, directors of religious education, professors in colleges and seminaries, overhead workers, leading laymen, to answer this question: *Do our churches to-day teach and preach a religion that can*

effectively influence conduct and character? Three hundred of them replied in letters, many of which were full of intense concern. Here is a summary of their answers (remember the question is: Do our churches to-day teach and preach a religion that can effectively influence conduct and character?):

GROUP	YES	NO	QUALIFIED
	%	%	%
Ministers (53).....	28	45	27 (72)
Directors of religious education (33).....	28	36	36 (72)
Members of overhead organizations (45).....	27	20	53 (73)
Professors in colleges and seminaries (86).....	29	34	37 (71)
Laymen active in the church (31).....	25	50	25 (75)
Combined total.....	28	36	36 (72)

My point here is not, of course, that the opinions of these churchmen, distinguished as many of them are, establish the case against religion as a social control. It is rather that if these men and women fairly represent the Christian Church (and I think they do fairly represent the forward-looking section of the church), then the church itself has little confidence in the religion of our pulpits and classrooms as a factor in shaping conduct and character. Whatever may be the contributions of religion (and it certainly makes contributions other than ethical), these leaders do not believe religion is to-day an important force in determining conduct. *And surely if the workers in any program do not themselves believe in that program it can hardly succeed in any large way.*

2. The second type of evidence that leads me to question the effectiveness of present-day religion as a character-forming influence comes from research and experiment.

The thorough and extensive studies in conduct and character which have been carried on by Professors Hartshorne and May are known to us all. Many hundreds of children of various ages and types, coming from different kinds of social environment, have been investigated. In briefest form, some few of their findings are these:

From extensive tests given many children in such traits as cheating and copying in school work, telling lies about their own achievements, taking unfair advantage of others, etc., no relation was found between such conduct and the number of years of Sunday-school attendance. Non-attendants made quite as good a record as regular attendants from the same community. True, these few traits do not constitute all of character, but they

are important, and what holds for them is at least likely to hold for other traits as well.

Character traits investigated by the same men among other groups of children were: kindness and helpfulness, loyalty to their group, generosity, self-control; positive traits, to set against the negative traits of the preceding tests. Here again no relation to Sunday-school attendance was found, or so slight a relation as to be negligible. In fact, the correlation of moral knowledge with Sunday-school attendance was slightly negative. In one high-grade neighborhood it was found that those who never attended Sunday school made a better score on the character tests than those who attended somewhat regularly.

3. Professor Hightower in a study of the relation of biblical knowledge to character and conduct found no relationship between knowledge of the Bible and such traits as honesty and co-operation. A group of delinquent boys included in his study passed biblical tests with higher marks than did normal boys.

4. Dr. G. R. Mursell, psychologist for the Ohio State Department of Public Welfare, has recently made an extensive study of the relation of religious training to delinquency. His manuscript is, I think, not yet published, but I have had the privilege of reading it. He found that some 700 delinquent boys whom he investigated had had slightly more church-school training than an equal number of non-delinquent boys of the same general social environment; and that the delinquents passed a test in religious information with higher marks than did the non-delinquent group. Only in the one single test of social attitudes did the non-delinquent boys excel the delinquents.

Professor Goodwin Watson may go somewhat beyond the degree of positiveness justified by the few researches which have been carried out in this field, but he has the present weight of evidence on his side when he says: "Scientific investigations have revealed beyond any reasonable doubt that people given the religious training now common in homes and churches do not develop characters superior in the ordinary virtues to persons without such training."

I bring these negative points before you not to discredit religion or to express any lack of confidence in it; but we cannot ignore such evidence. I have already said I believe we have available in religion the greatest potential agency for the shaping of character and the uplifting of society which humanity possesses. But in view of such evidence as I have quoted

and other evidences I have not taken the time to mention, I am forced to the conclusion that we are not doing our part as leaders, teachers and preachers in interpreting religion and teaching it to others. Something is the matter.

Now if religion is potentially the dynamic and the norm for character which we have believed, and if on the other hand it actually is exerting as little influence over personal conduct as our evidence implies, then it behooves us to discover what is the matter and what the remedy.

As a first step in diagnosis and treatment, I think we need a new philosophy of religion and religious education. *It is the business of philosophy to set goals.* This it does by discovering to us the values which give purpose and direction to effort; and by setting before us the ends which quicken aspiration and make striving worth while. Knowledge of the physical universe and mastery over its forces have made marvelous progress in the present generation. Scientific thought has daringly pushed back its horizons. Not only has religious thought failed to keep pace, but it is now in a state of confusion and indecision such as it has not known before since the Protestant Reformation. Religion needs a new philosophy.

There are so many things of which we are no longer sure that we do not know how to proceed. Many preachers, even, are not sure; teachers are not sure. Some decades ago we *were* sure: The nature of religion was then fully defined in the doctrines and creeds which we accepted without question. The function of religion was then to get us saved for a future life. This we were taught from the cradle to the grave and we did not question or doubt it. Now the old orthodoxy has passed away, doctrines and creeds possess little authority. Last week I had a request to write an article on the topic, "Substitutes for Hell." Fear has largely disappeared, and most of us were not sorry to see it go. But Protestantism has lost some of its most precious infallibles and has found nothing adequate to take their place.

First went the infallible Bible. Its science became poetry, its history became myth and now some are questioning its spiritual validity. Next went the infallible church and with it the infallible, or next to infallible, clergy. And both are now admittedly on the defensive.

Going deeper yet, our modern temper has led us to question the infallibility of Jesus as formerly understood. This trend is shown in a study which I made not long since of the beliefs of the clergy. While 71 per cent of older ministers of my group believe in the virgin birth, only 25

per cent of theological students so believe. While 70 per cent of the ministers believe that Jesus' death on the cross was the one act making possible the remission of sin, only 29 per cent of theological students so believe. Less than half of the students believe that Jesus actually rose from the dead with a physical body, but 84 per cent of older ministers believe this claim. So I might go on, but even these few items show that some long-accepted infallibles are disappearing.

The infallible God, even, is not above question by the relentless modern mind. Many to whom a generation ago God was the great *I Am*, the same yesterday, to-day and to-morrow, the personal deity who numbers the very hairs of our heads, are now no longer quite so sure. One teacher of religion recently said to me, "The universe, life itself, tells me there must be a God—but personal? I wish I could believe it." In modern circles when we speak of God we use such terms as Creative Evolution, Dynamic Law, Integrated Ideals, Order of Existence, Interaction between Individuals.

Probably most, certainly some, of these changes in faith were inevitable in the light of modern knowledge. But such changes must be reckoned with and proper readjustments made if religion is not to suffer. We need a new interpretation of religion in the light of present-day knowledge, thought and problems. We need this more than we need almost anything else. We need a religion with some positives in it.

But the positives which we seek can never again be the positives of authority alone. The spirit of the present age is to question, to examine, to prove—and to reject what will not stand the test. *And this must be the spirit and method of our new philosophy of religion and religious education.*

One of the positives we must have is certainty of God. Without that religion cannot exist, let alone being a conduct control. And the best way to be positive about God is by the testimony of personal experience. If the God-presence is felt; if this presence strengthens courage, purpose and aspiration; if it reconstructs and elevates ideals; if it helps in times of decision and temptation; if it makes more certain the doing of right acts and the avoidance of wrong acts—if the felt presence of God works with us in these ways, then we have sufficiently established the first great positive of our religion. And if, through any adverse circumstance of training or choice, we fail to find God by this test, the reciting of creeds and articles of faith will have little effect. I should therefore make the personal dis-

covery of God the first problem for our new philosophy of religious education and the first condition for making religion a social control.

By this same test of experience also we can satisfy ourselves about Jesus. Says Doctor Tittle in a sermon: "There are many things we should like to know about Jesus, but there is really only one thing we *must* know: *Was he right?* Was he right in his teachings and in his philosophy of life? The only safe answer to this question, as to the question about God, is to be found in the laboratory of experience. Put at work Jesus' philosophy of life, his teachings about peacemakers and about the value of righteousness; and watch the results in the personalities which are produced and in the social order which evolves.

And who knows but that the failure of the old orthodoxy and the discarding of authority which have so confused us may open the way to a religion of personal experience which will transcend anything that Christianity has yet known!

The new philosophy of religion and religious education must not only reveal to us the nature and purpose of religion; it must also show how as teachers and preachers we can so unfold its nature and purpose to the young that they will build its spirit daily into the growing structure of their lives.

Jesus once explained that the way to lose a life was to try to save it, and that the way to save a life was to be willing to lose it in a great purpose. Applying this method, we can best teach religion by not teaching it. What in the main we have in the past taught as religion has been what Santayana called *secondary* as against *primary* religion. We have gathered the young and taken them to the church saying, "Children, this is religion; going to God's house is religion." We have taught them verses of the Bible, told them stories of Joseph in Egypt, and of David in his bout with Goliath, and have said, "This is religion." We have had them recite the creed and perhaps bits of the catechism, we have explained to them the meaning of the sacraments and said to them, "Children, this is religion."

I would not be misunderstood on this point. I am not objecting to taking children to the church; that is mainly what the church is for. I am not finding fault with acquainting the children and youth with the Bible or even, when they have reached a proper age, teaching them the creed of their church; our churchmen know all too little about either. My point is that these things are not religion, but at best only helps toward religion. Instead of being *ends*, as we so often make them, they are but *means* to

an end which we often leave obscure. The way to teach religion is *not to teach religion but to direct life*. Religion is not the Bible, the church, the creeds or the sacraments; it is living experience permeated by the consciousness of God, and motivated by intelligent good will toward others.

Guided by our new philosophy of religious education we will, then, henceforth make the conduct and character outcome our primary objective in teaching religion; we have never done so as a Christian Church. No principle is better grounded in education than this, that *only the objectives which are consciously sought and definitely planned for are attained in any measurable degree*. This principle must find expression not only in the printed curriculum, but in the training of teachers and their supervision. Especially must it find expression in the classroom, where instruction finally succeeds or fails as it impinges on the young.

In this discussion I have expressed the conviction that religion is potentially a powerful factor for the shaping of conduct and character—an effective instrument for social control. I have said also, giving evidence for my conclusions, that we seem at present not to be succeeding even reasonably well in making religion perform its normative function. As a step toward remedying such defects as may exist, I have suggested that we need a new philosophy of religion which will give us a clearer insight into its meaning and its function in our lives.

Then to match this new philosophy we shall need also what is essentially *a new psychology of religious education*. Our present psychology of religious education has done too nearly what the psychology of general education has done—devoted itself to easy and relatively unimportant things and neglected the vitally important. It has dealt with the intellectual aspects of development and control and omitted the emotional aspects. It has told us how to cultivate certain skills and apply certain procedures but not how through instruction to tap the sources of motive and action. It has laid down laws of learning, explained how to cultivate memory, how to train thinking and guide the evolution of concepts; but it has not revealed to us how to use religion in directing the *basic drives* that control human behavior. It has overlooked the fact that trained skills, sharpened wits, ability to plan and reason may be (and too often are) used for bad ends when not balanced by right ideals and a proper sense of values. It has overlooked the indisputable fact that while trained reason and practiced thought are necessary and invaluable as *critics* of action they are not in the main the sources of *motives* of action. We need a psychology

which, without ignoring the intellectual factor, will balance it with the emotional factor.

Now I shall not undertake to outline to you a system of psychology such as I have in mind, but I can suggest to you briefly the general principles of the new emphasis which I think are needed.

Probably well over nine tenths of human action comes from some combination of a half dozen or dozen basic drives, which are the original sources of motive. To list a few:

1. *Demands inherent in living tissue*, such as *hunger* and *sex*. These are universal, insistent, powerful. They will not be denied without registering violent protest that leaves its mark on the individual and society. Properly conditioned they are the source of many fine motives.
2. *Fear*, with all its concomitants, an urge so deep-seated in the race that it has colored our religion, influenced our social codes, built and maintained our armies, shaped our national policies, made us incredibly cruel and intolerant to others. With all our boasted civilization fear is still a powerful factor back of human behavior.
3. *Social need or responsiveness*, which drives us to seek the fellowship of others, demand social recognition, dread derision and loss of "face," strive to keep pace with those of our group or gang, offer them service and helpfulness. Properly integrated with other motives there is no more civilizing and spiritualizing urge in human nature than the social.
4. *Affection and love* is a powerful motive, and elevating beyond almost any other if its object be worthy. Browning says, "The soul assimilates to itself what it loves." And love is peculiarly susceptible to the appeal of religion.
5. *Hate*, with its milder forms of dislike and aversion, figures strongly in the drives that move us to thought and action. It needs to be tamed and directed else it will embitter the spirit and fill life with the negatives that kill.
6. *The demand for change, variety, excitement, thrills, relief from monotony* accounts for many otherwise unaccountable acts. To direct the young to high adventure instead of low is one of the privileges of religion which our new psychology should help us better to attain.

Here I shall stop. This is not a complete list of the elementary drives to behavior but it contains enough to suggest their great significance. These drives seldom work singly and alone. They are constantly interacting upon each other, combining and recombining as the situations change which call them forth. Then also habit takes hold, reason and judgment join their contribution. Finally out of the ebb and flow, the action and interaction come great *complexes of motive* which constantly exert their compulsion on conduct, and so give character and personality their form and direction.

One of these great complexes is what we call *attitudes*, which in their essence are but emotionalized habits. And attitudes are a most powerful and constant control over action. How to make religion function better in the attitudes with which we daily confront life, our new psychology must unfold to us.

Another of the complexes is found in our *ideals*, the patterns of conduct which we set for ourselves and to which desire attaches. Let the patterns come from high sources and the flame of desire burn steadily, and our ideals will lead us to high accomplishment.

Still another great complex which goes back to the basic drives for its elements is our *loyalties*, a steadying, compelling source of motive which can bring human action to its greatest heights or its most degrading depths in accordance with the quality of the object of our loyalty.

But enough to reveal what I have in mind. It will be the business of the new psychology of religion to show how religion can take hold of the elementary drives in human nature, its hungers, its loves, and its hates and all the rest, and weld them into ennobling attitudes, high ideals, transcendent loyalties. And, finally, infusing the whole with the spiritual quality of Jesus, this new psychology will show us how to help those we lead build a *philosophy of life* patterned after the philosophy lived and taught by the Nazarene.

When all this has been done (and it can be done) there will be no further question about the force of religion as a social control.

Music and Worship

CLARENCE DICKINSON

THE use of music in worship is instinctive and therefore practically universal. From the moment of the birth of the religious impulse in man he has used music as one of the chief means of expression of his awe, his admiration and his spiritual needs and longings however vague. It plays a large part in all primitive ceremonial as well as in the most richly developed liturgies. It is a vital, indispensable element in all corporate worship save only worship which is purely a "sacrament of silence."

Whenever spiritual lassitude has crept over the church, music has either been practically banished from its worship services, or, weak, poor, half-dead, has filled but an insignificant, unmeaning place. Whenever spiritual life has revived, music has at once signalized that revival and imbued it with richer life and vigor and enthusiasm.

Whenever the church has concerned itself wholly or chiefly with morality, that is to say with a sort of external, material, and worldly goodness, music in the church has faded away for lack of inner, spiritual sustenance. Whenever the church has concerned itself chiefly with doctrine, that is to say with literal truth, music has had little place in it, for in the icy air of reasoned dialectic there is no food for a thing so wholly of the spirit. But no reformation, no revival of religion has ever failed to make abundant use of music. For reformation and revival mean a quickening of the inner spiritual life of men, which implies fresh vision of God and of the meaning and significance of life. And this new sense of the invisible, infinite, eternal, ever present, and ever loving is vivified and enlarged through the immaterial, wholly spiritual art of music, which also offers for it the only adequate means of expression.

Interest and participation in the music of the service are a just criterion of the vitality of the spiritual life in any church. If a church takes little or no interest in its music and does not participate in singing congregationally, the spiritual consciousness and vitality of that church will be found to be running low. Quite irrespective of its cultural standing or of the elaboration of its services, it will almost invariably be found that its spiritual consciousness and vitality and music alike have been left to languish through spiritual inertia or stifled by personal, worldly self-consciousness and a sort of haughty aloofness which has resulted in a lifeless formalism. Vital spiritual life will always reveal and express itself in the music of the

church. It may not always be music of the highest type, as music; that is, after all, more or less a matter of general culture, although it may be and should be steadily lifted to an ever higher plane through leadership which is wise, thoughtful, and devoted. But whatever be the cultural standards of the music, it is a thermometer of the degree of spiritual vitality in a church. The congregation that is alive and keen to receive messages from the Most High, to learn of the divine purposes, and to enter into communion with the Eternal Spirit of Life, seems invariably to find in worship-music both a channel of reception and a means of expression. Of course, just as there are those whose mentality is not so keen and whose spiritual responsiveness is sluggish, and who will therefore get less than others from the sermon, there are also some few who are practically tone deaf and will get nothing from the music, and others who are so insensitive that they can be reached only by the most obvious truths and the most obvious rhythms and melodies. And because there are so many degrees of sensitiveness and of resultant responsiveness, the minister knows he must arrange for a certain variety in the matter and manner of his preaching, and to this the director of music also should give thought in his music.

It is one of the significant signs of the times that so much interest is being manifested in church music. Never have there been so many conferences about it. Almost every large denomination has appointed a Commission on Music and Worship. New Hymnals are appearing on every side, denominational and non-denominational, to the music of which, for the first time in history to anything like this extent, internationally known composers of orchestral music are devoting their gifts, composing or collecting for them worthy hymn tunes. Schools for the study of sacred music are being established in theological seminaries and outside of them, and that not only in this new country or in connection with nonliturgical churches: the very latest of such establishments is the School of Sacred Music in Heidelberg University, Germany. Does all this intimate a rebirth of religious consciousness, a revival of spiritual sensitiveness, a deepening of the inner life of the church? Is it in some measure a response, perhaps an unconscious one, to such a stirring appeal to the Christian Church as "The Call of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church": "Again we hear the cry, 'Lift up your hearts,' and again we answer, 'We lift them up unto the Lord!' Only a revival of personal religion can meet the tragic needs of this generation." Throughout the whole course of the church's history has not one of the signs of such a revival of personal religion invariably been a rebirth of Christian song?

From its beginnings Protestantism in America has had quite well-defined chief centers of interest. In early Puritan days the principal concern was with morality of an ethical, we might almost say a material type, which laid all its stress upon physical goodness and uprightness of character. An inevitable accompaniment of this was emphasis upon maintaining invariability of doctrine. In a church so centered music could not signify much. Then the emphasis changed to social service, to brotherly concern for one's fellowmen and active, self-sacrificing helpfulness. This was more nearly a soil in which music could flourish and the whole period has been marked by increasing enrichment of church song and more general participation in it. In our own day, within a comparatively few years in fact, have come intimations of a new emphasis which we might call the mystic emphasis: a fresh, vivid sense of the unseen world, and man's real spiritual life within it. This was undoubtedly called forth or at least greatly intensified by the war, which revealed to so many hearts the need of immediate touch with infinite sources of strength and comfort and courage. As Evelyn Underhill wrote: "In our present religion, consciously or unconsciously we keep stressing humanity rather than God, service rather than awe, but in the awful moments when we face pain and mystery, what is left? Where is the source of strength for what Tauler called 'suffering in God'?" Like an answer to this is the new mystic emphasis upon an ultimate vision to be ministered to, a life beyond the need of mere ministration to material, physical requirements. And with this realization comes the need for a medium which may in some measure convey and minister to this vision and in some measure also give expression to it: a medium immaterial and spiritual. In music it finds this medium, for music has power to express that which is beyond the range of ordinary language. "I see beyond the range of sight, I hear beyond the range of sound," wrote Thoreau. "What is the prospect which these strains of music open up to me? The field of my life becomes a boundless plain, glorious to tread, with no death or disappointment at the end of it. Ay, there is a logic in those strains that the combined sense of mankind could not make me doubt their conclusions."

Another reason for the renewed interest in sacred music is undoubtedly the amazing revival of interest in the church service itself, its purpose and significance, and in the building of orders of service which will conduce to the fulfillment of that purpose, the appreciation of that significance.

One of the largest and most rapidly growing of our younger communions granted a two years' leave of absence to one of its most important ministers in order that he might study historical liturgies and more modern

orders of service, inquire into the devotional needs of men's hearts, and frame for his denomination a noble and significant order of worship.

One of the most interesting expressions of this new interest is that not only the students in theological seminaries and schools of sacred music but enthusiastic crowds of the young laity at summer conferences all over the country are asking for courses in the historical liturgies and the psychology which governed their construction, in order that they may have a foundation upon which to build orders of worship of various types, upon which they spend many eager hours.

This "recovery of worship," if we may borrow Fiske's phrase, is vital to the religious life of our age. In spite of all our bravado and the hard brilliance of our apparent worldliness we are a wistful generation calling into the dark and listening if perchance there be One who hears, and catching at whatever seems to give us new hope. This is the meaning of the response to Anglo-Catholicism and Christian Science and Humanism and to the many esoteric religions which are establishing themselves in the western world; and it is the meaning too of this search for orders of worship which shall reveal God to man and lift the soul of man into the knowledge and love of God. It expresses itself in two notable ways in most of the orders of service which are planned by these students: in the inclusion of a period of silence or of silent prayer, and in the inclusion of much more music, fitted into the service as an integral part, and especially of musical responses, short "introits" and orisons, and of quiet organ interludes to accompany or terminate the period of silence.

It is expressing itself too in the demand for greater use of two kinds of hymns especially. These young students of worship services insist upon more hymns with music so strong that we may almost call it austere—music which has power to intensify the consciousness of the might and majesty of God and to communicate, to this younger generation at least, a sense of the great potentialities in man; and with these they ask also for hymns that are expressive of personal fellowship with Christ—hymns which we might characterize as mystical in feeling.

One of the most interesting things about this study of worship and search for expressive orders of service is that it is not confined to the non-liturgical churches. For use at secondary services in the Church of England, Walford Davies has compiled "Ten Orders of Congregational Worship" with suitable music. Such a thing would not have been thought of in the Church of England a few years ago.

I shall never forget a recent morning service in the Temple Church,

London. The choir had entered and an anticipatory stillness had settled over the packed congregation as we awaited the priest's opening sentence of Morning Prayer, "Dearly Beloved brethren, the Scripture moveth us in sundry places"; but, instead softly, out of the stillness, through the beautiful old church there stole very simply the voice of the choir:

"Shepherd of mortals, here behold
A little flock, a wayside fold
That wait thy presence to be blest;
O Man of Nazareth, be our Guest!"

The effect was indescribable in the intense realization it created of the presence of God, and in the creation of an atmosphere of devotion, as hearts were made ready to learn of him and to commune with him.

On the other hand, in some quarters music has even come into disfavor in churches because those responsible for it have chosen texts, or music, or both, of a character that could not possibly heighten the devotional quality of worship or fulfill any high spiritual purpose. Congregations are deprived of this great spiritual aid to devotion, this most natural and spontaneous means of expression of the joy of salvation, simply because of the lack of realization of the place and function of music in church worship. Such a realization involves choice of the kind of music that will fill that place and fulfill that function and a presentation of it characterized by spontaneity, sincerity, and as great a degree of beauty as it is possible to attain.

And it involves more than that. It demands the conception of a service as an entity and of the music as a vital, integral part of the service. Music in the service of worship is not merely a frill, a pleasing adornment. It fails of its true purpose if it does not breathe a benediction upon the hearts of the worshipers and lift them into fuller realization of the beauty and the glory of God and into "mystic sweet communion" with him. In the Temple of old was it not at the moment "when the singers lifted up their voices with the instruments and praised the Lord, saying 'for he is good, for his mercy endureth forever,' " that "the glory of the Lord filled the house of God"?

If music is to be actively effective, it must be, as we have said, not only suitable music, interpreted with sincerity and as beautifully as possible, but, in order to be fully significant, it must also be an integral part of the service.

At the conference last summer of the Lutheran pastors and choir

directors of Lower Saxony, a speaker quoted from an article by Freiherr von Liliencron this sentence: "The organic connection of the musical offerings with the church service is an essential." He then went on to say: "Most emphatically we all agree with him in this; we who have so often suffered from the purely accidental, hit-and-miss character of the music, or its choice according to the mood of the director or the immediate repertory of the choir. This is what makes a service partake of the nature of a concert. The only solution is inner unity. The texts must be in the thought of the service, the music in its mood." "Ah!" he continued, "if the voice of von Liliencron could only be heard by all the clergy and all the church musicians!"

How shall we secure this inner unity? This unity which requires that "the texts (of the numbers sung) shall be in the thought of the service, the music in its mood"?

The first requisite is, of course, to establish a central thought or mood for the service. This demands that both minister and director shall think of the service in terms of a service and not the one in terms of the sermon solely and the other in terms of the anthems. If both would consistently plan a service of worship as a whole we would not have the hit-and-miss succession of unrelated hymns, prayers, scripture readings, anthems and sermons which all too often passes for a service.

The anciently formulated liturgies found their unity in the unvarying significance of the service itself. The major service in the Greek and Græco-Russian Churches, for example, presents invariably the drama of the Atonement; at every service Christ is again realized as offered up, a Lamb without spot or blemish, sacrificed for the sins of mankind. And toward this moment of culmination of the sacrifice everything in the service moves as to a climax. This presence of climax and the relation to it of all the parts of the service creates the unity.

Take, for instance, the order of service in the Græco-Russian Church. Like that of the Jewish synagogue the service begins on the eve of the Sabbath. It opens with the world full of brightness and joy; the lights are brilliant, the royal doors which open into the Holy of Holies stand wide open. It is as on that morning of Creation when God looked upon his world and saw that it was good. And the song of praise of all his creatures goes up to him: "Bless the Lord, O my soul. O Lord, my God, thou art very great."

But sin enters this beautiful world. The lights go out, the royal doors swing shut. Man has created a fog between himself and God and in it

he wanders lone in the darkness. His cry goes up: "Lord have mercy upon us!" "*Kyrie Eleison!*"

And, in response to the cry, into the darkness of the dimmed lights and the desolation of the closed doors, comes a gleam of hope—a lighted candle. "O Gladsome Light," sing the choirs, in that ancient Hymn of Sophronius. It is the promise of the Incarnation.

In appreciation of this, the morning service opens with praise. But as he considers this "so great salvation" the worshiper is overcome by a sense of unworthiness. "Lord, have mercy upon us!" he cries again and again, in song. How shall he attain? And the answer comes in what we call "the Beatitudes."

Started again on the upward path of vision the worshiper is led through the Scripture readings and through prayers and song to the great "Hymn of the Trinity" with its outline of the life and Passion of Jesus Christ; through the confession of faith to the culmination in the presentation of the elements of the Communion of the body and blood of Christ. Then is made, through the royal doors, the Great Entrance of these symbols of the Sin-Bearer, crucified yet triumphant, and then is sung the great hymn of adoration, the Cherubimic Hymn: "Like a choir of holy angels, singing . . . that we may raise on high the King of all, like a Conqueror, by angelic hosts invisibly upborne—Holy, Holy, Holy!" After this Adoration follows the consecration of the believers in the "To Thee we sing," and then the preparation for the return to the life of the world of every day—for which help is sought in the Lord's Prayer and counsel is given in the song, "Blessed is the man who walketh not in the counsels of the ungodly, but whose delight is in the Lord. Serve him now with awe and with eager hearts be joyous in the Lord. Hallelujah!" The parts taken by ministers, people and singers are so interwoven that the whole service seems a united outpouring of the hearts of all.

But the real point is that this, one of the most ancient of all liturgies, has climax, which implies that it has perfect coherence of parts and unity of thought and purpose. And more and more in these days we are seeking to invest our services with such inner unity and a sense of climax; and in this effort music can be of inestimable value. Better than anything else it can create that spirit of joy in God and in his works, or of meditation upon him and longing for his presence, in one of which defined moods a service must open if it is to take on any character as a vital service of worship. Nothing else so effectively as music's minors can express the sense of sin with which we are oppressed when we do catch a glimpse of

the perfect beauty and holiness of God. Nor can anything more graciously lead us back out of this valley of penitence and set our feet again upon the steady upward path of the service. Along the way we are strengthened in spiritual vitality through the better knowledge of God through the teachings of his Word, and our sense of oneness in him as a congregation of his children is intensified by the responsive readings, but above all by the hymns. The effect of the prayers in leading us up to the throne may be at times immeasurably heightened by a period of silent devotion, through which or after which strains of soft music, sung or played, may make hearts more responsive to the heavenly vision.

Awkward transitional spots in the service, as, for instance, while the Responsive Reading is being looked up by the congregation and late-comers are being seated, or when one must pass from the devotional part of the service to the more businesslike "Announcements," may be bridged over by short organ interludes which must be wholly in the mood of that particular service.

Thus we move steadily toward the formal climax of the service in offertory and sermon and possibly hymn. The significance of the actual offertory in Protestant churches should be much more deeply felt than it is; congregations are not often in full realization of the beautiful memories and solemn significance which should attach to it. Music accompanying it can mean incalculably much to the minister's message. It should be the high point or the climax of the service musically and atmospherically; while, in relation to the sermon, it can either prepare the soil by creating the definite mood for it or it can greatly increase its effectiveness by repeating the purport of its message with a new emphasis from the side of beauty or emotional appeal. This may be achieved by the simplest means; in some churches it may be wise or even necessary to use simply the congregational hymn.

But, someone may object, that makes the sermon appear to be the real point and climax of the service. No; the significance of the service is clearer vision of God, richer knowledge of God, closer communion with God. But we cannot reach this mountain top by a dozen paths all at one and the same time. There are many paths, but we cannot follow them all in every service; so the one path chosen for any particular service is indicated by the sermon. The minister and director of music should share the knowledge of that path and together lead the worshipers to the heights to which it leads. One may reach hearts the other has not stirred. "A song may find him who a sermon flies," wrote that old Dean of Bristol, in 1643.

But the music fulfills yet another function in the service. Not only can it lift the worshipers to a clearer vision of God and bring them into closer communion with the Most High; it can bind them in heart closer one to another. In his notable two-volume work, *La Culte*, Professor Will of Strassburg offers the conception of a service as a circle in which the worshipers are bound each to each and all to God, as

"The whole round earth
Is bound by gold chains about the feet of God."

Nothing is a greater aid in lifting the worshipers "out of themselves" and uniting them in bonds of the spirit to their fellow worshipers than music, especially, perhaps, the hymns. "In the light of this strain" (of music), cried Thoreau, "there is no *I* nor *thou*."

We are arriving at a faint realization of the values we may discover in music in the church service as a means both of impression and of expression. The single fact of the organization of children's choirs in so many churches all over the country bears eloquent testimony to this. But we still suffer great and unnecessary deprivation in failing to use more significantly this powerful agent in the promotion of the sense of spiritual values, of intuitions of the unseen. For, as Percy Dearmer writes: "How can we establish the Kingdom if we do not serve ourselves of all that can help to give fitting and adequate expression of the Vision!"

Higher Education in the Far East¹

GEORGE M. DUTCHER

EDUCATION is one of the outstanding characteristics of the present age. The average American is so conscious of the extraordinary attention devoted to education in his country to-day that he scarcely realizes that his country and his generation do not possess a monopoly of this great achievement of civilization. Moreover, the average American has in mind only a particular form of education—the one provided by the public-school system. Education, however, is just as old as the human race and co-extensive with it in diffusion. Every generation among every people has given a large part of its effort to the training of the new generation. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe that ever since the dawn of history, among every people that has risen above the level of barbarism, there has prevailed a specialized type of training for the favored few—the children of the ruling class or of the dominant groups of the population. This specialized training for the élite youth has naturally varied widely from age to age and from people to people, according to the prevailing economic and social environment and political status.

Until quite modern times literacy was usually regarded as a necessary accomplishment for only a special class or limited group even of the élite. It is a peculiarity of modern civilization in the West, probably shared only by the Greeks and Romans in earlier times, to regard literacy as the indispensable basis for the training of all the élite youth. Indeed the tendency has been to extend the idea to the education of all classes, as now seems to be the case in the United States and in some European countries. It is important to emphasize the novelty of this situation because it has produced two entirely false conceptions with regard to Eastern nations, namely, that Asiatic peoples have failed to develop educational systems of their own, and that education is an ultra-modern Western importation into the East.

Frequently during the last two thousand years, if not actually for

¹ This paper is based on the observations of the writer made on two occasions, first in 1921 and more recently in 1930. In the first year, traveling entirely in a private capacity, he visited as lecturer six colleges and universities in Japan and twelve in China, while in 1930, partly as visiting professor accredited by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and partly in private capacity, he lectured at twelve colleges and universities in China and eight in Japan. Allowing for places visited on both journeys, his acquaintance has extended to sixteen institutions in China and eleven in Japan. On one or both of these two journeys he visited similar institutions in Hawaii, the Philippines, Manchuria, Korea and India.

the major portion of that period, the higher classes in India and China were the superiors of their European contemporaries in cultural advancement and even in literary scholarship. It is highly doubtful whether prior to the nineteenth century any people in the West had produced such a highly developed system of literary training as China had enjoyed for centuries, and prior to the last century no other people has equalled the Chinese in insistence upon thorough literary training for its ruling class. In India the intellectual gifts and literary attainments of the Brahminical castes have long been proverbial. The case of Japan is perhaps more nearly parallel to that of Europe. Literary scholarship has there long been held in high esteem, but the dominant position in social and political life has for an equal time rested with the military class. What the feudal lord and chivalrous knight were for western Europe, the *daimyo* and *samurai* were for Japan until two generations ago. Just as the ideals and practices of chivalry dominated the training of most of the youth of the better classes in western Europe for centuries quite without regard for literary attainments, so the ideals of Bushido and the punctilious mastery of the military art gave the tone to Japanese life for many generations. The higher classes in Japan, China, and India have rarely, if ever, been a whit behind their European contemporaries of similar position in state and society in upholding for the best of their race lofty ideals, in maintaining high standards of achievement, and in systematically transmitting to successive generations the torch of culture.

Wide variations indeed there were in aim, method, and achievement between India and Italy, between China and France, between Japan and England, for East was East and West was West, and almost never did the twain meet. How, then, it may be asked, is to be explained the apparent wide cultural differentiation which suddenly developed in quite modern times between Asiatic and European peoples? It was probably due to four factors. Beginning in the fifteenth century European nations were profoundly affected in turn by four great developments: the Renaissance, the Reformation, the political revolutions, notably the English in the seventeenth century and the French in the eighteenth, and the Industrial Revolution. No clear parallel to any one of these four movements developed in India, China, or Japan. Fundamental as were the first three of these movements, it was not until the fourth had made considerable progress that the greater advancement of Western civilization became clearly manifest. Doubtless an important factor in contributing to the

development of this marked differentiation between East and West was that just when the Renaissance, by producing the Age of Discovery, made the nations of Europe outward-looking, political and other events in Asia caused India, China, and Japan to become even more inward-looking than had hitherto been their wont. This result was of peculiar importance because it emphasized to a pronounced degree the divergent tendencies of Western and Eastern thought and ideals of life. The Occidental has come to emphasize more and more the material factors in life, the spirit of adventure, zeal for activity, and the importance of making a living. Meanwhile, the Oriental has become introspective, has glorified passivity, and has grown zealous for the spiritual values.

It is one of the greatest paradoxes of history that the Asiatic has shown no evidence of initiative, even though he may have possessed the desire, to impart to the Occidentals the spiritual values to which he accords so high an esteem. On the contrary, it is the materialistic Westerner with his adventurous temperament and restless activity who has set out to impart to his assumedly inferior Oriental brother the higher values of Western civilization. The Occidental performance is rescued from incongruity, however, not by its enormous material achievements, nor by the perfection of its literary culture, but by the peculiar characteristics of its religion. It is not necessary to assert the superior virtues of Christianity, but merely the diverse nature of its merits from those of Oriental faiths. It is not, however, the purpose of the present paper to enter into any discussion or comparison of either the material or religious aspects of the situation, but solely into the educational phases of the situation produced in the East by Western contacts.

At the outset it must be clearly emphasized that the readiness of the Oriental to be receptive has been no less potent than the determination of the Westerner to impart his vaunted ideals. This purposeful spirit has doubtless been best exemplified by Japan in the famous imperial oath, three-score years ago, that "intellect and learning should be sought for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the empire." China and India have been slower and perhaps less explicit in avowing this purpose of receptivity, but the rapid changes in both countries in the last three decades have given abundant evidence of similar aim. The whole situation will be quite misapprehended unless it is clearly understood that, while for a half century Europeans and Americans have been trying to introduce more or less of their educational systems into Japan, China, and India, the

governments and peoples of these countries have been intent upon the effort to recast thoroughly their age-old systems for training their youth, and especially those portions of the systems which affect the training of their élite. This means, and most properly so, suitable realization that the best interest of any nation rests, not in the submissive acceptance of imparted ideals and methods, but in the voluntary and deliberate revision of ideals and readjustment of methods in accordance with new light from wheresoever derived.

The history of education, particularly of higher education, in the Far East during the past half century, and especially during the last thirty years, has therefore been a twofold process more or less equally due to Western and to Eastern initiative. The process has been one of the most interesting phenomena in history, and is one of the most potent movements in the world to-day. The initiation of the new development was doubtless due to Christian missionary enterprise in establishing in the Far East institutions of higher learning, based primarily upon Western models but modified to meet the local needs of the country concerned. Christian collegiate institutions have multiplied rapidly both in Japan and China and have shown remarkable improvement in buildings, equipment, personnel, and educational standards and methods, and notably an increasing tendency to adaptation to the national cultural surroundings.

The development of institutions of higher learning under national auspices, though but little later in Japan, was almost a generation later in China. In both countries progress has been rapid and the multiplication and expansion of the institutions has been extraordinary in the last fifteen years. In both countries the progress of higher education under state control has been highly nationalistic in character, both responding to the demands of nationalism and accentuating the spirit of nationalism in a period of intense growth of nationalism in both countries.

There have thus come into existence two systems of higher education in each country, widely different in origin and in fundamental character and purpose—the one alien and Christian, the other national and governmental. In strictly educational matters their programs and methods are substantially alike, but partly due to the differences in personnel of the instructing staffs, and partly due to the circumstances of their establishment, the influence of the church schools is more cosmopolitan, while the larger resources and the consequently superior equipment of the state institutions afford opportunities for both broader and more advanced curric-

ula and scholarship. Though the two systems are more or less rival in character there is no essential conflict between the two, and in general their relations have not been inharmonious. In both cases there is a high purpose to serve the youth of the nation and the tendencies are distinctly modernistic and progressive.

The old indigenous system of education in China has left practically no trace of influence upon the new system of higher education even in the government institutions, while in Japan the principal evidence of the survival of old ideals is to be seen in the retention of a certain amount of military training. One somewhat unfortunate tradition, however, has persisted from the old order in that the graduates tend to look to the state for employment rather than to their own initiative to find their places of service in society. In both countries the ideal of literacy as the one foundation of education for the élite has been fully accepted. Both types of institutions in both countries have been accessible and open-minded to a wide range of influences emanating directly or indirectly, often deliberately sought, from Western lands.

It is difficult to estimate with any accuracy the significance of the reactions upon both classes of these institutions in China and Japan from the fact that the doors of Western universities have constantly been open to their more ambitious youth, and from the fact that these students upon their return to the homeland have often joined the teaching staffs of the collegiate institutions or in other ways exerted considerable influence upon the development of the system of higher education. Until recently the youth who studied abroad appeared to have had a distinct advantage over those who were home-trained. Within a few years, however, important changes have occurred in this situation which, on the whole, are tending to integrate study abroad with the system for higher education at home instead of leaving the old-time separation between the two.

As already intimated, higher education on Western lines is almost a novelty in the Far East and is at any rate still in the experimental stage, or at most, just emerging from it. The Catholic University of Santo Tomas, founded at Manila in 1611, was practically without a rival in the field of higher education in the Far East until sixty years ago. The University of Hawaii and the University of the Philippines were both established in 1908 under governmental auspices. In China, Saint John's University at Shanghai, which celebrated in 1929 its semi-centennial, is the patriarch among church institutions of higher learning. The abandonment of the old literary

training and of the examination system for government offices and the introduction of national universities of the Western type occurred in the opening years of the present century. The great National Central University at Nanking was transformed from a teachers' college into a national university so recently as 1921. The pioneer Christian institution of higher learning in Japan, Doshisha University, at Kyoto, began its notable career in 1875. Though the agricultural college at Sapporo dates from the memorable work of President William Smith Clark, of Amherst Agricultural College, in 1876, the formal creation of Hokkaido Imperial University did not take place until 1918. Even the great University of Tokyo, the foremost institution of higher learning in the Far East, traces back only to 1877, and the University of Kyoto is a score of years its junior.

As in America, so in the Far East, the last decade has witnessed astounding expansion of colleges and universities on the material side. Expenditures for plant seem to have been made everywhere almost without stint and the work still goes on. A few universities, such as Fukien Christian University at Foochow and Yenching University at Peiping, have occupied new locations since 1921, and, consequently, all their buildings are new. Since the earthquake in 1923 the Imperial University and Aoyama Gakuin at Tokyo have been reconstructed and enlarged. At the other extreme stand Saint John's, at Shanghai, and Tsing Hua, at Peiping, which have each made considerable additions to already extensive plants. The institutions of the large intermediate group have erected more than half—often more than three quarters—of their present buildings since 1921. Everywhere there is evidence of the most careful attention to securing structures suited for the most efficient conduct of the work in the particular field of instruction for which each is planned.

Material expansion has, however, not been limited to institutions already existing. Both Japan and China are adding to the number of state controlled institutions. At Seoul, Korea, the Japanese are creating, with their customary skill and thoroughness, a new imperial university. An immense hospital with an associated medical school has provided the nucleus. The large new buildings are in good Western style and admirably arranged and equipped. The superb English seminar room, beautifully furnished and amply supplied with books, is unrivaled even in the United States. At Mukden the National Northeastern University testifies to the generous patronage of education by the late Manchurian ruler, Chang Tso-lin and his successor, Chang Hsueh-liang. The extensive campus on the out-

skirts of the city is already well-sprinkled with buildings, all on a large scale, well arranged and fairly equipped. The physics building, for instance, is surpassed in size, arrangement, and equipment at only a few of the largest American universities. It is gratifying to find that these new institutions are apparently, from the outset, commanding the services of well-trained men on their faculties.

The personnel has been steadily strengthened during the past decade, notably in the government universities. In every government university that I visited on my second tour I was impressed by the character and ability of the person who was serving, under whatever title, as president of the institution. They represent a wide range of personal types and of scholarly interests. In some cases, the selection has been based upon administrative experience rather than eminence in scholarship. In every case the president was a native of the country concerned except at the University of Hawaii, whose chief executive comes from the mainland of the United States, and at Seoul, where a Japanese is in charge.

In Japan the government universities seem to command for their faculties men of fine character and excellent scholarship. One might expect this at Tokyo or Kyoto, but it is no less true in the three provincial imperial universities and at the church institutions. In China, however, recent years have produced great changes in the administrative and teaching staffs of both the government and the church institutions. The nationalist movement has operated to substitute Chinese administrators for Westerners in the Christian universities. With one or two exceptions, a Chinese is now the nominal, usually the actual, head of the institution. In some cases the former Western president remains at his post, sometimes with the old title, sometimes with a new one. This wise arrangement, which varies greatly in detail from place to place, is working admirably in this period of transition at such places as Yenching and Lingnan. In other cases, as at Foochow, the Chinese president is sole chief, though his friendly relations with his American predecessor, who remains in the vicinity in a different capacity, help to tide things over. In the case of the national universities, the unstable political conditions have an unfortunate effect. The presidential tenure is consequently uncertain. Under the circumstances the institutions have been extremely fortunate that men of outstanding ability have nevertheless been regularly found for the posts. It is to be hoped that the presidential posts at these universities will soon be lifted out of politics. The same factor has operated to some extent in the

matter of faculty appointees. In view of this condition and of the general turmoil, it is a matter of congratulation that these Chinese national universities have been able to maintain, with so great uniformity, high standards of scholarly quality. Still another cause for surprise and of satisfaction is that, in spite of the uncertainty and often default of salary payments, the various institutions have been able to hold their faculties and carry on their work. In the government universities of China as well as of Japan, Western instructors are now scarce, except for occasional survivals in the language departments.

The church institutions in China have likewise had trying experiences in recent years. It has not been unnatural that the nationalist movement should tend to make them a target because of their foreign origin and support, because of their propaganda for an alien religion, and because of the large proportion of foreigners on their staffs. For several years these institutions have been perplexed by the question of registration. The Chinese Nationalist Government is undertaking, as did the Japanese a generation ago, to establish some supervision of all educational institutions. To this end they have demanded that all church or private schools should register with the government, and have specified certain regulations to which an institution must conform in order to receive registration in any desired class. So far all is well. One may also concede the further point to which reference has been already made, namely, that the control of the institutions should be fully in Chinese hands. This means not only that the president must be a Chinese but also that the board of trustees must be predominantly, if not exclusively, national. Though the regulations are not so specific with regard to the faculty, the tendency is to secure the progressive exclusion of all except Chinese.

The serious point at issue, however, is the religious question. Any required form of religious instruction or of chapel service is banned, while voluntary instruction and services are viewed with suspicion and hedged about by more or less meddling restrictions. Most of the institutions are quite prepared to accept the principle of abolishing required religious exercises of any sort but they naturally object when the demand passes from tolerance to one of insistent intervention with regard to voluntary instruction or services. Thus far, some institutions have completed their registration, others are negotiating upon the subject, while a few are postponing action rather than compromise on what they regard as fundamental principles. There seems no reason why a reasonable spirit of

accommodation on both sides should not effect an entirely satisfactory solution. No other outcome can be contemplated with equanimity.

The problem of financial support for the church schools or colleges in view of these changes is a serious one. No less perplexing is the relation between missionary organizations or other societies and their supporters in the United States or elsewhere, and these institutions when their control is transferred to the nationals of the country in which they may be located. With possibly an occasional exception experience has shown that, until the present time, the church colleges in China have not been able to develop a local constituency prepared to meet in any substantial degree the responsibility of financial support. Consequently, if the valuable work of these institutions is to continue, more or less support must be obtained from outside, chiefly from the foreign missionary societies. These organizations, then, are faced with the question of whether they have a right to make their contributions to institutions over which they have ceased to exercise control. If, indeed, they have such right, both legal and moral, can they continue to rely upon their contributing constituencies to provide the necessary funds?

The practical problems involved are three: expenses for grounds, buildings, and equipment; the establishment of an adequate endowment; and the defraying of current expenses. Thus far there seems to have been less hesitation than might have been anticipated, in view of the disturbed conditions in China, on the part of generous outside benefactors to contribute to the erection of buildings and provision for their equipment. Probably every church school in China has, during the past decade, even during the past five years, been an important beneficiary of such generosity. On the other side, it must be recognized that the Chinese are themselves making liberal contributions for the same purposes.

In practically every case the church institutions are very insufficiently endowed. Furthermore, none of them can see its way clear to charging more than a nominal sum for tuition. Consequently, the problem of meeting current expenses is a source of constant anxiety to the authorities of each institution. While the Chinese are showing greater readiness to contribute to such purposes, the increase in their offerings does not tend, as yet, to offset the decline in contributions from abroad. Inasmuch as these contributions from outside come mainly from the faithful and generous church members it is becoming increasingly difficult to persuade them to continue their gifts in view of the effects of governmental policy in

steadily minimizing the place of religious instruction in the church colleges. The individual institutions are alive to the significance of this problem and are striving to meet it.

One institution seems to have arrived at a rather simple and effective solution. The foreign supporters, in addition to contributions for permanent equipment, limit their gifts to the support of foreign members of the faculty, and each year they enter into a definite contract with the Chinese board of trustees to furnish a specified number of foreign professors to be assigned to specific departments. The entire selection and support of these persons rest with the foreign board. This arrangement retains to the contributor in the United States, or elsewhere, his control of the use of his gifts, while at the same time it places squarely upon the shoulders of the Chinese the burden of supporting all the Chinese instruction that they desire. The scheme apparently is working satisfactorily.

While this particular institution registered promptly, quite different are the conditions at another one which is still delaying to comply with this requirement. Though it has eliminated every element of compulsion in regard to religious matters, it still insists upon loyalty to its obligations to its home church in the United States. A school of theology, a department of ethics and religion, and Christian chapel services, all on a voluntary basis, are accordingly maintained. More than this, the strong Christian tone of the institution is fully preserved without any overt propaganda or proselytism.

The unfortunate experience of a third institution, located in a provincial capital, reveals clearly that, up to the present time, the practical problems of registration depend upon relations with the local authorities and especially with the local organization of the dominant political party rather than upon the Nationalist government at Nanking. In the autumn of 1929 a student branch of the local party machine made its appearance and speedily assumed a dictatorial attitude with regard to the procedure of registration. The effect of its activities thoroughly disorganized the institution and finally forced the suspension of instruction for the remainder of the academic year. The whole story is an amazing illustration of the ineptitude of youthful revolutionists. Three sentences from one of their proclamations will illustrate the point. They declared that the university, "a co-operative undertaking of thirteen missions, is the headquarters of the imperialists of North China. The influence of this institution in destroying Chinese intellectual life is more dangerous than big Krupp guns point-

ing at our breasts. Now, that we are awake, we solemnly vow to eliminate this obstacle to China's progress." Such nonsense was too arrant to endure and before long the Nanking authorities intervened. This splendid institution, with a long and praiseworthy history, managed to reopen in the autumn of 1930, and it is to be hoped that the good sense of the Nationalist Government will assure the continuance of its work and that of similar institutions without further meddling from presumptuous local politicians and more presumptuous undergraduates.

Fortunately, there are excellent illustrations of the possibility of registration consistent with dignified maintenance of Christian traditions. A spirit of generous co-operation between the Chinese and foreign elements in the institution, and between the institution and the governmental authorities could produce a condition apparently acceptable to all parties, as has long been the case in Japan. No doubt whatsoever, there has been in recent years a large amount of both anti-foreign and anti-Christian spirit in China, but it is difficult to believe that they represent an enduring conviction of the responsible elements in Chinese society rather than the momentary effervescence of small-minded and shortsighted individuals whom the accidents of revolutionary conditions have temporarily landed in positions of some importance or influence.

There remains, then, the deeper question of whether the mission school or the church college has a real service to perform in China. If any deduction may be drawn from the experience in Japan, the success of such collegiate institutions as Doshisha University in Kyoto and Aoyama Gakuin in Tokyo gives full assurance of their justification. The contributor to missions, whether in the United States or elsewhere, if he puts aside all ideas of religious proselyting, may find his justification for gifts in support of education in China either in the idea of social insurance or that of international altruism. It is perhaps a little sordid to use the former argument. None the less it is a significant thing that the people of the United States should feel it worth while to encourage the development of those conditions and of those attitudes toward life which conduce to stability and progress in their neighbor nations across the Pacific. When the nationalist movement in China shall have attained success, it will be a matter of the highest significance to the United States what the attitude of that country shall be toward it and what the attitude of all Easterners shall be to all Westerners. Most of us will prefer, however, to think of the whole situation in more idealistic terms and to feel that such contribu-

tions as we are able to make to the development of right conditions and ideals in the Far East stand on the same level of effort for world betterment as do similar enterprises within our homeland. It is all to make this a better world to live in, and it is a world in which all men are brothers.

It is worth while, however, to consider more precisely the place of the church school in non-Christian lands in general, and in China in particular. The missionary's conception of his problem has undergone a radical change during the last generation. He no longer views his problem as merely the duty of saving souls by winning from other faiths converts to Christianity. Now he must acquaint himself fully with all the good elements in the native creeds and give them their full value while trying to exhibit the superior worth of Christianity as an ethical system for society and as a religion for the individual. Mere evangelizing must, consequently, give place to rational investigation. The church college through proper courses can place the Bible in comparison with the sacred books of other religions, both as literature and as the exposition of the best system of life. Through other courses, both analytical and historical, Christianity may be set in comparison with Buddhism, Confucianism, and other faiths, both as to the character of its teachings and the significance of its achievements. Courses in ethics can exhibit the parallels and the differences between the Christian system of morals and others. No religion or system of ethics can be judged solely by its formulas. It must be tested by experience, for the lives of its followers are the truest evidences of its authority. Consequently, the life and personal influence of the teacher are more significant than the course of instruction which he offers. Without doubt the greatest contribution which the church college can make in comparison with a state or private institution is to be found in the personal influence wielded by its Christian teachers, both foreign and native.

The Christian missionary, whether as teacher, evangelist, or physician, has never directly carried on propaganda for Western political ideas and practices. Nevertheless, more than any other single group, the missionaries have been responsible, through what might be called their unconscious influence, for inculcating republican and democratic ideas into Chinese minds. It would be possible to make out a good case for the argument that the missionary was responsible for the revolution in China, at least down to the moment of Soviet intervention. While there may be more important passive forces operating at the present moment, there is undoubtedly no other active force comparable to the Christian influence in

combating communist tendencies in China. The courses in history, government, economics, and sociology, as presented in the church school, will naturally and properly exert a wholesome influence in favor of the ideals which the peoples of the West regard as fundamental to the world's political and social welfare.

While it may be argued that the liberal proportion of foreign teachers on the faculties of church institutions is not in accord with the spirit of nationalism, it is the presence of these men and women in the church institutions compared with their almost complete absence from the state and other private institutions which enables the church college to render one of its greatest services. The foreign teacher introduces a spirit of cosmopolitanism. This cosmopolitanism does not mean anything anti-national, but it does mean a breadth of outlook which gives to these institutions an atmosphere of liberalism and broadmindedness which cannot be matched in institutions where the faculty is of a strictly nationalist composition, whether in China, or in the United States, or in any other country. There is reason to believe, therefore, that the church institution can best provide the environment favorable to the discovery and development of those ideals and methods best calculated to secure the regeneration of China. Perhaps this idea may be illustrated by a reference to Japan. Though there are less than 200,000 Protestant church members in a population of approximately 65,000,000, the presidents of two of the five principal imperial universities are Christians. Likewise, in whatever field of leadership one may choose in Japanese national life he will find the Christians occupying a position of importance quite disproportionate to their small numbers. Returning to China, it is only necessary to note the surprising number of Christians among the leaders in the present Nationalist Government.

Though only a small matter in one sense, in another way it is a fact of immense significance that the church colleges still continue to conduct a considerable amount of their instruction in English. While perhaps the students do not average to-day as well as they did ten years ago in their command of English, they do average very distinctly higher than is the case in other institutions. This is significant not merely because English is the *lingua franca* of the Far East, but also because it means that the pupil has acquired the ability to command the intellectual output not merely of his own land, but also of the leading nations of the West, for almost all works of outstanding importance do appear in English versions, while the number of such translations into Asiatic languages is as yet small. This

means that the graduate of the church college occupies a peculiarly favorable position for interpreting the whole intellectual contribution of the West to the people of his own nation.

Finally the church institution affords to its pupils extraordinary social advantages. One of the greatest handicaps to Chinese progress at the present day is the tremendous inertia of the family system. The individual Chinese does not easily and naturally, as does the young American, join in social life with his equals, let alone others, outside his own family circle. The church institutions are providing a social life for their students which enables them to meet with their fellows very much as our American youth mingle with one another in their colleges. Now that co-education is developing, the church schools are also affording opportunities for the young men and the young women to establish social relations under the most wholesome auspices.

The collegiate institutions of the Far East are distinctly fortunate, as has been already indicated, in their ability to command the services on their faculties of men of high character and eminent scholarship. Superficially, at least, the faculties of the church institutions do not appear to measure up to the same scholarly standards as attained in the government universities. This difference, however, does not require an excuse so much as an explanation. As a rule, the professor in the church institution has to carry a heavier teaching burden. The number of members of the faculty is smaller so that there is less division of responsibility for the range of subjects taught, for the number of classes that must be met, and for administrative burdens to be borne. Furthermore, in the church institutions the professor is subject to various collateral obligations of a social and religious nature from which his colleague in the government university is customarily exempt. As a consequence, the teacher in the church institution, though he is undoubtedly little, if any, inferior to his compeer in the government institution in his preliminary training, finds that the demands upon his time prevent him from maintaining the same pace in scholarly development.

In general the teaching burden of the professor in the Far East is not very different from that prevailing in corresponding institutions in the United States, though it may average a little heavier. It is a most gratifying sign that the Far Eastern professor, whether Chinese, Japanese, or Filipino, maintains along with his teaching obligations fruitful enthusiasm for research. To some extent this is due to governmental stimulus and

material support. In other cases there seems to be a mingling of national pride and of personal emulation in the desire to make a good showing in comparison with the professor in the older institutions of the West.

The fields of research are as varied as the departments of instruction. In my own field of history I was interested to find that practically every teacher with whom I came in contact had in hand some research problem. Those located in Tokyo and Peking naturally enjoy unusual advantages in access to both archives and libraries, so it would be cause for disappointment if one did not find the professors of history at such institutions as the imperial university at Tokyo and at Tsing Hua University and Yenching University at Peiping eagerly utilizing their opportunities. There, as in the West, current interest seems to be unduly absorbed by the period of the last hundred years, and that especially in the diplomatic field. Political and economic questions, particularly those of an immediate, practical sort, are likewise the subject of abundant effort. It is gratifying to find, however, that there are those who are devoting themselves to the more theoretical and philosophic aspects of these subjects, as is a brilliant young professor of politics in Kyushu Imperial University, at Fukuoka. Naturally, the native languages and literatures afford an almost monopoly field for the Chinese and Japanese professors. It is interesting, therefore, to discover that Japanese and Chinese scholars are undertaking to make their contributions in the field of Western languages and literatures. Again at Kyushu Imperial University a professor of English is showing in an admirable way that Orientals can contribute to the exposition of English literature. Various reasons would probably have to be introduced to account for the special interest, both in China and Japan, in Russian literature.

There is probably not a single important branch of science or technology which is not engaging the research activities of Far Eastern professors. Especially conspicuous is the activity in the field of agricultural science. This may be of a specialized sort, as in the case of the sericulture investigations, notably in Lingnan University, at Canton, and the University of Nanking, or of a general sort as to be observed in the wide range of investigations pursued at Hokkaido Imperial University at Sapporo, and the affiliated experiment stations. The East has many problems of medical research peculiar to itself. The splendid Peking Union Medical College justly holds the leadership not merely in medical training but also in medical research in China, thanks to a splendid group of both foreign and

Chinese scientists. On a smaller scale numerous other medical faculties and hospitals scattered throughout China are making worthy contributions to the same ends, as at Soochow University, Shantung Christian University, Saint John's University, and West China Union University. In Japan the medical faculties in the several imperial universities are doing valuable work. Though Japan has as yet failed to equal Western nations in the care of the insane, I was interested to find at Sapporo, not only that progressive methods of psychiatric treatment were in use, but that the physicians in charge were actively engaged in important and timely investigations.

All the government universities in China and Japan, as well as in Hawaii and the Philippines, include several faculties, though their number and character vary somewhat from place to place. In some cases one or more faculties are not located at the chief seat of the institution. Thus, while the principal faculties of the University of the Philippines are located in Manila, the faculties of agriculture, veterinary science, and forestry are established about forty miles away at Los Baños. Some of the faculties of the National Central University are not at Nanking, but in Shanghai. Everywhere the emphasis is upon the professional, scientific, and technological branches. In Japan, for instance, there are faculties of letters in the imperial universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, but in the imperial universities at Fukuoka and Sendai there is only a faculty of law and letters, and in these places the literary emphasis is largely upon political and economic subjects. As yet, the university at Sapporo is still anticipating the establishment of a faculty of law and letters. While in China the faculty of letters seems to occupy a better-established position, professional and technical interests have acquired unquestioned leadership. In the church institutions the faculty of letters, or of letters and science, is customarily the heart of the institution. The addition of one or more other faculties has resulted from the varying conditions at the different places. Sometimes there is a faculty of medicine, sometimes one of agriculture, sometimes one of theology, sometimes one of engineering. The only faculty of dentistry in China is at a church institution, West China Union University, in remote Chengtu.

To some Westerners the tendency away from literary studies and toward professional and technical subjects may seem unfortunate. On the other hand, the institutions are actually ministering in a very wise way to the immediate needs of these Far Eastern nations. The contrast with

India, where the emphasis has long been on literary and legal training, is illuminating and convincing.

The Far Eastern countries, like Western lands, have a large number of institutions of higher learning of various types besides those just discussed. In the first place mention may be made of the institutions maintained by the Catholic Church, which are numerous and widely scattered, like the Protestant ones. Among the oldest of these is the Jesuit institution at Sicawei, in Shanghai. In the next place there are private colleges and universities. Foremost in this group, because of their long history, their high standing, and their large attendance, numbering several thousands in each case, are Keio University and Waseda University, both in Tokyo. These two institutions are comparable to many in the United States, such as New York University, which minister to the demands of great municipal centers. Both in Peiping and Shanghai there are several similar universities though none of them, except Nanyang University in Shanghai, has attained a position comparable to the ones in Tokyo. In Tientsin the splendid school built up by that eminent Chinese educator, Chang Po-lin, has now attained full rank as Nankai University. Amoy University, at Amoy, is another private institution of notable importance which has developed within the last decade. Manila also has two or three largely attended private universities.

As one turns his thoughts to the contrast between the conditions in the Far East a half century ago and at the present day, he must needs marvel at the wide range of the changes which have taken place and at the rapidity with which they have been occurring, especially in the last decade. Interesting as it is to explore the significance of any single phase of this development, there can be little question that nothing has been more far-reaching in its importance than the progress in education, notably in higher education, upon which, in the last analysis, must depend the whole pedagogical enterprise. Grounds and buildings, faculties and students, government departments of education and church societies, with all their splendid progress and achievements of the half century, are after all but outward evidences of the great cultural movement which is stirring the life of Asia to the depths.

If Wesley Came Back to the World

P. W. WILSON

IN the days that now seem to be so distant, when the Victorian Era, roaring with machinery and reverberating with the thunder of artillery, was sure of itself and of the future, there were men here and there who wondered whether amid the pride and prosperity all was well. Among the idealists who were conscious of evil in civilization there was one, a great journalist, William T. Stead, a name not yet wholly forgotten, whose flair for sensation, material and spiritual, appealed thirty, forty, fifty years ago to countless millions throughout the world.

Among Stead's most dramatic triumphs was a campaign for a clean-up on the shores of Lake Michigan. Looking back on it all, it is curious to note how Moody, from Chicago, preached the gospel of Christ in England, while Stead, from England, adopted as his slogan, *If Christ Came to Chicago*. The title was a stroke of genius. Wherever the English language was spoken, a book of 500 pages, packed with social propaganda, sold for fifty cents. Not only Chicago but every city, similarly growing in size and wealth, similarly subject to graft and crime and vice, was stirred to a new vision of civic obligation and opportunity. There was everywhere a municipal renaissance, and Stead's enthusiasm was an expression of it.

What was the secret of so signal a success? With all his moods and whims and hypnotic delusions Stead had faith. It was faith in God and man that uplifted his crusades above the mere paganalties of a much advertised play like *On the Spot*, by Edgar Wallace, or the plethora of "pictures" which have been dramatizing the dishonesties and the cruelties of "the public enemy." Stead did not merely expose and exploit wrongdoing. If he made so great a difference it was because he showed a better way.

For some weeks I have been browsing with ever increasing satisfaction over the eight volumes, sumptuous and delightful to handle, in which with infinite pains Mr. John Telford has included and annotated much the largest collection of John Wesley's letters—2,670 in number—yet appearing in print; and as I dip into this correspondence, so easy to enjoy at any point, I am pursued by a question similar to Stead's. If Wesley as the Lord's horseman came back to earth again, what would he think of us? If, clad in his decent black gown, with the familiar white linen bands at his throat, he were to stand on the Great White Ways of pleasure and luxury, or within the Boweries of distress and privation, what would his

calm, clear voice say to the crowds? Or, again, if he were to sit at a desk in some mighty hotel, with the meeting and parting of guests like a surging tide around him, what letters would he write in that concise style and exquisite caligraphy which were among his weapons of influence for the larger part of a century? *If Wesley Came Back to the World*—what a title for a book!

One thing is certain. John Wesley would not have rested content with coming back to any single city, like Chicago, however great its abundance of property and population. The world was his parish, and to the ends of nothing less than the world would he ride abroad. Our world may include regions and races with which Wesley's generation was not fully informed. But it contains no regions and no races which the message of John Wesley and his impulse to deliver it would not have reached. The prayers that he prayed for the Indians in America are prayers equally efficacious if they be prayed for Indians in Asia and for Negroes in Equatorial Africa. If Wesley's world had its limitations, Wesley's love was universal.

The founder of Methodism lived in days when mankind was divided by every kind of frontier—distances not yet overcome by locomotion, caste not yet obliterated by revolution, color still emphasized by slavery, creeds not yet adjusted by comparisons and associated by charity. All these divisions in the commonwealth of peoples were reflected in his own mind as a mirror of the life of his time. But the mirror in itself was inclusive. Its ample survey comprehended the remote as well as the near, the aristocratic as well as the humble, the black man as well as the white man, the heathen as well as the Christian. John Wesley was a man who could say with Pope that "the proper study of mankind is man." With Terence he could add, "*Homo sum: humani nihil a me alienum puto*"—"I am a man: there's naught which touches man which is not my concern." About John Wesley there was a faculty of observation as penetrating and as widely embracing as Shakespeare's.

If, then, Wesley were to find himself at Geneva he would be quite at home within a League of Nations. France and Germany and Italy would be all within his cure of souls. But he would insist that Frenchmen are more important than France, that Germans are more important than Germany, that Italians are more important than Italy. For whereas France and Germany and Italy, as countries, belong to the things that are temporal, Frenchmen and Germans and Italians, as children of God the Father,

whether they be obedient or rebellious, are beings that belong to eternity. Be they princes or peasants, illustrious or obscure, learned or illiterate, prosperous or in penury, they are shrines of the soul that may be happy or wretched but can never die.

Similarly John Wesley would have been able easily enough to accommodate himself to the study of what we call comparative religion. It is true that he drew a sharp distinction between Christian and heathen, and within Christendom between Roman Catholic and Protestant, and within Protestantism between Methodism and Calvinism. John Wesley was thus in a sense as sectarian as the rest. But in all his controversies we have the feeling that he is testing systems not by academic speculations but by their influence on the wellbeing of persons. The Catholic was more to him than Catholicism; the Protestant was more to him than Protestantism; the Methodist was more to him even than Methodism. At all points the institution was held to be the servant, not the master, of the individual. It was not enough that it should exist, still less that it should have existed for a long time. It had to be a sphere where men within it could do good, not harm.

The universality of Shakespeare was dramatic. He showed men and women as they are, and under given circumstances they acted according to their character. Wesley was not only universal; he was redemptive. Like Shakespeare, he saw men and women as they are. But he had the vision to realize also what they might be. He set out definitely with the conviction that the life of man is not only a phenomenon to be accepted as humorous and tragic and thrilling, but a possibility to be achieved, a field to be rid of weeds and enriched by cultivation, which, if it be worked, will yield infinite treasures of reverence and beauty and devoted service. Statesmen change laws. Inventors develop new processes. What Wesley wanted to see was a transformation in man himself. It was his belief that character may be changed, and not only changed for the better, but be lifted from the worst to the best.

If, then, John Wesley were to pay a visit to New York to-day, I doubt very much whether he would play the Rip Van Winkle. He would be, I imagine, as modern as any of us. Possibly he would have a look at the skyscrapers, and make notes in his diary about airplanes, and listen with a certain anguish to the radio, and gaze with grave concern at the movies, and read the newspapers with bewildered eagerness. But it would not be long before he would begin to find his bearings. Amid the magic of

the mechanical he would peer again into the mystery of man. In the height of a skyscraper he would be less interested than in the ideals of those who work within it. The speed of a train or the tonnage of an ocean liner would mean less to him than the consciences of the passengers carried therein. The radio would be subordinate to what is heard over the radio, and the screen to what is seen on the screen. Sitting in the subway with the rest who so commute, often have I wondered what John Wesley, were he a straphanger for a day or two, would think about us. "They have made improvements in the twentieth century," I seem to hear him saying, "but if I am to judge by the look in many an eye and the sadness on many a face, there is one thing that they have not improved. It is the soul. These people are as sheep not having a shepherd." It was to seek and to save that which is lost, that He came to whom John Wesley gave all the conscious hours of his eighty years of strenuous life.

There is no doubt that Wesley would be enormously impressed by the multiplicity of schools and colleges and universities. But we greatly underestimate his capacities if we suppose that he would have been unequal to the task of dealing with the new knowledge and seeing it in its true perspective. We are apt sometimes to assume that Wesley, because he appealed everywhere to people in poor circumstances and of simple ideas, made use of ignorance as an ally of faith. It is an entire misreading of his mentality. He was a son of the Charterhouse in London, a school, then as now, exacting in its erudition. He went forward to Christ Church, Oxford, and became a Fellow of Lincoln College. At Yale and Harvard he would have been able to hold his own with the best of scholars, quoting Latin and Greek with reasonable facility, and having much that he could not quote as his background. Wesley talked to multitudes who could not read or write. But what he said to them was never illiterate. Whether of things on earth or of things in heaven, he preached that which he knew and testified to that which he had seen. No man was better informed than he. No man made better use of his information. No man was more direct in his examination of and judgment upon a problem to be solved.

John Wesley believed in education. If it be true that the average person utilizes no more than one tenth of the brains with which he has been endowed by the Almighty, then it is no less true that it was Wesley's persistent aim to bring the other nine tenths of a man's capacity into full operation. Most of this abundant energy was devoted to exhorting people, hitherto spiritually and intellectually inert, to make the most of their

latent abilities, their wasted time, their neglected opportunities. As a tonic, John Wesley's influence worked as a bracing atmosphere on a sufferer from lassitude. No one could become a Methodist without discovering an aim in life.

So far from Wesley depreciating the importance of education, he expected of education a good deal more than most presidents of colleges and professors appear to be in a position to offer. As gymnastic for the intellect, geometry is unsurpassed in efficacy; as nourishment, history and biography and languages are among the invaluable. But in John Wesley's curriculum there were emphasized certain elements which do not appear in any textbook. He expected his students to acquire what Saint Paul called the fruits of the Spirit. They were to know as much about love and joy and peace as they knew about Vergil and Cicero. They were not to be satisfied with avoiding mistakes in algebra or the scansion of hexameters. They were to overcome their passions, curb their tempers, and cease to be covetous. John Wesley's university was open to all. But the standard was high. Only by conversion could the freshman matriculate; only by consecration could the senior graduate into the life worth living. To finish that course, as Saint Paul had discovered, was an achievement that tested every fiber of the body and every resource of the mind.

When, therefore, we comment upon the intensity of educational and other initiative in the twentieth century, we must not suppose that we are separating ourselves from the eager spirit of John Wesley. If ever there was what we call "a go-getter," it was this fisher of men. No specialist was more concentrated in his search for truth, no expert was more thorough in his examination of facts, than was the Methodist. What, however, Wesley did insist upon was the necessity for an adequate objective. He laid down the principle that the infinite capacity of man, if it is to be developed by education, will be misused unless it be dedicated to the infinite purposes of God.

To-day, the United States is full of people who throw their entire being into the endeavor, as they say, to succeed. They wish to be first in something—first somewhere. It may be flying across the Atlantic. It may be reaching the Poles. It may be breaking the record in a speed boat. It may be winning a championship on the golf course. Life appears to us as an arena of activity where the prizes glitter and glow with a fascination from which youth cannot escape. Into the competition we throw ourselves

headlong: A few are rewarded by a fleeting moment of triumph. The rest fail.

John Wesley was not against success. Never was man less of a spoilsport. But, weighing all the prizes that the world has to offer, he found them to be wanting. For all alike, the peer and his footman, the wife and the husband, the grandfather and the grandchild, there was no prize worth the trouble of winning except the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus. His kingdom was the only kingdom to be conquered. His service was the only service which was its own reward.

John Wesley was, frankly, a Puritan who refrained from the theater, objected strongly to dancing, and condemned cards. In our period he would find himself among those millions and millions of people to whom the Puritan tradition, if they were ever under its authority, has ceased to be an influence. Moreover, it is undeniable that the conditions under which Puritanism was powerful have changed. It was not difficult, socially, for Methodists to establish a community where worldly amusements, as they regarded them, were avoided. People naturally sorted themselves into classes. I was brought up myself, never to touch a card, never to dance, drink or smoke, never to enter a theater or race course, and never to ride on a train on Sunday. So absolute was this Puritanism that I was unconscious of its severity until, at Cambridge, I discovered suddenly that what I had supposed to be the world around me, was no more than a very exceptional minority within the world.

To-day we live in a civilization where the wheat and the tares grow inextricably in the same field. The same newspaper publishes reports of sermons and descriptions of a prize fight. Over the radio the same station will broadcast the singing of hymns and hints on how to play bridge and improve the complexion. An entire vogue of music has been developed for the ballroom, and if you would hear Beethoven over the air you cannot avoid the risk of the contamination called jazz. Life is thus woven together with interrelated complexities which offer innumerable puzzles to the Puritan conscience.

Let us suppose, as an illustration, that we condemn the use of cosmetics. To what does that condemnation commit us? Is a girl to refuse to sell scent in a drugstore because she is also required to sell lipstick? Is a typist to refuse a position in a firm of merchants because some of the letters, dictated to her, deal with the price of rouge? Is a station agent to resign his position because his freight includes vanity cases? And what about

journalists? Is no Christian ever to write for a newspaper unless his editor undertakes to exclude all references to the stage, the turf, the prize ring, the beauty parlor, and the Blue Danube Waltz?

It is thus instructive to notice how much, and how little, was said by John Wesley in his letters about doubtful recreations. I find but one reference to card playing and dancing. It is as follows:

I say in the present case to one that asks, "Can't I be saved if I dance or play cards?" I answer, "Possibly you may be saved though you dance and play at cards. But I could not." So far you may safely speak; but no further. So much and no more I advise our preachers to speak. But I cannot advise them to speak this to unawakened people. It will only anger, not convince them. It is beginning at the wrong end. A plain preacher in London used to say, "If you take away his rattles from the child, he will be angry; nay, if he can, he will scratch or bite you. But give him something better first, and he will throw away the rattles of himself." Yet I do not remember that I call these things "innocent amusements." And you know we do not suffer any that use them to continue in our Society. Yet I make allowance for *those that are without*. Else I might send my own father and mother to hell, though they not only lived many years, but died in the full assurance of faith.

You do not seem to observe that it has pleased God to give such a measure of light to the Methodists as He has hardly given to any other body of men in the world. And He expects *us* to use all the light we have received, and to deal very tenderly with those who have not received it.

On the theater also, there seems to be one reference only:

The endeavours lately used to procure subscriptions for building a new playhouse in Bristol have given us not a little concern; and that on various accounts: not barely as most of the present stage entertainments sap the foundation of all religion, as they naturally tend to efface all traces of piety and seriousness out of the minds of men; but as they are peculiarly hurtful to a trading city, giving a wrong turn to youth especially, gay, trifling, and directly opposite to the spirit of industry and close application to business; and, as drinking and debauchery of every kind are constant attendants on these entertainments, with indolence, effeminacy, and idleness, which affect trade in an high degree.

Drink is mentioned more frequently and we have this classic passage:

Distilled liquors have their use, but are infinitely overbalanced by the abuse of them. Therefore, were it in my power, I would banish them out of the world.

The idea that Wesley was forever preaching abstentions is thus without foundation. His Puritanism was not a gospel. It was merely what seemed, in those days, to be a corollary to the gospel. It was not dogma, it was discipline, and, as every theologian knows, there is a profound difference between the two.

In Wesley's attitude there was no intolerance. His line of thought

was directed by logic and common sense. He held as a general proposition that people should seek the best in life. If they can attain to nothing better than "innocent amusements," then those amusements, compared with the larger spiritual failure involved, are innocent in the sense that they are of negligible importance. But it is possible to find in life that for which it is worth while to surrender amusements, however innocent they may be. A footballer goes into training. Why not a Methodist? It is the reasoning of Saint Paul:

Know ye not that they which run in a race run all, but one receiveth the prize? So run, that ye may obtain.

And every man that striveth for the mastery is temperate in all things. Now they do it to obtain a corruptible crown; but we an incorruptible.

I therefore so run, not as uncertainly; so fight I, not as one that beateth the air:

But I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection; lest that by any means, when I have preached to others, I myself should be a castaway.

Amusements must be subordinate to efficiency. To dance until three o'clock in the morning may not be in itself a sin. But he who so dances must not expect to be able next day to give his best to the world in which he lives.

The Puritanism of Wesley, it should never be forgotten, was one feature only of a larger program, the aim of which was human betterment, spiritual, intellectual, physical, social, international. In the astounding letter which Wesley wrote to Richard Steels, a Methodist in Ireland, we see the prohibitions in their true perspective. "Touch no dram," we read. "It is liquid fire. It is a sure though slow poison." Similarly, we have this:

Use no snuff unless prescribed by a physician. I suppose no other nation in Europe is in such vile bondage to this silly, nasty, dirty custom as the Irish are.

So with tobacco: "It is an uncleanly and unwholesome self-indulgence."

But we also have directions to "touch no supper but a little milk or water gruel," and to "rise early in the morning whether you preach or no," and to "avoid all familiarity with women" on which Wesley added:

This is deadly poison both to them and you. You cannot be too wary in this respect; therefore, begin from this hour.

Moreover, the Methodist must "be cleanly" as a Quaker; he must be especially particular over his clothes and, Wesley does not hesitate to add, over his head. "Do not cut off your hair," writes Wesley, "but clean it, and keep it clean." Hygiene was thus an element in holiness and, to

Wesley, such holiness was what we to-day indicate by the term preventive medicine. So with the use of physic and even electric treatment for disease. There is nothing in the modern hospital, clinic, and pharmacopœia which lies outside Wesley's determination to find practical remedies for the pain and illnesses which, unchecked, were afflicting the people wherever he went. At a time when Europe was rent in twain over systems of government and the precise delimitation of frontiers, here was a realist who had the eye to see that all the diplomacy and all the politics in the world mattered less to the human race and to the individual than soap and water, a healthy skin, and decent modest clothing.

If, then, Wesley went to Geneva, he would approve with his whole heart of the aims pursued by the League of Nations. His declaration that "wherever war breaks out, God is forgotten," is the basis on which the entire fabric of peace—the Kellogg Pact, the Hague Court, disarmament—may be built. His terrific denunciation of slavery prepared the way for the abolition of that intolerable wrong which is still proceeding, and for the safeguarding of weak races which are supposed to be secured under the system of mandates. The promotion of health by the League, the amelioration of labor conditions, and the suppression of drugs and other evils are of the very essence of the Methodism preached by John Wesley.

There was, thus, no agency for good that John Wesley was not prepared to apply to the benefit of mankind, nor can I see any reason for supposing that, if he were to return to the Oxford of the twentieth century, he who welcomed the use of electricity for bodily healing would refuse the use of psychopathy for assistance in the healing of the mind. He would judge of this method, as he judged of all methods, by its results.

But in the clear and logical judgment of Wesley there was never any danger of confusing mechanics with the power that drives mechanics. Others might discuss physic and psychopathy. Wesley looked also at the physician and the psychopathist. Others were much concerned over gospels and creeds. Wesley looked beyond them to the Christ who gave the gospel and the Holy Spirit by whose wisdom creeds were made a vehicle of truth. Whether man be assisted by method or by miracle did not matter much to Wesley, always providing that man was really assisted; and whether there be method, whether there be miracle, there must be Omnipotence, the power of God unto salvation.

John Wesley would not have rejected psychology as an expression of the love of God. But he would have repudiated it as a substitute for the

love of God. He would not have denied that psychology may lead to useful results. But he would have insisted that, psychology or no psychology, there is a process of conversion which transforms lives. "I have seen instances of this," he wrote. "No Indians are more savage than were the colliers of Kingswood; many of whom are now humane, hospitable people full of love to God and man; in every state content; everywhere adorning the gospel of God their Saviour."

If John Wesley were to revisit this world there would be such results manifest in the individual. The bandit would not need to be convicted. He would be converted and cease to be a bandit. The grafter would not need to be pilloried. He would repent of his dishonesty and cease to be a grafter. The bootlegger would lose his customers and his desire to have customers and would turn to honest trade. Wherever John Wesley went he made that kind of difference.

There is one grave problem to the solution of which John Wesley, by his very misfortunes, would be in a position to add his contribution. Year by year, hundreds of thousands of homes are shattered by divorce; and why? What is it that is breaking down? What is it that is failing to stand the stress and strain of life?

It is the theory that matrimony is an indulgence or a luxury or right that affects the two partners alone who enter into it. Each is to exist solely for the other, and if that be not satisfying to either side, there is incompatibility and its usual sequel. John Wesley stood for the principle that no husband is, in himself, sufficient to guarantee the happiness of a wife, and that no wife is, in herself, sufficient to guarantee the happiness of her husband. Both husband and wife must be ready to look beyond each other to the society to which both owe obligations. To John Wesley, marriage, like everything else, was not an end in itself but a means to an end, namely, the glory of God and the service of man. It was a doctrine that had to be accepted by both partners in the home—husband as well as wife and wife as well as husband—nor did Wesley find, or at least marry, such an equal in consecration. But his very difficulty demonstrates the urgency of his conviction that the home and all it contains is only founded upon a rock when it is administered as a trust by people who themselves put their trust in God.

It would be untrue to say that in the recognition of woman as the spiritual partner of man in the church John Wesley stood alone. For many centuries an enormous service has been rendered by sisters of mercy

to Catholicism, and for many years before Methodism became powerful the Quakeress in her bonnet had been active and influential. But to this day the Society of Friends, however noble may be its witness, is small in numbers, while the nun, with all her devotion, belongs to a religious order separated from the community as a whole. What Wesley did was to enroll multitudes of women regarded as ordinary in capacity and certainly surrounded by average circumstances. Many of them were wives and mothers. Most belonged to a family circle. Yet they became as active, as skillful in parochial duties as many an ordained curate or minister. Out of the spiritual consecration of womanhood there emerged a new conception of the secular citizenship of women. The votaress of the class meeting established the claim to be a voter at the polling booth and, what is no less important, the claim to be voted for.

If, then, John Wesley were to revisit our world, he would, I think, seek to envisage that world as no different in essentials from the world of his own day. He would demand that it be organized as a home where the Eternal Father may bless even the least of his children; and from all of God's children he would demand that obedience to the Father, that confession of disobedience, that penitence, prayer, and praise which were his own habitual approaches to the Eternal in whose presence daily he bowed the knee and opened the heart.

Religion and Medicine

RICHARD C. CABOT

I HAVE four points to make in the relation of religion to medicine—first, that the practice of medicine gives meaning and body to certain religious ideas; second, that the practice of religion helps health; third, that religion as a profession is now being drawn toward medicine; and fourth, that medicine as a profession always has been drawn toward religion.

I

First, then, what the practice of medicine does for certain religious ideas: One of the most obvious and time-worn, one of the most often emphasized of religious ideas is the dependence of man upon powers outside himself. Of course religion has something particular to say in regard to the nature of the power outside himself upon which man depends. In season and out of season, medicine has to tell man how much he depends on some powers outside himself. So far as the ideas called "humanism" are concerned, meaning that man can go it alone, they get a body blow from the daily practice of the doctor, who knows that man cannot go it five minutes alone, that he depends from moment to moment on oxygen, on warmth, on food and drink, that he depends for his whole rescue from the attacks of disease upon what comes to him from without, supplemented by unconscious powers that fight on his side from within.

The physician finds in the body a strong bias toward health, what used to be called the *vis medicatrix naturæ*, the healing power of nature. A power in ourselves, not our conscious effort, is always fighting on our side for health. I shall not go into detail on that to-day. The only illustration which I should like to leave in your mind is the illustration of a lead keel on a sailing boat. The lead keel biases the boat toward staying up, toward maintaining its balance rather than being upset. When a boat is on even keel, one does not notice the effect of the lead. When she tends to tip over, the lead has a tendency to pull it toward the upright position. So the bias of the healing power of nature tends to pull us up to work toward health, and to furnish healing powers often sufficient without human aid at all, to bring us through into health.

II

Secondly, how does religion, the practice of religion, not theories about

religion, but its use in daily life, the "practice of the presence of God," help toward health? It is apparent to anyone who has dealt with the sick how a variety of other influences, not called religion, work toward health. A man taken away from his work, for instance, by some accident, laid on the shelf, as it were, for the time being, finds it much harder to maintain his physical vigor. He needs work almost as much as he needs food, drink, and sleep. Work is a necessity to the hygiene of the man who has become used to work, as much as the natural forces that I have referred to. Work, then, is a means to health. Happy marriage is a means to health. Success in one's undertakings is a means to health. All those familiar physical forces help to keep the human body upon an even keel.

Now religion, I think, more than any of those forces, in so far as it is the practice of religion and not talk about it or theories about it—the practice of religion tends to keep a man on an even keel.

I have known few, if any—I cannot now recollect any person—who had the regular habit of prayer and who suffered seriously or had any ill-effects from not sleeping. There are people used to prayer who do not sleep very much, but they do not suffer from their lack of sleep.

Religion rests on the belief that we have found ourselves at home in this universe; we think we have found where we belong; we think we have found our place. For anyone to know he is at home in the world, or to believe so, is a great means to health. It is one of the pathetic forms of suffering in elderly people who have begun to suffer from disease of the heart and brain that they are apt to fancy themselves away from home even though they are in their own house and among their own people. They are tortured by the sense that they are away from home. Anyone who has watched—as I have so many times watched—those sufferings, knows how much it means to us to be sure that we are at home. Such confidence acts through the ductless glands doubtless to better the chemistry of the body, as we know that fear and rage act through the ductless glands to change the chemistry of the body. We do not know much about the effect of great positive emotions on health through the ductless glands, but we have every reason to think that there is an effect. It certainly looks so to one who watches people in health and in disease.

People who have been accustomed to the practice of religion, then, are steadier; they meet the shocks that all of us must meet and the disturbances that those shocks must bring to our bodies as well as to our minds. And they meet those shocks better.

The need of religious interest and preoccupations in medicine is clear

to anyone who has passed, as I have passed, a good many years of his life in hospitals, where we see medical work at its best but also see most clearly what it lacks. Physicians know that a good hospital can give better physical care, better medical and surgical care, better clinical and nursing care, than can be gotten anywhere else. What they are ludicrously apt to forget is that a hospital is not a place where most people would choose to pass their lives. The doctor is so used to living in a hospital, it seems to him such a natural place, that he fails to realize that to a patient it is likely to seem gruesome. Because the doctors and nurses often do not realize what a dreadful place a hospital must seem to the patient, they do not attempt, much as they ought, to explain to the patient what it all means, or try to make the hospital less grim, less apparently heartless, less fearsome. For example, physicians have always been prone to forget that even a sick man needs work, unless he is in the very acute stage of illness. He needs something to do with his hands, something to do with his mind. Physicians, when they are in the hospital, have plenty to do with their hands, have plenty to do with their minds, and so they are apt to assume that everybody else has, and to assume that nothing can be easier or pleasanter than to lie quietly in the bed and do nothing. In the acute stages of pneumonia or after an operation a patient does not need any occupation, but during nine tenths of the stay of a patient in a hospital he does need to be occupied. There is a beautiful story that Dr. Alfred Worcester used to tell of one of the German hospitals—that every person in that hospital, even the day before he died, had something to do and was glad he had something to do.

Then, the other interests of the patient before he came to the hospital and after he leaves the hospital are apt to be forgotten by physicians. The physician's interest is focused on the page or strip of the patient's life that is passed in the hospital. Where he came from, where he is going, what he has been and what he will be, the physician does not have the time to focus on. Yet it is absolutely necessary, if the best is to be done for the patient, that somebody else should focus on what this patient's interests are, out of what life he came, to what life he will return, his present affairs and hopes and disappointments.

Illness needs to be interpreted to the patient; in the first place, the physical meaning of this illness. He has probably heard the name, the long Latin or Greek name of what he is suffering from. But does he know what it means? Is he to be sick a week, a month, or a year? Is he to recover shortly? Will he be able to work as he worked before? Has he got to reshape or remodel his life, or will he go on as he did before? His

disease and his suffering need interpretation from someone other than the physician, most properly, I think, from that profession which is committed to every interest in his life, namely, the ministry.

But the interpretation of a person's illness goes further than what I have spoken of. It is not merely an interpretation of the physical consequences of his troubles. I suppose many of you who have been through illness, or have seen it, know what patients so often ask, "Why did this come to *me*?" We are willing to bear with illness as a fact in the universe so long as it does not strike near home. It is natural that someone else's child should be hit by an automobile or that someone else should have typhoid fever or tuberculosis or cancer. Until it strikes us ourselves we never imagine there could be a world that could hit us this way, and we need to be told how this can be a world tolerable to anyone and yet contain that fact.

Of course, if one is facing death, as often enough one must, one wants to be told what that means, by somebody who has some idea of what it means. And the vast majority of physicians are not willing to say to a patient anything of what they think it means.

Unfortunately at the present time, under the influence of some very fashionable fads, the clergy, like many of the doctors, when they try to help sick people are likely to get off on certain psychological trends, certain pseudo-scientific ideas which they mistake for the benefits of the Christian religion. I might as well make it clear now that when I am talking about religion in this afternoon's talk, I must be talking about the only religion that I really know anything about from the inside, which is the only way that anyone can know religion. And that is the Christian religion. It is not that I think it is the only religion in the universe, but I think that no man can really know two religions. He can know one from the inside and many from the outside, but he is not likely to know more than one from the inside. I am talking, then, about the Christian religion.

The sort of benefit that I think should come to sick people from the clergy is the benefit of Christian ideas, not of ideas that never were heard of until within the last thirty or forty years, but of ideas which have been the sustenance of the human race since the Founder of Christianity made them live.

The ministry can be, and is, helpful to medicine by serving those portions of the human life which the doctor and the nurse are apt to forget, by standing for the interests of the whole man, and therefore not being content when any part of human interests is left out.

Because of certain mistaken ideas about the relation of religion to insanity, some people think insanity causes religion and some people think religion causes insanity. Those ideas are equally fallacious. Some people, seeing that in the violence of insane delirium certain patients are troubled with delusions which concern religion, try to keep religion away from the patient, not only at that moment but at other moments, because it seems to them it must have produced or to be producing the patient's illness. If there were any truth in the idea that religion tends to favor insanity, then it would be true that clergymen, priests, nuns, and those most concerned in the practice of religion would have a higher percentage of insanity than other people. But statistics show that they have a lower percentage than other people. There is no evidence whatsoever that religion ever caused or favored insanity.

On the other hand, some people feel that the insane show what the real meaning of religion is because when they are insane they may have delusions. Some misguided individuals, therefore, tend to treat religion as if it were merely one form of insanity. The fanatic, of course, is the person tremendously concerned with one idea. The insane man also is at times tremendously concerned with one idea. By keeping those ideas in mind one can delude himself, provided one knows nothing particularly about insanity or religion, that they are a good deal alike. I merely want to enter a general negative as against all this. No one who has intelligently studied either one would confound them.

Another mistake which has sometimes kept people from believing that religion is essential to mental and physical health is the idea that religion is an escape from reality, an escape from the hard facts which man ought to face, which science tells him he must face. Religion, it is said, is one of the ways of attempting to escape difficult situations, and therefore, of course, as it is an escape from reality, religion must be leading us toward sickness and not toward health. In a certain sense I think there is something in this idea. I think religion is an escape from reality in precisely the same sense that all civilization is an escape from reality. When the savage faces the weather and the prospect of starvation he escapes from the damage of those facts by learning how to clothe himself in skins, by learning how to fish and hunt, and how to cultivate the ground. Civilization is an escape from reality in the sense that the more destructive and painful aspects of reality have to be warded off or guarded against by the devices of civilization.

Art is an escape from reality. When a man learns to dance or to sing

—and I mention now two of the most primitive of arts—then he escapes from certain facts in the actual world, namely, the blundering of his own muscles and of his own vocal cords. Nature and reality are represented in his own muscles and his own vocal cords. He learns to control them and so he learns to escape from the domination of nature, of his blundering muscles, and his blundering vocal cords in so far as he learns to dance and to sing.

Science is certainly an escape from reality. I have felt that experience more keenly than I have the rest. Anyone who has been trying to practice medicine, especially anyone who has been trying to practice medicine among the poor, so that he cannot possibly keep out of social work, has to face the fact that most of what he does for most people is a failure. Most of his attempts most of the time do not succeed. He tries to find out things but he does not find out. He tries to cure people and he does not cure them. They get well themselves or they die, but most of the time he cannot fool himself into thinking that he does it. Most of the time the life of the doctor and the life of the social worker—and especially the life of the doctor in hospitals and among the poor—is a life of frustration and of failure. From that frustration and failure he learns to escape into science. When he cannot do anything else he can make statistics.

I think statistics are most valuable. But you cannot eat them; you cannot sleep on them; you cannot benefit the human being with them in the next five minutes. Statistics, however, are the basis for preventive work in the future; they are the basis for better calculations, and better work in the future. Man escapes from his troubles into statistics. When he is facing unemployment he needs to escape into the proper statistics, what the figures on unemployment are. When he is facing disease and cannot so far conquer disease, he needs statistics to tell him where the disease is at its worst and where it is increasing. Then he can plan his campaign so that it will be most effective.

I am not speaking of theory. I am speaking out of my own experience and out of the experience of many others. I have seen them getting comfort out of science, retiring into the deeper aspects of scientific reality in order to save their spiritual lives and keep themselves from disappointment and despair.

This recognition is of especial importance to social workers because, while the doctors rather generally recognize that without science to steady them they cannot keep their balance, they cannot keep their hearts, social workers have not recognized that nearly enough as yet; they have not

realized that they can get courage and balance and strength out of the study of the scientific side of their work when they cannot get it out of the attempt directly to improve reality.

In the field of science one can make a success of things; one can ask a question and get it answered. Even though the success is all in our own mind, even though these statistics cannot now be applied to the future, we have made a start, and that is a help when one is facing failure and frustration to the extent that we are in medicine.

III

I want to exemplify next how religious work is getting drawn more and more toward medical work. It is natural that medical work and religious work should draw together, because they began together and, I think, belong together. It was so in the beginnings of Christianity. All through its history until very recently there has been spiritual ministration and healing, spiritual ministration and physical helpfulness, like the washing of the disciples' feet.

We find when the beneficent spirit of the universe draws men into religion, it drives men also into physical service as a genuine part of service to anyone who is in trouble. Anyone who cares for religion wants to help someone who is in trouble. But helping of someone who is in trouble never can be carried through, as a stroke in golf, unless it extends to physical helpfulness as well as spiritual helpfulness. The New Testament points out certain typical situations which call for the religious man's activities; hunger, thirst, nakedness, imprisonment. Those are among the situations mentioned in the New Testament as especially calling for religion. They call for physical helpfulness as well as spiritual helpfulness.

Therefore, until recently the function of the religious man, the priest, or the minister, has been that of doctor as well as teacher. When Saint Francis turned with all his heart to religion, the first thing he did was to go to a leper hospital and nurse the lepers. Hospitals and the religious side of hospitality went together in the beginning. They came out of the same forces. We had hospitals because there were pilgrimages to Jerusalem. One of the earliest hospitals was started in Jerusalem because so many of the pilgrims arrived half-starved, sick, and wounded, and as a matter of hospitality to those pilgrims they built hospitals there and in the various countries through which they traveled. So, along through France and Spain there were hospitals as a part of the religious houses and monasteries to care for the physical ailments of pilgrims.

The clergy instinctively felt that they wanted to be close to people in the time when human kinship is most easily brought out and they can most easily get next to people. It was borne in upon me when I first began to work in a hospital how easy it was to make friends in a hospital. You can make friends with almost any sick man if you will do some simple, decent, stupid thing for him, something that anyone can do. It is extraordinarily easy to make friends on the basis of any physical injury, not merely a sickness. One of the things that first brought this home to me I have told before and put it in one of my books. I was passing in a street when a horse fell down in the shafts. The driver began to get the harness off. He asked me if I would not help him. I knew less than nothing about it. But he said, "All you've got to do is to sit on his head." So I sat on the horse's head, while the driver did the expert task of getting the shafts and the harness off the horse. By the time the horse was on his feet, the driver and I were old friends.

In misfortune we say that a touch of nature makes us kin. The touch of misfortune makes us kin, and the misfortune of illness particularly so. Hence, if one wants above all things to get close to human souls it is natural to look with longing on the opportunities that illness offers. It is intolerable to be close to people in their misfortune and be able to do nothing about it, much worse than not to be with them at all. But if the clergyman tries to do anything about it he is tortured by the sense that he may be doing the wrong thing. It is then that he wants to know something about medicine.

I have seen something in the last two years of a young clergyman working among the Indians in South Dakota. He first came into my office two years ago because in working for the spiritual welfare of these Indians he discovered that as the only white man within so large a radius he could not possibly avoid the practice of medicine. He said, "I know absolutely nothing about it, but I challenge any human being with a heart to live where I am living and not practice medicine. He must practice medicine." So he asked me to do what I could within three months to get him something that would make him less ignorant in these contacts which he could not avoid. Through what I was able to steer him to in one of our Boston hospitals, he picked up a useful kit of ideas with which he went back to his work. He told me recently how he has been using these ideas. He knew how tremendously ignorant he was and how inadequate what he could do was. But, "It is not a question between me and an educated practitioner; it is a question between me and no medical attention at all. I know that

I can be clean where cleanliness is needed. The alternative is somebody who is dirty."

One of the things that always makes me feel that religion and medicine belong together is seeing nuns in hospitals. I do not know how nuns in hospitals strike you. They strike me as people in the right place, especially in hospitals for chronic diseases, in which class are the majority of human diseases that need to be in a hospital at all.

I wonder if you have ever stopped to think that the present-day nurse's uniform is a relic of the nun's uniform. The cap that the nurse puts on the back of her head does not carry out any hygienic purpose. It is only the remains of the nun's headdress. The nurse is one of the few people in civil life who wear a uniform, and she wears it because the nurse used to be a nun. Essentially she ought to be a nun to-day. We never shall get good nursing service in our chronic hospitals till we get people who are there without looking for any earthly reward. It is too monotonous a job, it is too discouraging, sometimes too risky, a job for people to go through for pay.

From time to time we hear of scandals in our hospitals for the insane. It does not make the slightest difference whether you hear of them or not. They are sure to be going on there. We try to hire people for a low price to do a disagreeable, discouraging, and sometimes dangerous job. Of course, we do not get, and never shall get, angels under those conditions. But you need angels or the nearest thing to angels that you get on earth for the nursing of the chronic insane. It is a terrible job. We never shall have it properly done until it is done by nuns or their equivalent, either religious people or people devoted to this thing for its own sake, not for anything they can get out of it.

IV

Lastly, let us see how medicine reaches out toward religion, though not of course all the time, not of course in the work of every medical practitioner. It reaches out when medicine is most truly medicine, namely, when it is non-competitive. Medicine was never meant to be a competitive job. The medical man was meant to be facing troubles of his patient all the time, not part of the time facing his patient and another part of the time facing some other doctor who, he is afraid, may drive him out of the job. Medicine is sometimes a non-competitive job, for instance in public health work. The most devoted doctors I have known, men like Dr. Richard Strong, public health men, are of that type. The Red Cross

workers in emergencies do not compete with anybody else; they are thinking wholly of the need. Sometimes the doctor in a country town is *the* doctor, as the grocer is *the* grocer, and therefore out of competition.

Beyond these, and still more clearly non-competitive, is the missionary physician. It is no accident that men like Grenfell in Labrador, Schweitzer in Central Africa, and Torrance down by the Sea of Galilee, are doctors who cannot keep out of religion, doctors who have to preach as well as practice. They have to, because of the tremendous sacredness of the work. Here, of course, religion and medicine are so blended that one cannot say which is which. And that is what they should be, as I see it, all the time.

Religion and nursing are very poor trades. They are magnificent professions. When they are professions they are not content to deal with anything less than the whole man, and so they cannot rightly keep away from man's most fundamental and central interest, which is religion. These two professions, as I have been trying to show, belong together because they started together, because they both intend to serve the whole man.

The Romance of Tradition in Literature

PHILO M. BUCK, JR.

TRADITION—in these our later days of science and progress, does not the very word suggest things long out of date, that our enlightened and hygienically fumigated age has thrown into the dust bin of romantic curiosities? We are ever discarding tradition. Science years ago learned to get along perfectly without the geocentric theory of the universe; and though at first there was the natural shock at the discovery that man no longer occupies a unique and central grandstand seat in the cosmic circus, we get along fairly well, with our trust in our little house-keeping not greatly impaired. Indeed, with the discovery at first there came a larger self-confidence. Now we are learning that much of the old confidence of the science of the past century or two is not much more firmly placed. Yet we find ourselves not greatly hampered, for all of Mr. Einstein and his like, in discovering new ways of adjusting our practical lives to these revolutionary catastrophes of the theories of science. For seen thus the whole history of science and human progress is the tale of revolution on revolution, old kings are dead, long live the new. Can the tradition of human art and literature be any the less a tale of repeated revolution and catastrophe, and its romance the tragedy of disillusionment or chronicle of dead kings?

What remote human commodity have we in common with the age of Homer, or the petty piracies that gave their motives to the tale of Troy? And the lies of Ulysses may have been an edification to rude soldiers watering their imaginations with drink and poetry; but what to us to whom the secret places of the world are raucous with competing tourist factotums? Virgil may tell us much of the Latin use of the subjunctive, and Cæsar of indirect discourse; but the tragedy of Dido, or the forgotten wars in Italy, the conquest of Gaul and the near invasion of Germany—a modern newspaper can give us all we want of the one and we did the other in a far more wholesale and spectacular manner just the other day. Are not comparisons with the ineptitudes of the past only odious to the past? Why travel the lonely road with Dante through the baleful regions, up the mortifying heights of Purgatory, only to fly through the ten spheres of a Heaven that our richest science to-day will tell us is only stark interplanetary space offering no spot of rest for even a poet's imagination? In brief—are we not long past the puerilities of Homer, the lovelorn romance of Virgil,

and the cosmic faith of Dante? Why trouble our souls with the romance of a tradition that is as dead as Babylon or Tyre?

And all this were true, if literature, like science, were only organized knowledge, and dealt with abstractions. A psychiatrist meeting the fleeing Orestes, obsessed by remorse for the murder of his mother, doubtless would by subtle psychoanalysis arrive at the cause, and perhaps proceed to his cure by a scientific regime. (One to-day has.) The scientist would be interested in the present symptoms only as they correspond with certain abstract generalizations about *dementia præcox*, which his science had provided him with, and his cure similarly would be equally good for all who were similarly afflicted. But Euripides is interested only in the nerve-racked Orestes, and in the play where his madness is made plain cures him by contact with the only pure, unselfish family affection the poor obsessed boy had ever known, that of his sister Iphigenia, who herself too had known exile and misery and the fatal hand of a parent. The poet Euripides was no scientist as we know science to-day; and its terminology would be a barbarous jargon in his ears. But he knew what the human soul can suffer, and when it is crushed under an impossible load. And by the magic of his divination he knew also where the right relief may be found that will discharge the burden and bring peace. He knew Orestes and Iphigenia. The scientist knows only *dementia præcox*. The one gave us exquisite tragedy, the other hopes to cleanse society of its motive.

For great literature in its tradition is interested only in the problem of human nature in the concrete—the grimness of tragedy when personality strips for action against overwhelming odds; the grotesqueness of comedy when personality is distorted from all that good manners or the human conscience holds sensible or just; the bitterness of cynicism or satire sharpening its anger against manifest inhumanity; the gentleness or swift adventure of romance with its idealization of human virtue and the sweetness of accomplished love and victory over malicious obstacles—whatever form it may take, from the earliest to that of to-day, great literature has been a manifestation of the stature of man and a search for the secret of human destiny.

Nor has human nature and the central human problem essentially changed in the years from Homer—at least human nature as the poet sees it, and as we acknowledge it. It is the gradual unfolding of its tradition that is the romance of great literature—a romance as varied in its theme as humanity itself, as it has developed under the varied demands of its

social and natural environment. It was as natural for the Greeks—as we now look back and pronounce judgment—to take life as a glad adventure, as it was for the Hebrew to glow with the fierce intensity of his moral enthusiasm, or the Oriental in India to dream of the vanity of all things of sense and to fix his gaze upon the ineffable mystery of infinity, or for the Roman to be enthusiastic only in his sense for order and civic duty.

To be sure, we are a long way from Homer's Greek world to-day, its narrow horizon, its petty states and still more petty wars, village squabbles, almost, with billingsgate and bludgeons, its lying accounts of adventures with Cyclops and Sirens, and the lady Calypso and the dark House of Hades for romance and terror. At first sight there is not much to choose between the braggart Ulysses and the after-dinner long-bow of Sindbad, the Sailor, in the art of lying convincingly; and the world of romance has always loved the genial liar, even at the sacrifice of edification. But Homer edifies, and more, he reveals. Sindbad is an impossible but interesting story. Ulysses is a man, a character, the incarnation of an idea, as human as the least and the greatest of us, in pursuit of an ideal greater than he—the vital and convincing symbol of the eternal restlessness of the human heart, its eternal dissatisfaction with every newly won success. Ulysses is no romantic dreamer shedding idle tears over man's sad lot—he is the eternal adventurer, ever at grips with fearful odds, ever resourceful, but finding in each newly gained victory only the added zest for all that life has to offer. Even Penelope and the righteous revenge over his house's foes and the company of son and aged father may not hold this restless imagination, and an old man now, he must fare forth anew, bitten by restless curiosity for new knowledge, that his book of adventure may be closed only by his death. Yes, Ulysses is human; the romance of Greece and Europe, not static and complaisant and contented with things as they are; but ever at strife with the unknown, ever in invasion that he may bring back some new fragment of knowledge to add to his priceless treasure. "Much did he learn." So the poet begins the poem, "Many were his adventures," and such too has been and still is the story of scientific and dissatisfied Europe.

Against the restless Ulysses, Homer in his other great poem places that seeker after the glory of self-realization and self-respect, Achilles, the pattern, but a flawed pattern, of the heroic soul, the romantic knight. Flouted in the beginning by a capricious commander in chief, in anger he retires from the fight that his friends, and his foes, too, may know what a treasure the tyrant Agamemnon has dishonored. He seeks vindication only,

for has not his name and soldiership been made a shaking of the head among the host? And he gets his vindication in full measure and running over. For while he sulks in his tent, the attack under the dauntless Trojan prince, Hector, is pushed home. His companions one by one are carried from the fight; until his life-long friend, Patroclus, who has till now been faithful in his allegiance, can bear it no longer, and presses to be allowed to show himself to the foe. The request is granted, but the friend is killed. Achilles has been amply vindicated—but at what a cost! Now he is eager for revenge against the man-slaying Hector; and all unknightly—utterly out of character—he meets and slays the Trojan prince. Surely now the romance should come to a glad ending. Achilles has gained each request. But no—human nature has ever grasped eagerly at the apples of Sodom, whose taste is that of dust and ashes. And our last glimpse of the hero is in his tent, where he is approached by the tragedy-laden Priam, the aged father of Hector; and here the two mingled their tears, the slayer and the father of the slain—united in a common grief. Victory like defeat brings no romantic compensatory thrill; its price is disillusionment and tragedy. Here is a picture of the eternal in human nature, sung ages ago in early Greece to soldiers in their moment of relaxation. To-day, after a similar adventure, the Achilles and the Priams are sitting in the same sort of tragic bewilderment. Of such texture is the romance of tradition in great poetry.

Nor has the story Virgil tells us less human significance in this romance of the past. Perhaps no poem ancient or modern has been so widely praised and so universally abused as the *Æneid*. To Dante, Virgil is "*lo mio maestro e il mio autore, degli altri poeti onore e lume*." To the centuries that followed he became the pattern of all that should become a gentleman and soldier and guide of states, and his poem the eternal lamp of poetic verities. And yet the *Æneid* has also been the *pons asinorum* for all beginners in Latin and the laboratory where youth learned to parse Dido's infelicitous adventure with the subjunctive and the pious *Æneas*. It is difficult to mix syntax and romance.

But to Virgil, as to those who read him in his own age and later, *Æneas*, like Ulysses and Achilles, is the incarnation of a human idea; and as the romantic adventurer of Homer is Greece and then Europe, so is *Æneas'* Rome and her gift to the world, the pride and the responsibility of empire. *Æneas* is Augustus, Trajan, Marcus Aurelius, Justinian, the Roman ideal of justice and world order.

"Yours, Romans," he writes, "be the lesson to govern the nations

as their Lord: This is your destined culture, to impose the settled rule of peace, to spare the humbled, and to crush the proud."

World order, peace, justice, the benign reign of law. This is Rome, in ideal, this is Virgil's hero, as he caught the gleam that led him from adventure to adventure, ever selfless, seeking the place, the time where he might lay the foundations of the Eternal City. Against this ideal there was naught of the personal that might prevail, private peace, love, home and fireside, the quiet that even Ulysses sought—these must weigh as nothing against this compelling destiny. Against these the charm and the grief of a Dido, the beauty of the youth of a Camilla, the heroic patriotism of a Turnus, are only precious but dangerous obstacles that must be warred down and sacrificed. A huge ascetic ideal of lofty world patriotism against which all private motives are less than nothing—this is Rome as Virgil caught the vision. And also its tragedy—the tragedy of empire. A romance assuredly, but a romance with no personal motives of glory and compensation, the ascetic romance of the saint of the Middle Ages who would do the same for the glory of his God, the ascetic romance of Marcus Aurelius, whose painful chapters one may read in his *Meditations*:

"Moreover, let thy God that is in thee to rule over thee, find by thee, that he hath to do with a man; an aged man; a political man; a Roman; a prince; one that hath ordered his life."

It is also the ascetic romance of each and every man who finds a duty in the larger world of men and affairs, and who must, that his eye may be single, sacrifice all that the private man holds dear and a recompense for living.

And Dante, the medievalist, perhaps the greatest romance of all the world's great, what is there in his vision of the three supernal regions consistent with human nature, in this day when Hell, Purgatory, and the ecstasy of Heaven have been by a triumphant science banished to the limbo of forgotten and useless lore? Of all, perhaps, Dante is the hardest to read, for his speech is interlarded with a theology that to the modern mind is often abhorrent, and his compact earth-centered universe looks in vain in modern astronomy for its shadow. Better we would say the vaporings of a lying Ulysses about his clashing islands and his land of Cimmerian darkness than this accurate cosmography that falls to pieces before even an infant's science. And to many this fact seems an unconquerable offense.

But it is not Dante the fantastic cosmographer that is of human sig-

nificance, for it is tenable that a future age with a future Einstein may discover that our modern scientific hypotheses are as fallible. For it is the boast of science that it is always consistently inconsistent, and human character is never measured for its worth by the infallibility of its science, but by its truth to itself. Lucretius is as great a man as Newton, perhaps a greater, though the Englishman has vastly the larger accumulation of scientific knowledge; and Dante is greater than the most accomplished modern astronomer, for his truest observations are of human nature and not in the realm of astro-physics.

To Dante the cosmic universe from Hell to Heaven, and we need no doctrine of immortality as no Ptolemy's universe to make his record true, is a vast proving ground for the exhibition of the heights and depths of human nature, the tragedies and grotesque comedies, and the cynical hardness of the human personality. Damnation, discipline, perfect light and knowledge, these things need no after life that they may be abundantly displayed in their true visage. And though to-day we live in an age of chronic disbelief, the fact that Dante aspires for the human state when knowledge and life shall be perfect—this larger optimism of the middle ages and of its great poet should not startle us into too much incredulity, for have we not with us also the buoyant optimism of Shelley and Emerson? For such optimism looks to the far-off goal, to which even science bends its cloudy eyes.

So Dante threads his painful way through the drear shade of evil, exploring in its depths for signs of human behavior that shall define for him and for us the significance of human depravity. The scars that are left by abuse of the appetites, or by lack of right knowledge, or by the unsocial vices that set the world of men and manners awry. Here is the tragedy of human maladjustment, which knows not its own fearful shortcomings, but tragically and grotesquely glories in its own discomfiture. "Alas—that our sins so cruelly deface us." Humanity dehumanized—not even in the tragedies of Shakespeare and its ironies are there anywhere more clearly envisaged the ravages that humanity makes on itself. Fire, ice, blood, the baleful wood, and the glowing sand, these are the allegory of the price that humanity must pay for its own shortcomings. Dante is here the world's greatest realist.

But the great Florentine is also the poet of a humanity purged and redeemed. And because discipline is always hard and its lessons painful, the ascent of the mount of Purgatory is for the reader, as for the poet, always arduous and never so thrilling as the descent through Hell.

Facilis descensus Averno—as in Virgil so in Dante; but the ascent, *hic labor, hoc opus*, this the labor, this the effort. One need not be an orthodox medieval Catholic to tread the steep path of moral discipline with the poet, for on its summit we shall meet Beatrice, the symbol of the larger reward and more adequate knowledge, without which the flight to human perfection is in vain. But it is gained only through discipline.

And the mysticism of the rhapsody of heaven! Here is the poet's faith in human nature at its highest and best. It is not the mysticism of the Orient, where personality fails, desire is lost, and Buddah-like the individual is caught up into transcendental oneness with the spirit of the whole. Dante's is no such mysticism, and his reward for perfect knowledge is not a closing of the avenues of sense and a complete surrender of all personality has cherished. Dante is never more human than when, bathed in the river of light, he beholds face to face the mystery of the universe, and finds that it possesses human lineaments. Here reason meets reason and is at home in reason. The last knowledge is human knowledge and a revelation of the secrets of a human universe. And this alone brings peace. It was what Ulysses was searching for, and Greece. It is what most science is searching for, stumblingly, like the poet himself. But the poet's faith is strong—the key that shall unlock the last door of knowledge is one the human hand can hold and the secrets shall be patent to human eyes. Strip the poem of its medieval allegory and it becomes a vindication of the utter worth of human character, and a hard-won trust in human science. In this romance of a fourteenth-century Florentine is the *sursum corda* of all later thought; without it there could be no Goethe, no science.

The romance of great literature is discovered in the fact that it has never been awed into silence by any discovered discrepancy between the claims of science and those of human personality.

It is only in these later years, the past century and a half to be accurate, that there has been something discovered in science that at heart seems incompatible with the values of poetry. It is the lesser poets, to be sure, and those who have spoken in the name of science, not the great masters of those that know, who have had this fear. Herbert Spencer, for example, wrote a philosophy of all things from atoms to star dust and the forces that unmake human destiny, and in it all he discovered no place on which the dove of poetry could set its foot, nor could he find for it and its olive branch any ark of refuge. And to those timid souls who saw in him the philosophy of the future, it appeared that the whole universe of human

affairs was subdued under a flood of orderly universal law of science eternal and immutable. Where in this could be discovered the warm values of human romance and poetry? Where in this is there room for human freedom and responsibility and ethical character, if man no less than atoms and star dust perforce obey.

But science, even though we spell it with capitals, is no new thing under the sun; it is not the treasure only of the past century; and its significance is not to be measured by its accumulations of fact and the multiplicity of its hypotheses. We are not more scientific to-day because our science has made larger inroads upon the unknown, than the Greeks who reared it in its infancy. Our technique is more nearly adequate and our laboratories far more expressly equipped, but an old poet, who to-day is much more than a name, had as true a scientific attitude as any modern scientific philosopher; and he could vision a world dominated by law as complete and as immutable as Herbert Spencer's, and yet discover the finest of human values in great poetry. Lucretius never felt compelled to build *himself* a city of refuge to which *he* might betake himself when the poetic urge was on him, and sing, Cassandra-like, the fall of its empire and the ruin of its romance.

To Lucretius, the great poet, there is no conflict between the true philosopher of science and the true proclaimer of the human tradition. It is only the lesser men, whose capricious desires are in conflict with the eternal and immutable, whose imaginations are in revolt:

"A misery of men, he cries. Oh, blinded hearts. . . . But naught is sweeter than to reach these calm, untroubled temples, raised by wise philosophy, whence thou mayest look down on poor mistaken mortals, wandering up and down in life's devious ways."

It was this very passage that stung the imagination of Dante as he stood among the hierarchies of heaven and gazed at the petty blindness of erring human hearts:

"O insensate care of mortals! How defective are those syllogisms which make thee downward beat thy wings! One was going after the laws, and one after the aphorisms, and one following the priesthood, and one to reign by force or by sophisms, and one to rob, and one to civic business, one, involved in pleasure of the flesh, was wearying himself, and one was giving himself to idleness, when I, loosed from all these things, with Beatrice, up in Heaven was thus gloriously received."

Beatrice to Dante was not only the inspiration of woman, she was light, rapture, true knowledge, the only clue to the supreme science which is

the synthesis of all knowledge, and the vital sense of cosmic order and law.

Dante, like Lucretius, was scientist first and poet likewise, because in poetry alone he could discover the larger synthesis which could bring into one cosmic system objective science and the subjective values of the human conscience. He discovers a reign of law as irrefutable as that of the Latin poet, and a series of human values as immutable. And by whatever name we may call it to-day, sin for the Florentine thinker is no purely ecclesiastical or theological disobedience—as it was to the liturgical Hebrew or his more modern descendant, the Puritan—but imperfect human adjustment to the universe in which man lives. To be sure we to-day prefer at times to call such aberrations pathological or seek for them purely physical or physiological motives, but in essence Dante's damned are also in a cosmic hospital for incurables, where their ailments have confined them in vindication of nature's law. Their symbol is Satan, the inert figure of universal degeneracy, the final symptom of fatal *dementia præcox*, as Beatrice is the symbol of perfect sanity rightly employed in orderly activity.

But we may still carry this thought farther to explore the scientific background of Dante's poem and its modern significance. The world of spirit and the world of matter are not in discord, and neither loses its proper dignity. The laws that govern both are one, from one source which is their final synthesis. The lower, the world of physics, is an allegory of the world of mind and spirit—or to put it differently, the law is the same except that in the human and angelic world we are in a higher dimension with its larger significance. This thought is at the farthest remove from any Oriental mysticism—though Dante has frequently been called a mystic and his Paradise sheer rhapsody. Sin, aberration, departure from the normal, call it what you will, is the drama of the irrational in an otherwise orderly world. It is unreason at war with reason, the incalculable defeating the calculable, the lawless always to be expected—as modern science too has discovered—in any orderly scheme, the thing that in the human world by being overcome gives significance and moral grandeur to character. It is difficult for modern science to point a scornful finger at Dante's vision. The medieval poet would have the finest contempt for those poets who, in dread of the closed gates and fetters of a scientific determinism, are flying in panic to little imaginary paradises of their own, where human values and pure poetry might discover a precarious safety. Dante's Paradise is itself the immutable source of laws, as also its final reward.

No, the tradition of great literature has never feared the impact of

the ideas of science; and the greatest have built the mansions in which the just may dwell, on the very foundations of scientific law, and in it discovered the only real source of human values. Great human poetry, instead of being a moral Noah's Ark, drifting idly over a submerged unmoral world, itself possesses the stability of the world, and is the monument erected by human genius to the world's human conquest. It is the romance of man's richest tradition.

But what has become of the long-maintained ideal of human freedom, when even Dante, the most orthodox of Christian poets, discovers in his vision of the two eternities only a realm of immutable law? Is the paradox an unresolvable one; is Dante's faith in human nature, or Lucretius', something that modern science must call vain? I think it is this thought that has troubled the faith of the poets that came after Goethe, and gave color to what is called the Victorian compromise. For to these more seemed at stake than a trust in human nature; even the justice and peace of the world order seemed involved and man's highest prerogative, his boasted moral freedom. If the universe is no universe at all, but a tangle of warring forces, and man a mere formula in this vertiginous dance, "where ignorant armies clash by night," where is the philosopher poet's boasted complacency and his vision of peace? Where is the promise of Dante's *e la sua voluntade è nostra pace*? There is no peace, only an eternal tumult, and the power of darkness and death.

And in these our later days this despair of science to discover the larger pattern or any care in nature for human values—it is this despair that seems to render the thought of a new synthesis between science and poetry so hopeless. In this maze of worlds, if an inhabited world is a mere accident and so trifling that its nearest neighbor is blankly ignorant of its existence, is not the still greater accident that man has emerged from unconsciousness only to reason about his own utter futility—is not this one of the idlest and most irrelevant of ironies in a universe unconscious of its own jest? Where can the poet, on this quicksand, rear any temple of philosophy; where shall he pass to see the ineffable vision and hear the unutterable word; if about, below, above him there be naught but unresonant space? "The silence eternal of these infinities terrifies"—this was Pascal, three hundred years ago—a modern Pascal comes oftener to cynical indifference.

It is this cynical indifference that has had its serious repercussion upon our newer literature. There is a trembling faith in the essential nobility

of human nature that is always in half hiding behind the thing we call the Victorian Compromise. Man is a creature of this world, and subject to natural law; but at the same time he is forever breaking the locks that science forges for nature; in imagination at least he is free, in this region of spiritual values he can build himself a city whose laws have other origins. But now that the simple dualism of the nineteenth century is discarded —? Perhaps nowhere do we catch this note of cynical abandon more clearly than in O'Neill's latest play. Striking as it may be for other qualities, we may well ask if its obvious success is of much more significance than a strange and passing interlude. *Æschylus*, *Sophocles* and *Euripides* attacked the same problem of a family involved in what looks like a helpless destiny. It is dangerous to tread in the old paths where the mighty have trod.

The Greek protagonists of *Æschylus* and his successors never, even at their lowest, lose caste—always they are princely in their dignity, and in their moments of deepest suffering their human nature is always most admirable. They are completely human and as such examples of moral worth, whose value is always to be free though their fate may be spread for them by a malicious destiny; and their pain is the exclamation of a human soul dismayed at the bitterness of discrepancy their nature and ours revolt at. But O'Neill's figures are never such as could dream of having moral health.

This cynical indifference is the most serious break in the romance of the tradition of human worth. But to assert that the tradition is dead before the new knowledge, and that new times must bring new and cynical manners, is to make a daring postulate, which, in the face of human achievement, looks almost like poltroonery. Nor is the case substantially altered if man resorts to a species of higher mysticism. For it is man's own resources that have discovered to him this new modern universe in which he now feels so unwelcome a guest.

Human nature in the romance of the tradition of its past has always gloried in its power to discover a synthesis between the inflexible law of the world without and the longing for value in the world within. It has always read the pattern of its soul to make it correspond with the orderly world of nature; and discovered both to be full of rich meaning. It is unmanly, it is unhuman, to think that both factors in this new equation of man and nature must be reduced to irrational figures, or that the final answer shall be zero. The end of this search cannot be silence.

The Modern Interest in Jesus

OSWALD W. S. MCCALL

A SIGNIFICANT study in contrasts awaits anyone who will open side by side a life of Christ read by church folks of, say, twenty years or more ago and one of to-day. Strauss and Renan were scarcely read by good church people, but put David Smith's *The Days of His Flesh* alongside of J. Middleton Murry's *Jesus, Man of Genius*, and the difference in approach and conception is as marked in the pages as in the titles. With the conspicuous exception of *Ecce Homo*, which many thought a dangerous and impious book in its day, the older methods invariably made much of the supernatural, of Christ's deity and miracles, and these, inseparable from him as pattern from carpet, have attended, explained, and authorized all his words and occasions. To-day a "Life" so written would be a novelty. *The Man of Genius* frankly dispenses with the supernatural—and yet conquers. *The Jesus of History* is preoccupied with something else, and yet succeeds in being very vital. *Jesus: a New Biography* considers its presence in the New Testament story, to be sure, but only to show that it has been manufactured, and G. Stanley Hall's *Jesus, the Christ, in the Light of Psychology*, by the very name it wears might have seemed profane to an earlier generation. Even at the opposite end from this highly critical work of Professor Case and of Professor Hall, the poets, who lately have loved to linger much in the Great Presence, are not talking in the older accents. Kahlil Gibran's *Jesus*, for example, is not really interested in the manner and accomplishments of Jesus' birth (except as those serve the uses of poetry), nor in the making of wine from water, nor in the stilling of a storm. Rather it is in Jesus' power to break the human heart with beauty and to liberate it with goodness, Jesus as our Light, as the speaker of the great Word and the performer of the great Deed, that the eager attention lies, and these are his lineaments as he is described to-day. The poets find in him a haunting and ultimate charm that is the longing of all men.

This contrast in our descriptions of Jesus shows rather a changed sense of value. It is life that we want and must have, and Jesus cannot give it to us by raising Lazarus. Can he give it to us at all? Can he? Stand back. We would hear him. What has he to say? We have time only for one with something to say. This fairy haze of wonder which they have thought important hides him; it is not our world, it makes us

intellectually ill at ease, and anyhow it hides him. We would see Jesus. However, where is he? What sort of a man is he? And what did he have to say?

Never was there a time of more general curiosity about him among thoughtful people. The curiosity is lay and unprofessional; and it is sober, not unfriendly, not a little wistful, and more than occasionally hopeful. The older awe may be lacking, and there is refusal to regard anything as glass-cased and sacrosanct, but this may be only from a terrible fear of being misled. Men have been misled a lot—by assumptions, for instance, that later proved unable to bear examination. I do not think there is unreadiness to render respect where it is found to be due. While this curiosity is not particularly interested to tarry with what it regards as the candy of embellishment in the Gospel narrative, it is after the plain heart and actuality of the matter. Not a bad thing.

But Jesus himself is having to submit, with all other notable figures, ancient and modern, to our present-day temper of search and trial, and surely no one given to reflection can regret it. If he is not able to meet all that can come he is not what we have thought him. George Washington was a man before he was a myth, but we shall never know whether the man justifies the myth if patriotism requires us to keep hands off his halo. Religious veneration must not be allowed to do Jesus a wrong. Let those who are not afraid for him rejoice that he is being judged with no extra or special pleadings to help him. He will have no advantage over the rest of us. He will stand in his own right or not at all.

Yes, the Master is abroad again, among the crowds, where his features grow familiar to common men. They jostle him and demand of him. They haggle at his words and question his motives and his sanity. They pry into his home life and his education and they want to know "by what authority"; sometimes they resent his reputation. No priestly caste defends him, no cloister or tradition. The Master is on the trails again. If he is larger than other men he must show it by comparison. If he is wiser it will be acknowledged only as he is able to silence opposition, and nothing great concerning him shall be taken for granted. In open field the Master must look to himself. All of his disciples together are not enough to maintain him if he cannot maintain himself.

And if some to-day, startled at the unconventionality of all this, would be happier to have him safely entrenched behind stout defenses of doctrine and miracle, let them reflect that his being "safe" there would not make

him either Lord or Saviour. Let them also be comforted in this, that the popular inquiry for him is unprecedented, a quite significant inquiry, an inquiry of men who are sick of illusions and who ache for that which may be trusted, who are sometimes brusque, but they have suffered, who are suspicious, but they have felt betrayed, and their inquiry is for him, for him himself, disentangled, free, natural, and without special guards. It is sometimes a great earnestness and a great hunger that make men brush impatiently aside the Master's halo and investiture. Asking for bread, they are not satisfied when offered stones, not even precious stones. Shall sparkling gems of sentiment, tradition, and marvel save them, whether in the Bible or out of it? What has this man really to give? Stripped of renown, will he remake himself by inalienable worth? If, let us say, he rides unknown and unlabeled into the lists, visor down, anonymous, will all who bear against him feel the manhood in his arm and know him for a champion? Or is he like that knight whom Gareth met, whose soaring reputation he braved, and through whose formidable armor he hacked only to discover that a mere boy was housed within?

Jesus will not be found built of trivial frame and sinew. The manhood in him is already being felt anew and this always was preliminary to any sense of divinity. Was he tempted by visions of temporal power? "The kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" cannot tempt a man who has nothing in him that is able to answer such an appeal. Cæsar was ambitious. So could Jesus have been, so he was. Unlike Cæsar and most of us, however, he knew how to guard against the clamor of the adolescent in him and refuse to be dazzled and misled by baubles. He was tempted to feed his appetite. So was Byron, and used his great talents to turn intractable things into bread, which no man will be tempted to do who has not the hungers of a healthy man. Byron gives us cause to suspect that he later came dimly to see that not thus is a man's life, but Jesus saw it without first having to prove it by a gorged and living death. Howbeit, that he "hungered" is an interesting revelation. "Tempted like as we are," run the words.

Such qualities as these are often accompanied by a dominant personal presence, such a presence as made the French soldiers sent to take Napoleon throw down their weapons and run to embrace him instead, such an easeful mastery as caused the Nazarene crowd to yield before Jesus as he walked at it and through it and away, and which had a similar effect on the rabble outside Gethsemane, and which disconcerted the money-changers, and

which made the maniacs stand in Christ's presence as if a hand had fallen on them.

A man of force is here, considerably more a man of action than is usually associated, perhaps, with his reflective power and habits of meditative solitude. A man of action, a man of crowds, of constant journeys and physical hardihood. A magnetic man, unable to be hid, compelling, provoking in men extreme reaction either of love or of savage hate. The people were fascinated by him. They trampled on one another to get near him, hunted up relatives and friends to bring them, too, and always there were those in the crowd that stared sullenly at him and did not like him, and feared, and yet did not go away. Fascinated! A lovable man, as often happens when the driving force of powerful primitive instinct is controlled and directed, when to unusual natural strength there is added understanding and insight, and when there are personal graces. Women adored him. Children climbed about him. Men who had made fools of themselves could entrust him with their folly. There is no more exquisite revelation anywhere of the innate delicacy of Jesus' feelings than is made quite incidentally in his *touching* of the leper who sought his help. Here a poet's natural æsthetic shrinking from a festering spectacle is outweighed by a brother's vast humanity, and by no betrayal of inward revulsion will Jesus let that man go away physically healed but nervously wounded. Leprosy, that final ostracism, spared neither polite nor vulgar, but in its unclean and desperate despair it was tenfold a horror to a temperament that happened to be sensitive. Beneath the sores there lived a man. More cruel than sores was the mental consciousness of being loathed, feared, and hateful. But Jesus withheld it, the normal, anticipated sign of distaste. Jesus reversed the universal recoil. "Jesus put forth his hand and touched him, saying . . ." Many years later that man must still have been telling the story of the perfect gentleman. Indeed, a lovable man! And not a little man, surely!

Within the limits of this article it is not possible to follow further the qualities of Jesus which lie simply and naturally on the gospel pages. Rich human qualities they are, and some of them reveal him moving on strong and adequate wings in high places, contemplating with wise eyes our human scene, and commenting on it in words whose stubborn truth becomes more felt the more one lives. Yesterday a very fiercely argumentative and iconoclastic young university man, all "het up" about mostly everything, and particularly about the benighted absurdities of churches and religion

and religious people and all that, was met in my presence with the rejoinder that Jesus' point of view rather clashed with some he had just said. I had missed what it was but noticed the young man's unfazed and blithe reply. With something to the effect that he "doesn't bother to go so far back as Jesus," he added: "And if he does contradict me, I don't agree with him, that's all." Simple, wasn't it? Just like that. And to-day I chanced upon this from T. R. Glover: "Matthew Arnold found in Homer something of the clearness and shrewdness of Voltaire. There is nothing archaic about Plato or Virgil or Paul—to keep abreast of their thinking is no easy task for the strongest of our brains, so modern, eternal and original they are. They have shaped the thinking of the world and are still shaping it. How much more Jesus of Nazareth?"

Nothing need be hushed up, debarred, or forbidden. The ways are open, the Master is there. Far from fearing it, we only ask that man shall *dare* to look him in the face. There's the rub, a little. The judicial mind and exact inquiry can only be fruitful, but prejudgment is neither of these, and no one will deny that we are capable of it and that it is much easier than the other way.

"*Forbidden*" cannot be left any more upon the curtain. Nevertheless, it is a trifle overdone sometimes, the ostentation with which a few of the critics rush through the veils of reverence, adoration, and sentiment woven and hung by twenty centuries of Christian love, and despise even so much as to feel the texture to see if it be not tough, too, with much Christian thought. Perhaps it won't really matter if they are truly bent on finding whether there be anything substantial there, providing they retain eyes that can see. For whether there is or is not a God in the Holy of Holies will not be decided by any mere valiant parting of the veils which have been long respected and trampling in with foot-rules and poking fingers. Doubtless if the staring intruder upon the great soul of Jesus proves unable to see any cause to worship, none whatever, and can only shout his "I told you so!" where others would have hushed their voices and whispered, time and the better sense of men will yet conclude that there was more truth in the whisper than in the shout, and that the raucous one was declaring less the measurements of the Holy Place than of himself.

The Progress of Christian Education

PAUL H. VIETH

PERHAPS I should not have used that word "progress." It means movement in a direction which is *right*. And there are those who say that the trend of Christian education is all wrong. Nevertheless, let us assume progress and see whether the evidence will support the assumption.

The word *Christian* in our title is used deliberately because it symbolizes one of the recent movements in this field. Long and bitter has been the debate on the question of whether Protestant Christians should say *religious* education or *Christian* education when they mean education in the religion which they profess. The religious educationists maintain that Christian education does not say what they mean. It says to most people "education under Christian auspices," while what they mean is "education in the Christian religion." The Christian educationists, on the other hand, hold that "religious education" says too much. Under it can be taught any kind of religion. Moreover, there is more than a hint that this is just what is happening—religious education people are teaching much that is not distinctly Christian. The recent vogue of humanistic religion served to augment their fears. With some the argument takes the form of going *back* to something which was supremely good in the older Sunday-school movement. With others it is a case of going forward, but with a more distinctly Christian emphasis. It might of course be argued quite aside from this major point that there is an element of fair play lacking when Christians assume to pre-empt the term religious education for what they are doing, when it applies with equal appropriateness to religious education among Jews and other non-Christian groups.

It has come to pass that a man cannot speak in a group of Christians of ordinary intelligence without explaining fully that when he says "religious education" he means education in the Christian religion, and submitting testimonials to the effect that he is not a propagandist insidiously trying to bootleg non-Christian teaching under the guise of Christian. The author tried a few years ago to effect a compromise by applying the term "Christian religious education." That makes for definiteness. But it is probably too cumbersome. At least, the argument goes on.

The ultimate victory seems now to be well assured for the Christian education side of the argument. A number of denominations have already

adopted the term. At its annual meeting in February the International Council of Religious Education debated a change of name to International Council of Christian Education. The proposed change seemed to meet with favor, and action was held up only because other questions in the change of name of this organization are involved, and any change entails an action by Congress to change the charter of the organization.

The significance of all this is that it marks a definite trend to insist that Protestant churches, in their religious education, shall deal with distinctly Christian objectives and content. This is in line with a growing emphasis on the *message* of the Christian educator.

One of the best ways to see the trends of any movement is to examine what competent people are writing about it. In the field of Christian education there has been a superabundance of writing during recent years. In this great mass of publication there are, however, a few outstanding books each year. As we look over the past twelve or fifteen months we may select a few which serve as open doors (to use one of the titles which is before us for review) to the question we have at hand.

Professor Phillip Henry Lotz seems to agree with the walrus that the time has come to talk of many things, but he finds more serious things to speak of than cabbages and kings. In his book entitled *Studies in Religious Education* he presents a fairly complete survey of the present points of interest in the field of Christian education. The symposium includes chapters written by some of the leading figures in this movement. It has the merit of presenting in very brief compass significant articles on such questions as the aims of religious education, the place of worship in Christian education, the curriculum, the place of the Bible, the organization of the church school, church and state in Christian education, and many other things. As a handy reference book for one who has on occasion to get authentic information on questions of this sort at a moment's notice this volume will be found useful.

The emphasis on the content of Christian teaching has received marked attention in the literature of recent months. John Wallace Suter, Jr., has a simple little book which he calls *Open Doors in Religious Education*, in which he emphasizes the place of worship in the Christian religion, and the central place of worship in Christian education. He says that "Religious education is education for the religious life; more specifically, Christian religious education is education for the Christian religious life; therefore, whatever is fundamental to Christian religious life should be made basic in Christian religious education. Worship must occupy in our religious edu-

cational program a place corresponding to that which it occupies in our religion; and the worship of almighty God is the main thing in the Christian life, the heart of the Christian religion." He maintains further that if he were visiting a church school to see what might be done in order to make it more effective, the first thing he would do would be to set in order its public worship. "I would get that fixed and have it straightened out if it took a year. I am convinced that a school that has fairly good classroom work and good teachers, but which does not have anything significant going on in worship, is on the whole wasting its time and effort. I would put the worship to rights first and see that every boy and girl in the parish had a chance to go to a beautifully conducted service of worship where he himself could approach God and praise him. When I had that going so that it meant something in their lives, I would begin to think of picking out a group of boys or girls and sending them to a classroom before or after the service of worship where they could find out the reasons for the things done in worship." According to this point of view, the curriculum of Christian education would then become a series of Godward experiences. Other excellent chapters on the teaching of religion follow. His discussion on the place of receptivity in a program of Christian education is particularly wholesome in view of the dominant emphasis in our day on creativity in both teacher and learner.

In England they have concerned themselves far more with the content of Christian teaching, as contrasted with method and organization, than we have. Basil Yeaxlee in the form of a series of published lectures gives the English approach to religious education. In his book he says of the teacher, "His personality, his message, and his method are part and parcel of each other. He will teach effectively only as they are properly developed and thoroughly unified. But another unity is also needed. The teacher and his teaching must be rightly related to the whole world of thought and action in which both teacher and taught continually move. Clear purpose and deep conviction are born of experience and understanding. The teacher must have a philosophy as well as a vocation." Following this line of thought he develops what he calls the biological approach, the psychological approach, the biblical approach, the theological approach, and the personal approach. We teachers have to make up our minds about these things even if we find no occasion of discussing them with those whom we teach, that is, the teacher must have a reasonable faith and belief if he is to teach effectively even the simplest lessons in Christian living to the youngest child. Incidentally, this series of lectures delivered

to a group of English Sunday-school teachers would by our teachers be condemned as being "highbrow." Perhaps they called them that in Birmingham too, but we think not.

In the Abingdon series of religious education monographs, Clarence Tucker Craig has contributed a number on "Jesus in Our Teaching," in which he says some very pertinent things about the content of Christian education. Some of these will not be welcomed by professional religious educators, but nevertheless the truth should be known, and if the shoe fits we may as well wear it. Christian teachers say that Jesus is to be central in their teaching, but few of them know much about this Jesus of history. They assume that to know Jesus is a relatively easy question. They read the four Gospels and receive certain impressions, and then build a concept of Jesus which is but a reflection of what they themselves think Jesus should mean. Says he, "We ought to expect of our religious education 'leaders' a deeper understanding of the problem than this. If Jesus is as important for the curriculum as they say he is, he ought to be worthy of their most intense study with all of the aids of critical historical scholarship. No one of them would dare neglect the mastery of his Dewey or Kilpatrick. But much of their writing reveals a pathetic ignorance of the contemporary study of Jesus. They seek through 'modern methods' to obviate the necessity of seriously grappling with historical data."

The question is frankly raised whether the modern religious educator really wants to know the truth about Jesus. Following the bent of his technique he has looked for what he could use. He combs his Bible for passages that will furnish proof text solutions, but in so doing he neglects to organize his knowledge around facts in past history. Who, for example, in teaching American children, wants to admit that poverty was one of the ideals upheld by Jesus? "Courses which set out on a scientific historical task are branded as 'material-centered.' It may be that history, even the life of Jesus, is not religious education, but in that case it would be much more honest to stop assuming that an unauthentic Jesus is the 'solution of our problems.'" Following this clearcut statement of the problem, Professor Craig then proceeds to give some very illuminating chapters from which the Christian teacher may gain a better historical grasp of the Jesus whom he teaches, and a better understanding of the teaching values for modern life which the New Testament presents.

Yet one more voice should be heard in behalf of the objectives of Christian teaching. This is George Herbert Betts, who examines the character outcome of present-day religion and finds it wanting. One thousand

ministers, directors of religious education, members of overhead church organizations, professors and laymen were asked two questions: 1. Do our churches to-day teach and preach a religion that can effectively influence conduct and character? 2. If they do, why is it not working better to that end? Three hundred responded. The predominant reply to the first question was a qualified negative; the replies to the second were many, varied and sometimes pathetic or funny. We need not point out the shortcomings of the method used, for Betts himself has done that. The chief value of the study is that it has catapulted this great educator into a consideration of the vital question of how to make the character outcomes more positively evident, and unless we are sadly mistaken, something is going to come of it.

In the field of curriculum of Christian education the significant event of the past year is the tentative publication of a Curriculum Guide by the International Council of Religious Education. Through a period of years the Educational Commission and its sub-committees have been working on this undertaking, and the significance of it is attested by the fact that in these committees most of the curriculum makers of the Protestant denominations have labored. The Curriculum Guide was authorized for publication in tentative form in 1931, and again in more complete form in February, 1932. A careful study of the documents in this undertaking will reveal the prevailing trend of Christian education.

A comprehensive group of objectives of Christian education was first prepared and adopted as a general guide to curriculum makers. This was followed by a study of the experiences of growing persons for whom the curriculum is being prepared. Teaching is to be life-centered. In order to make it so, the curriculum maker and the teacher must know something about what pupils of various ages are thinking and doing, and what it is that enlists their interests. A great volume of material giving the description of actual experiences of children and young people has been gathered, and the study still goes on.

Taking these experiences of pupils as a basis and evaluating them in terms of the objectives of Christian education, the makers of the Curriculum Guide have then proceeded to set up specific objectives to be achieved in each age group and have suggested units of guided experience which pupils of these ages should undergo in order to attain the Christian growth which the objectives have indicated. With each of these units of guided experience teaching techniques and materials are suggested. The Bible is frequently mentioned, but it is made very clear that the needs

of the child shall come first, and the Bible shall be used as a means of meeting those needs. It is assumed, however, that one of the needs of growing persons is that for an understanding and appreciation of the Bible, and some units appear in which the life situation is assumed to be the Bible itself.

One interesting trend which is revealed by this Curriculum Guide is the fact that the curriculum is thought of as being almost as broad as life itself. It does not consist merely of materials to be taught, but of the total situation in which the pupil grows. This includes life activities and guidance materials as found in books and in the experience of teachers, the organization and life of the school and in fact of the whole church, the teacher and other leaders.

The purpose of this Curriculum Guide is to put into the hands of curriculum makers basic materials and techniques which may be utilized in preparing courses of study which are the responsibility of denominational editors and publishers to provide for their churches. The product which will be created on the basis of this Guide will probably differ widely in different churches. However, the fact that most of these curriculum makers have worked on this undertaking is prophetic of the kind of lesson material which will be forthcoming in the next period of years.

Method in Christian education has not received its usual share of attention during the past year. However, in the general field of method, at least one significant book has appeared which as a matter of fact has implications for content as well as method. This is Professor Richardson's *The Christ of the Class Room*. The author of this book maintains, "A study of Jesus Christ, the Saviour, clarifies the redemptive purpose or objective of Christianity. A study of Jesus Christ, the teacher, reveals the technique of this redemptive process, as facilitated and mediated by those multitudes of teachers upon whom, particularly, Christianity must depend for its own conservation, continuity, and transmission to succeeding generations. Christian education, when properly understood, is simply an effective, Christlike way of doing for those whose righteousness is immature, defective, or blighted by moral delinquency, what Jesus Christ accomplished as a teacher, working with individuals and with a group of chosen disciples. The gospel of Jesus Christ can be taught as well as preached; it can be learned as well as heard. Christian educators need to master the technique of teaching the gospel so effectively that it will be learned, not partially learned, but learned in all the ways by which learning is achieved." Professor Richardson seeks to go back to the Gospels for guidance in teaching technique.

If we are to have really evangelistic teaching, he maintains, let us go back to the first great Teacher. Throughout his book he shows by means of illustrations from the teachings of Jesus and actual proof texts that the Master practiced the approach to Christian teaching which he, the author, is advocating. One reviewer has suggested that ". . . this is an attempt to quote Scripture in support of the author's preconceived views. Perhaps he originally gained his views from a study of the work of Jesus. If he did, would it not have been much better to begin with that study in this book and then deduce principles, rather than to begin with principles which are said to be scientific, and then consider the teaching of Jesus in the light of those principles? It is difficult to avoid drawing the inference that the author is rationalizing his own views." Perhaps this is what most of us do—get our own preconceptions and then support them by further study of what others have had to say, but no doubt we also make some modifications because of what we find in the sayings of others.

In the field of departmental method, three new books have appeared which may be used as guides to the very latest technique with kindergarten, primary, and junior departments: *Guiding Kindergarten Children in the Church School*, Elizabeth M. Shields; *Teaching Primaries in the Church School*, Ethel L. Smither; *Junior Method in the Church School*, Marie Cole Powell. We are grateful that this group of women who have been so closely related to the Christian education of children should have given us these new books on method.

One of the most vexing problems of Christian education has been that of getting adequate housing and equipment. Many of our churches were built before modern ideas of education touched the church school. There is hardly a single situation where it is not necessary to make adaptations because of the inadequacy of the physical equipment. Nor is this difficulty limited to older buildings. It is not unusual to find a building but recently completed which is already inadequate and out of date. This is partly due to the fact that church building committees are likely to set up themselves as experts in a field about which they know little, or to assume that any good architect knows what constitutes good housing for a church school. Again, it may be due to the fact that while every effort has been made to build a church which is adequate, the march of progress has left behind the ideas on which that building was constructed.

Suppose a church is ready to construct an up-to-date building. What shall be provided by way of housing and equipment for the church school? What about having a children's chapel? And is there anything in this talk

about larger classrooms and abolishing departmental assembly rooms? Where may authentic information be secured as to what is considered best? The past year has seen the publication of a bulletin which will help in this problem.¹ This bulletin was prepared through co-operation of leaders in Christian education and church architects. It starts out from the standpoint of first setting up a program and then erecting a building in which the program may be successfully carried out. This is the way we build homes.

The newest field in church-school work is that of supervision. The past year has seen the fruition of the movement in two books dealing with the purposes and techniques of supervision. Supervision is usually defined as those activities which are intended to bring about improvement in the church school. Supervision provides a means of training on the job.

Professor Frank McKibben calls his book *Improving Religious Education Through Supervision*. He takes up the various aspects of the church-school program and ways of improving them. Thus he considers class instruction, worship, service activities, and recreational activities. He wisely assumes that it is necessary first of all to give the reader a comprehensive grasp of what modern religious education is recommending in these several fields, and then proceeds to present particular techniques and devices for improving the program.

The other book is by Ernest J. Chave, of the University of Chicago. It has been growing over a period of years as the author has taught this course in his classes, and therefore shows thoughtful and comprehensive work. It is his view that supervision ought to add more religion and more education to the process of Christian education. He says, "There is no situation in which improvement cannot be gained by means of supervision; for reduced to its simplest form supervision means that two people grapple with problems that hitherto have been left to one."

The question may well be raised, "Who is there in the local church to undertake such a difficult and technical task?" Our thought turns first to the employed Director of Religious Education. A few may find in the community persons trained in educational method and technique who can do this work. The only finally adequate answer, however, is that pastors must prepare themselves to do it. This assumes that the total task of the church is a unity, and that the pastor is concerned with all that the church undertakes.

¹ *Housing and Equipment for the Church School*, The Methodist Book Concern, New York. Research Service Bulletin No. 8, International Council of Religious Education.

Troeltsch's Masterpiece¹

Reviewed by JAMES MOFFATT

NOT only those interested in the relation of the church to social problems but all who have occasion to study the attitude of the church toward the state will feel a debt of gratitude to the publishers and the translator for having put this treatise at last within reach of a public unacquainted with German. Hitherto the translated works of Troeltsch have been some minor tracts and essays. Now English readers have access to his most important work upon the ethical and social development of Christianity down to the eighteenth century.

Die Sociallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen covers a far wider range than its title suggests, even in German, for what Troeltsch sets himself to analyze is not only the teaching of the various churches upon social and ethical issues but the structural development of church-life in its various forms, since the latter is bound up with the former. He finds three dominant forms—the church, the sect, and the mystical fellowship; all are present from the first century and all are interwoven, as the spirit of Christian fellowship expresses or organizes itself in social groups or communities. These are not of the world but they have to be in the world of men and morals. Hence they are considered from the standpoint of ethics (including economics) here, in three vast chapters: one on the early church, one on medieval Catholicism, and one on Protestantism.

With his interest in philosophy and law, Troeltsch brought to the complications and intricate phases of the subject an equipment which the ordinary historian of ethics or dogma does not possess; the result is a survey of exceptional range and independent judgment, which has been hailed by competent critics as a challenge to many traditional views and as a stimulus to further research. Doctor Bussell's remarkable Bampton Lectures on "Christian Theology and Social Progress" had appeared five years earlier, but Doctor Bussell's range was restricted, and though its incisive treatment promised much, there was room for the larger and more comprehensive *aperçu* of the German thinker. During the twenty years since the *Sociallehren* appeared, Troeltsch has been quoted, corrected, attacked, and followed. But no one could afford to neglect him. No one can.

To review these volumes with anything like adequacy, an article would

¹*The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches.* By ERNST TROELTSCH. Translated by Olive Wyon. New York: The Macmillan Company. 2 vols. \$10.50.

be required. All that is possible here is to call attention to their significance for men of all churches and to remind those who do not know Troeltsch about the practical object of his massive work. It is in reality an examination of the philosophy which underlies any theory of the relation between the Christian churches and the modern social problem, or indeed any active application of such a relation. Originally the early church simply asked to be let alone and allowed to live its own life. There was not the slightest idea of the church being responsible for any transformation of the social or political order. The first chapter, which by the way is the least original, discusses the reasons for this attitude. The second traces the rise of a political consciousness in the church, soon after the fourth century, when Christians commenced to lay down rules for the state, or for what corresponded then to the state, in a variety of more or less tentative ways. Here we come upon two of the most fruitful sections in Troeltsch's work, the revelation of a sociological significance in religious ideas like those of predestination and asceticism, as well as the theory that Christianity had to assimilate the Stoic notion of Natural Law in order to define its own ethical concepts and also to explain morality in the world at large. The third chapter, on Protestantism, is mainly devoted to the sect-idea, paying insufficient attention to the non-Latin forms of "catholicism" in the West and in the East, but furnishing a pungent criticism of ethical Protestantism, which is based largely upon Max Weber, whose influence was powerful when Troeltsch began to write. Here the radical individualism of the mystical fellowships emerges, as distinguished from church and sect alike. But Troeltsch is mainly interested in its sociological aspects, and in these as contrasted with the Lutheran and the Calvinistic ideals of the church. His aim in this elaborate historical survey is to bring out the need at the present day for clearer thinking upon the social implications of Christian ethic, which, as he rightly points out, is out of date. A new construction is required, for which the New Testament itself will not suffice; the church must to-day as heretofore face its contemporary civilization in the world, and face it in the light of the new factors which have emerged in the providence of God. What is "morality"? What is "the world"? And above all, what is the church in relation to these? Is a theocracy the ideal, and if so, is it to be on the lines of Thomism? Or is it the task of the church to permeate civilization with Christian principles, transmuting "cupiditas" into "caritas"? Is Christianity to push reforms, economic and political, as its chief business, in order to bring in the kingdom of God on earth? Or to train its members in faith and fellowship

primarily, leaving them to act in the outside world up to their lights, fulfilling their callings as God's men in an environment which must more or less remain alien? As a historian, Troeltsch is content to indicate how all these attitudes, with their philosophies of action or inaction, have come to pass; the present crisis for such traditional ethics, he thinks, is due to the industrial revolution, the rise of naturalistic morals, nationalism, and the gradual separation of the church from the state, till the adjustment of the two has become increasingly difficult. He sees no final solution. The burden of his book, most readers will feel, is the impressive and searching warning that, whatever Christians may think about the social responsibilities of organized Christianity, whether "religion" is to be turned into social-gospel propaganda or whether it is to reassert faith and fellowship as its main concerns, any policy involves an idea of the church which demands much closer thinking than facile propagandists in either camp seem disposed to realize, as a rule. It is these unexamined presuppositions, with their implicit indebtedness to contemporary sociology, that the historian lays bare. The results are sometimes uncomfortable, for they rouse reconsideration of traditional practice; sometimes indeed they are not quite so sure as Troeltsch imagines, for his methods of differentiation are now and then more logical than true to the data of the situation.

Troeltsch's style seems even more heavy and clumsy in a translation than it does in the original. Sociology like metaphysics appears to clog the utterance of nearly all who handle it masterfully, with the exception of some Englishmen and most Frenchmen. The translator of these volumes has done her best to provide an honest and conscientious version of Troeltsch's language, which does enable the reader to see more or less clearly what lies behind his rather uncouth terminology. It is only now and then that the rendering is more literal than lucid; for example, "gegenseitigen Stellvertretungen" is not quite "mutual oblations of a vicarious character" (p. 395), nor does "a purely spiritual and intellectual connection" (p. 827) answer to "eines rein innerlichen Geistes- und Gedankenzusammenhangs." The index of contents is very meager. Troeltsch's index ought not only to have been retained but enlarged, for no table of contents at the beginning gives anything like a guide to the rich variety of subjects touched by Troeltsch in the winding course of his argument. On the other hand it was a wise plan to print the longer notes at the end of each chapter. This prevents the book from appearing to be, like Harnack's *Dogmengeschichte*, two books running side by side in different sizes of print.

Discussion

What Has Professor Brightman Done to Personalism?

DOUGLAS CLYDE MACINTOSH

IN offering a brief comment on Professor Brightman's "new idea of God," I assume that readers of *RELIGION IN LIFE* (Vol. I, No. 1) are familiar with the essential features of this novel concept of "the Given in God"—an obstructing, retarding factor in the conscious personality of God, a factor by which eternally the creative will of God has been limited and against which he has had to struggle for the realization of his good purposes for man. Thus, it would seem, the problem of evil is to be solved by ascribing some evil to the nature of God himself, thereby making God not only an insoluble problem to us, but also eternally "a problem to himself."

One cannot but sympathize with Professor Brightman in his "revolt" against the "hideous doctrine" that such ills as "tornadoes, earthquakes, tidal waves, volcanoes, idiocy, insanity, hysteria, cancer, infantile paralysis," all come as the direct expression of the immediate will of God for man. But when these evils are ascribed not to the will of God, but to some other element in the spirit of God which is always opposing the realization of good will and occasioning evil, one is tempted to ask whether this "new idea" is itself altogether free from "revolting" features and "hideous" implications. As Professor A. E. Taylor reminds us, we can worship only what we can regard as *through and through good*, and one cannot help wondering how Professor Brightman finds it possible to worship what may still be called God, but what turns out to be, albeit a person, a complex of God and devil in one.

Professor Brightman rightly refuses to solve the problem of evil in relation

to God either by denying the reality of evil or by giving up the existence of God. Furthermore, he recognizes that man as an essentially free agent is himself, racially and individually, responsible for a large proportion of the evils from which he suffers. And although man's being and his being free are both ascribed to the creative activity of God, one gathers that Professor Brightman is appreciative enough and optimistic enough to believe and feel that the creation of man was justified. To be, he regards as better than not to be, and to be free than not to be free. This is all to the good.

But the problem of evil becomes acute when one considers the evils for which man cannot be held responsible. Professor Brightman rejects, for good and sufficient reasons, I think, the Manichæan dualism according to which evil is due to the retarding, thwarting activity of a factor which is and always has been wholly evil, wholly independent of the will of God and wholly outside of the divine nature. But he also rejects, as we have seen, any view which would explain extra-human evil as caused by the creative will of God, past or present. He seems to assume that for those who hold to the reality of both God and evil and to the perfection of the divine will the only alternative left is to ascribe such extra-human evil to something in the Spirit of God himself, namely, a mysterious "Given" which always has been and still is opposed to the will of God. The will of God is, of course, assumed to be and to have always been perfectly good.

Why does Professor Brightman regard this "new idea" as being, for the believer in God, the only alternative to Manichæan dualism and the "revolting" doctrine that natural evils are, as such, expressions of the will of God? Is

it not just because he is a *personalist*? As a personalist he maintains that "persons only are real," that the only place where evil or the cause of evil can exist is in persons. Since, furthermore, he is unwilling to accept the traditional notion of a created personal devil, Professor Brightman can find no place for extra-human evil except somewhere in the personal nature of God. But we may ask, is this not destructive of the complete worshipfulness and trustworthiness of Deity, a virtual putting of the devil into the very nature of the eternal God himself? And yet, cannot a very good case be made out for the new doctrine, *if personalism be assumed to be true*? But if it should turn out that Professor Brightman's doctrine is the only one fully consistent with personalism on the one hand and with an adequate revulsion against evil on the other, will this mean anything more—and can it mean anything less—than that *we must give up either personalism or God*, at least in the sense of an Object worthy of our absolute worship and trust?

In other words, if Professor Brightman can make good his case against the "revolting" and "hideous" doctrine of those of his fellow personalists who are "traditional" theists, will his victory mean anything more for the still theistic outsider than the *self-refutation of personalism* as a philosophical doctrine? In any case has not Professor Brightman rendered religious thought a service in calling attention in realistic fashion to the logical implications, for the interpretation of evil, of the personalistic doctrine, namely, that everything that happens in addition to the free acts of human agents is either the direct conscious creation of God at the time, or else the necessary outcome of the struggle of a finite, thwarted God against eternal opposition in his own personal nature?

For the theist who interprets creation from the point of view of realism, no

such dilemma exists as that which the personalist is called upon to face. The realist distinguishes two ways in which objects may depend upon personal subjects, namely, as *ideas* in the person's mind and as *works* which have an abiding reality which is not necessarily dependent upon their being all the time consciously contemplated by the mind of the person that produced them, whether as a matter of fact they are thus contemplated or not; and from the point of view of realism there seems no conclusive reason why there should not be in the life of a personal God a similar distinction between ideas and works. The universe, from this point of view, would be at once the work and, in a sense, the body of God. But it is in large part *the abiding effect of the past work of God*, and only to a limited extent his present creative work. In this the world-view of a possible religious realism would differ from that of personalism and would avoid the dilemma which has led Professor Brightman to his rather bizarre conclusion.

What I would suggest, then, as a way out of this dilemma of theistic personalism is that the personalism (the doctrine that only persons are real) be given up, and the religious realism, or theism, be interpreted from the point of view of a more inclusive realism, according to which there is a physical reality which is also independently real, and not *mere* idea or content of consciousness for some conscious subject. From this point of view, God may be thought of as having formed the physical universe as his body and the law-abiding processes of nature as his bodily habits (that is, as the persisting outcome of past creative activity), somewhat as man, on a smaller scale and to a more limited extent, has gradually by his conscious activity built up some at least of his bodily habits.

By the use of this analogy we gain

relief, it seems to me, from certain otherwise insuperable difficulties in connection with the relation of God to extra-human evil. It was well that there should be a world of orderly physico-chemical processes, as a dependable basis for man's learning of science (what to expect) and morality (what he ought to do), and to the same ends it seems necessary that this physico-chemical order should be dependable, not subject to any order-upsetting miracle. At the same time it is no longer necessary to suppose that every catastrophe to human life and every interference with human comfort occasioned by the necessarily ruthless operation of mechanical and chemical law is the immediate product of a new creative act of the conscious will of God.

Still more obvious are the advantages of the realistic interpretation of theism when we come to consider the problem of evil in the realm of the biological. There seems reason to believe that the laws of mechanics and chemistry are inadequate for the description of what takes place in biological evolution and in the development and behavior of individual living organisms. There seems to be, along with mechanical and chemical processes, a certain measure of free determination of its course at the time by the living whole itself. What we are morally assured of as the responsible moral freedom of man would be, from this point of view, a further development of a more rudimentary creative freedom in the lower orders of life. Thus, somewhat as man is regarded, even by the personalists, as a being who owes his existence and freedom to an original creative activity of God, while at the same time it is man himself and not God who is to be blamed for man's sinful misuse of his freedom, so in the biological realm generally, in so far as the evolution of new species, the development of individuals, and the activity of individuals is a process characterized by

a measure of creative freedom at the time, it is conceivable that it is to some extent *not* the present creative work of God, but rather an expression of the free creativity with which the divine Creator originally endowed life even in its most primordial and rudimentary forms. It is thus no longer necessary to ascribe to the present conscious, creative will-activity of God either the evolution of poisonous reptiles, parasitic growths and injurious bacteria, or their humanly harmful activities, any more than it is necessary to ascribe to the present creative conscious will of God either the incidental disasters due to the law-abiding nature of explosive chemicals or the deliberately sinful acts of human free agents. What is called for is not an order-upsetting or freedom-canceling miracle, but rather new and higher activities in which mechanical and biological processes can be used in new ways to produce new and higher values. Indeed it is quite believable that it was only on the basis of previously existing living forms, possessed of a limited but really creative freedom, that man as a morally free personal being could have been produced in an evolutionary manner. If this surmise be true, we have ample justification for a Creator's taking such risks as might be involved in giving to life a limited measure of self-creative freedom. We have in the potential value of man, when he appears in the course of evolution, more than enough to outweigh the misfortunes possibly involved in the existence of that limited amount of freedom, along with a large amount of mechanism, in the prehuman and infrahuman world.

From this more realistic point of view, then, we can say that God as Spirit is through and through good, his whole personal nature as well as his will, and consequently that he is absolutely worthy of worship in every respect. Furthermore, in harmony with the foregoing,

everything, in so far as it is God's created product, and when created, is free from evil. It may, however, not only persist until it is no longer adequate in a new situation, except as it may be used as a means to something higher; it may, even in the realms of life and mind, by virtue of its own created capacity for free development and activity, develop into something or act in some way no longer in accord with the will of God. But this does not necessarily mean that it was not desirable that it should have had either the degree of stability or the capacity for free development and activity with which it was originally endowed. Moreover, somewhat as we are able sufficiently for most human purposes to control our bodies and make them instrumental to ideals, so conceivably and believably can God control the universe as his body and make it subservient to his ideal ends. And he can do this more effectively, presumably, by having it a universe of dependable natural law and limited finite freedom than by having recourse to any order-upsetting or freedom-canceling miraculous intervention.

Perhaps, then, Professor Brightman's device of positing an antagonistic

"Given" in the Spirit of God, retarding the accomplishment of God's good will, may yet prove to have been but the first step toward his conversion, not indeed from traditional theism to atheism, but *from traditional personalism to realism*. And by realism as used here I mean not merely the personal realism and theistic realism to which Mr. Brightman already subscribes, but physical realism more particularly, a realism of the physical universe, mechanical and super-mechanical. If my good friend should thus come to be fully converted from personalism to a realistic view, I think he would find it possible to retain his faith in the absolute worshipfulness of God in his entire personal nature, and not be limited to the worship of an abstract rationality and an abstract divine will. He could do this, moreover, without closing his eyes to whatever evidence there may be that not only in the sinful wills of men but even in the realm of extra-human nature—that is, in the body of God—there is that which, for the time being, obstructs and retards the realization of the will of a God whom we can worship because in his whole personal nature he is "through and through good."

Book Reviews

Overstatement in the New Testament. By CLAUDE C. DOUGLAS. New York: Henry Holt & Co. \$1.75.

Doctor Douglas is the champion of hyperbole; he believes in it when used to delineate some striking truth and carry it, as Hosea would have said, "Home to the heart."

This book deals with the distinction, not in itself new, between pictorial and conceptive thinking. But it is a new thing to find a volume exclusively devoted to study of exaggeration in scriptural writings. The pictorial style is of the very essence of Hebrew religious genius; it appears alike in the Hebrew of the Old Testament and in the Greek of the New. Doctor Douglas makes us realize the driving power of language. The sayings of Jesus abound in hyperbole for the purpose of exalting faith, love, and service. Paul rejoices in extravagant paradox.

In terms of hyperbole we might say of the author's work that "Our hearts burned within us . . . when he opened to us the scriptures" (Luke 24. 32), meaning simply that we read the book at a sitting.

MARGARET B. CROOK.

Smith College,
Northampton, Mass.

Psychology and Religion. By ERIC STRICKLAND WATERHOUSE. New York: Richard R. Smith, Inc. \$2.00.

The lucid style of this book makes it pleasant reading. Originally its chapters were given as radio talks to British audiences—"to those who did not switch off," as the author whimsically states in his dedicatory sentence. No one would care to switch off while reading them. Professor Waterhouse, who is a clergyman occupying the chair of psychology and

philosophy in Richmond College, Surrey, England, has given us a book in which he does not psychologize religion so much as he religionizes psychology. Nor does he merely remove one by one the various organs of religious personality and analyze them like a surgeon lecturing to a class on anatomy. He approaches his subject from the normal rather than from the pathological point of view. Complexes, frustrations, inhibitions, escapes—they are all there but one reads about them without the usual sense of bewilderment or of depression. All eighteen chapters of the book are illuminating and particularly suggestive for the preacher. Perhaps the author is at his best in the chapters on: "Like Lost Sheep: The Soul Astray"; "Turning Again: Conversion"; "The Heart of the Matter: Prayer"; "Health and Healing: The Religion of Body and Soul"; and "Faith and Worship: The Approach to the Holy."

HERBERT H. FIELD.

Minister of Flatbush Presbyterian
Church,
Brooklyn, N. Y.

Has Science Discovered God? A Symposium of scientific opinion, gathered and edited by EDWARD H. COTTON. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company. \$3.50.

The activities of the scientist during the last decade have led not only to the further development of our machine age and of improved standards of living, but also to many enlarged conceptions of the universe and of man's relation to it. As wide publicity has been given to these new conceptions there have naturally arisen serious questionings concerning the relation of science to religion. To assist in following the trend of modern scientific thought, the editor has brought to-

gether in this volume sixteen essays by well-known American, English, and German men of science—Mather, Curtis, Conklin, Patrick, McDougall, Thomson, Stetson, Lodge, Bird, Millikan, Eddington, Einstein, Huxley, Pupin, Langdon-Davies, and Jeans.

The articles by the first nine scientists have been written especially for this book. The other seven chapters have been selected from recent writings by the authors. In addition, the editor contributes two comprehensive and helpful chapters, the Introduction and the Conclusion.

The reconstruction of the world by science and the effects of scientific thought and achievement upon religion are frankly discussed from the standpoint of the various fields of science represented by the authors. The symposium is a notable contribution to the development of a clearer understanding of the functions and interrelationship of science and religion in modern life.

EDWARD H. KRAUS.

University of Michigan,
Ann Arbor, Mich.

Liberating the Lay Forces of Christianity. By JOHN R. MOTT. New York: The Macmillan Co. \$2.00.

Here we have in book form the Ayer Lectures delivered by Doctor Mott at Colgate-Rochester Divinity School in April, 1931, the third of the series under that name. Their inspiration was found in the life of Francis Wayland Ayer, in whose memory the lectureship was established, one of the outstanding laymen of his generation among the Baptists of America.

In these lectures the fact is emphasized that the most vital and fruitful periods in the history of the Christian Church have been those in which laymen have most vividly realized their responsibility to propagate the faith. Many evidences are cited in support of this claim, both in

the early church and in recent times. The prevailing secularization of our times has generated an atmosphere of unbelief which has served to hold back laymen from identifying themselves with the church and its program, so that there is urgent need for the liberation of lay activities to ensure that the church shall be true to its distinctive character and appointed mission.

Laymen who are indifferent and inactive need to be exposed to real prophets and great servants of humanity, and Doctor Mott pays tribute to the influence of many such over his own life. The book abounds in personal references and is enriched throughout by the marvelous breadth of the writer's contacts and experience.

THOMAS F. HOLGATE.

Northwestern University,
Evanston, Ill.

Jonathan Edwards. By ARTHUR CUSHMAN MCGIFFERT, JR. New York: Harper & Brothers. \$2.50.

Here is an invigorating book which makes the real Jonathan Edwards live again for us of the twentieth century. We are all in Professor McGiffert's debt for having given us a new friend through this brief, masterly study. Not just a dour preacher of hell fire we see him, but a man with "the accent of modernity," daring to think for himself. Living on the frontier, he was yet peer of the best intellects overseas, and today ranks as one of the most forceful and stimulating of American minds. With literary charm and scholarly insight we are shown the man who inspired the Northampton revival of 1734, and whose study became a confessional for troubled folk. We come to know him as the head of a happy family, a lover of beauty with the soul of an artist. Yet, in his deathless loyalty to Calvinism, we watch him suffering because he was more interested in the truth of things

than in their pleasantness. Our liberal age may well have much to learn from his facing of sober facts. With excellent judgment this book was chosen as the February first choice of the Religious Book Club.

BASIL D. HALL.

Minister of the Congregational Church,
Florence, Mass.

The Character Outcome of Present-Day Religion. By GEORGE HERBERT BETTS. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.25.

Doctor Betts has added to his long list of contributions in the field of religious education a very stimulating survey of American Protestantism in general from the point of view of character education. The book contains an analysis of three hundred replies to a questionnaire dealing with the actual effectiveness of present-day religion as taught in pulpit and church school. Any one who thinks the contemporary church a complacent and self-satisfied organization ought to read this book. On the other hand, any one who is "up in arms" against the *status quo* and who thinks he is all alone and that there is little hope of a general reform, ought likewise to read the book.

The criticisms are severe and incisive, in fact many of them almost devastating, and bear out, along the lines of general observation, the results of such scientific investigations as pedagogical experts have recently conducted. For example, in the words of Professor Goodwin Watson, "Scientific investigations have revealed beyond any reasonable doubt that people given the religious training now common in homes and churches do not develop characters superior in the ordinary virtues to persons without such training" (p. 47).

The main difficulty is that religion as taught does not carry over into life. A great many people don't seem to know

what religion is all about; an even larger number do not seem to know what religious education is. The old methods of teaching and preaching are passing away, and nothing effective seems to have taken their place.

While far from proposing any panacea, Doctor Betts has several excellent suggestions which, if followed, would certainly go far toward making our preaching and teaching effective for the motivation of conduct and character. These are contained in his last chapter, which every preacher and pastor ought to read and note. He sums them up thus: (1) "Let the church, both in its teaching and its preaching, make the influencing of daily conduct with its resultant character its first and greatest concern." (2) "Let the church change the center of its emphasis so that the young will receive equal share with the old." (3) "Let the church in its teaching and preaching of religion keep it in tune with modern knowledge." (4) "Let the church search out and emphasize in its preaching and teaching those features of religion which so touch the motives of action that good character results." (5) "The church, each individual church, should seek to discover the points at which life most needs guidance and help and then direct its teaching and preaching to these points."

The book closes with a list of "experience-areas" in which religion may be a factor. These are very suggestive, and the experienced teacher or preacher, and especially the experienced pastor, can no doubt add considerably to the list as it stands. If he will bring his presentation of religion to bear upon these "experience-areas," it may revolutionize his teaching, but he will certainly begin to get somewhere in effective character molding.

FREDERICK C. GRANT.

Western Theological Seminary,
Evanston, Ill.

Grace in the New Testament. By JAMES MOFFATT. New York: Ray Long and Richard Smith. \$3.00.

The Doctrine of Grace. Edited by W. T. WHITLEY. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$4.50.

Doctor Moffatt follows his study of *Love in the Testament* by this inquiry into the meaning of grace for early Christianity. The work betrays a wide field of research with a careful appraisal of values. The expressions of "grace-interest" among Eastern peoples from 150 B. C. through three centuries are surveyed. Against this background New Testament usages are placed. In the records of Jesus' teaching "grace" does not occur but the fact is evident; the Gospels portray Jesus' mission so as to show that "the initiative lay with God." In Paul and his contemporaries "grace" denotes the "giving and forgiving love of God as he dealt through Christ with human sin and estrangement." Doctor Moffatt concludes that the religion producing the New Testament is a "religion of grace or it is nothing," and that grace teaching needs a revival.

The Doctrine of Grace is the first attempt to give a conspectus of Christian teaching. The Lausanne Conference on Faith and Order appointed a committee to face the primary problems in theological expression affecting Christian reunion. This book is the first-fruits of that united research by scholars at the behest of the continuation committee. The Roman Catholic view is presented by Professor Frank Gavin, General Theological Seminary, New York, the only writer who is not an adherent of the tradition he discusses. The investigation has persuaded the committee that different formulations of this doctrine imply variations in racial temperament, religious experience, and historical en-

vironment, and do not preclude a complete union of organized Christianity.

THOMAS WEARING.

Colgate-Rochester Divinity School,
Rochester, N. Y.

Mysticism East and West. By RUDOLF OTTO. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$3.50.

There is perhaps no other scholar more fitted by exceptional scholarship and deep sympathy to appraise the affinities and divergences of Eastern and Western mysticism than Rudolf Otto, distinguished author of *Das Heilige*. The "Gothic" mystic, Eckhart (1250-1327), and the scholarly Sankara (800) are taken as typical representatives of East and West respectively.

The similarities, even of language, of their mysticism are impressively set forth. For both, mysticism is not a metaphysics but a way of salvation, through "knowledge," not indeed of conceptual but of intuitional nature. Both repudiate the mysticism of mere emotion or of pantheism. In spite of a common daring exaltation of the soul in its union, and even identification, with the Godhead the mysticism of both is "arched over" a firm basis of theism. The important differences, though less developed, center about the tremendous optimistic affirmation of life and the practical Martha-love of Eckhart along with insistence on ethical salvation as contrasted with Sankara's pessimistic, though noble, quietism and his hope for utter peace. The appendices include short studies of the mystical elements in the religious philosophy of Fichte, Schleiermacher, Goethe and Kant. The translation is careful and accurate, though, unfortunately, the poetry and strength of Otto's style are not always retained.

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ.

Wesleyan University,
Middletown, Conn.

Seventy Years in Archaeology. By SIR FLINDERS PETRIE. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1932. \$4.00.

The Archaeology of Palestine and the Bible. By WILLIAM FOXWELL ALBRIGHT. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1932. \$2.00.

Few lives have been crammed with action and achievement as has that of Sir Flinders Petrie. Inheriting, so he insists, the aptitudes and skills that go to make a good archaeologist, for nearly fifty years he has spent his winters excavating in Egypt and Palestine, his summers in England exhibiting and writing up his finds, and his brief vacations measuring the hill figures and other ancient remains of England. Every winter records new struggles with the obstacles inherent in archaeological excavation, but new triumphs and discoveries. He has overcome a long line of what to another would have been insuperable obstacles: ill health which prevented him having the discipline of the English public school and university, a natural incapacity for abstract linguistics, and a constant succession of difficulties with museum officials and fellow archaeologists. For twenty years, with the invaluable aid of Lady Petrie, he has himself secured the funds to support his annual campaigns. Few scholars have never received any but honorary degrees.

Not a few of his discoveries are "household words" wherever the Bible is studied; for example, the brick platform at Tahpanhes (Jeremiah 43. 9), the temple of Onias at Tell el-Yehudiyeh, and the Merneptah stela. Of the last he remarked on the evening after its discovery that it would be better known than anything else that he had found. This is perfectly true, even though the mention of Israel in the inscription proves exactly the opposite of what it has usually been held to indicate: not that the Israelites left Egypt during Mer-

neptah's reign, but that they were already settled there before his time. The alphabetic inscriptions of Sinai are proving more important in the history of writing than Sir Flinders anticipates. So all archaeological discoveries are subject to reinterpretation.

At Tell el-Hesi in 1890 he inaugurated modern scientific excavation in Palestine. Forty years later he is again in the same region successfully wresting from the mounds of southern Palestine the story of Egyptian influence on the land of the Hebrews.

Biologists will take exception to Sir Flinders' theory of the inheritance of acquired traits, by which he explains his success as a self-made archaeologist, even as Egyptologists reject his chronology and some of his other theories. But no one can deny that he made a tremendous contribution toward the development of archaeology from a robbers' hunt for treasure to a scientifically ordered science. His account of his long life—archaeologically oriented from birth, as he believes—is a most entertaining and enlightening human document.

The dozen years since the war have been the most active and productive which Palestinian archaeology has ever known. A book by a writer who has lived in Palestine and had first-hand acquaintance with all matters archaeological during practically all of this period, who has participated in numerous and varied expeditions, and who combines unusual linguistic ability and knowledge of literary sources with exacting philological method, scientific archaeological procedure and outstanding knowledge of Palestinian ceramics, is a real event. In the volume which has just come from the press Professor Albright, now of Johns Hopkins University, long Director of the American School of Oriental Research at Jerusalem, has presented a convenient and con-

denser summary of brilliant discoveries and original and ingenious conclusions.

The first chapter reviews the history of Palestine exploration with emphasis on the postwar period. The second describes the very interesting and rewarding excavations which have been carried on by the Xenia-Pittsburg Seminary-American School expedition at Tell Beit Mirsim (Kiryath Sepher?) under Doctor Albright and President Kyle. The account is particularly significant as the attempt of a competent archaeologist and biblical scholar to present a synthesis of the results of recent excavation at a site covering the life of Palestine from before 2000 B. C. down to the Exile. The third chapter discusses the bearing of archaeological discoveries, not only in Palestine but also elsewhere in the Near East, upon three much-discussed problems of biblical history, the patriarchal age, the ethical and religious contribution of Moses, and the period of the Exile and Restoration. On each of these subjects he presents new and often startling views, sometimes confirming the results of historical and literary criticism, sometimes demonstrating the accuracy of conservative views.

Naturally certain of his conclusions will be disputed. Many Old Testament students will be slow to believe that Moses taught real monotheism and that the prophets were only the Luthers of a primitive faith. But no one will contradict the claim that details of the theories elaborated by Wellhausen and his successors must be radically revised and that the archaeological evidence is of primary importance in this revision.

The volume is not one for the nursery, but it is as simple and nontechnical in language as the subject can well admit. Full notes at the end give invaluable bibliographical references.

C. C. McCown.

Pacific School of Religion,
Berkeley, Cal.

Jesus in Our Teaching. By CLARENCE TUCKER CRAIG. New York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

Religious educators are indebted to Doctor Craig for a delightfully clear presentation of the significance of modern New Testament research for the use of those teaching the life and teachings of Jesus. The author shows a thorough acquaintance with the field of New Testament interpretation and also an intelligent understanding of the modern point of view in religious education—a rare combination. In less than 150 pages this professor of New Testament Language and Literature in the Oberlin Graduate School of Theology does more than most persons might be expected to do in a book double the size. He deals frankly with the problems, attempts no doubtful compromise, and leaves the reader with a feeling that a good, thorough, and honest reconsideration of the teachings about Jesus is needed in religious education. Instead of using myths and legends as if they were primary materials, Doctor Craig would have each person come to see what are the authentic records and feel the influence of the real Jesus in so far as he can be known.

In Chapter I he presents the dilemma of the modern religious educator who cannot honestly use the old teachings and who is unable to speak with confidence of the facts that persist and of the values he feels ought to prevail. In Chapter II he deals with the "Problem of the Sources"—"traditions not preserved by disinterested objective scholars but by intense believers"—and shows the difference between the Synoptics and John which "all the zeal of the harmonizers cannot truly put together in one picture." Chapter III lifts out the main lines of the historical portrait, revealing a dynamic figure with flaming zeal but one whose exact beliefs and acts are extremely difficult to discover in the enthusiastic descriptions of his biogra-

phers. Chapter IV deals with some of the problems faced in the records and in the use of the teachings of Jesus, such as miracles, legends, anti-Jewish bias of the writings, theological conceptions, and the authority ascribed to Jesus. Chapters V and VI are especially valuable, for this New Testament specialist speaks understandingly of the limited applications of Jesus' teaching for the different age groups and for the modern ethical problems confronting religious persons.

For little children he frankly says, "The man Jesus cannot be presented as an example—nor will such a term as 'Saviour' bear any possible meaning to their present experience." While he lifts out incidents that may be satisfactorily told he acknowledges that there is little guidance for the unskilled teacher in using them, but his own situations and illustrations are quite suggestive. For use with Juniors at the time when many are entering the church as regular members he shows how an outline of Jesus' career and the impression of his heroic character can be briefly but vitally developed.

For adolescents he does not make Jesus a "problem-solver" as many discussion courses have tried to do nor does he present him as the all-round example. Luke 2. 52 may be a good text to read into the ideals a leader would like to see drawn from Jesus, but Doctor Craig would not let such a person forget that the records do not show Jesus living a full, rounded life. Myths and legends may portray the spirit of Jesus, but the young person of to-day needs to know the authentic "man of Galilee," and to learn to do his own thinking on problems crucial to him and to the society of which he is part but foreign to Jesus and his contemporaries. This influence of Jesus may be powerful and Doctor Craig believes it ought to be, though the ideas of Jesus may be quite different from

what some religious educators have tended to give.

The bibliography is limited but suggestive. Perhaps the real disappointment is that the author cannot recommend without hesitation any books on the life of Jesus written for children or adolescents. It might even have been better if he had not listed any or had given critical comments on those he did name. A big task remains for those who believe in the value of Jesus for this and coming generations to search diligently for facts, write stories, and paint real pictures of Jesus that may become meaningful to young and old. It is impossible to prevent teachers using the materials they have until better and more authentic texts are available, but such a book as this of Doctor Craig makes us believe a body of literature can be developed that will present Jesus in a new and convincing way as a spiritual genius, and a daring prophet whom all men need to know.

E. J. CHAVE.

The Divinity School,
University of Chicago,
Chicago, Ill.

Through Experience to Faith. By
FREDERICK K. STAMM. New
York: The Abingdon Press. \$1.50.

The author of this book is the pastor of the Clinton Avenue Congregational Church in Brooklyn, N. Y. His voice has long been familiar to many, from coast to coast, who have heard his radio sermons on the Sunday afternoons of summer, under the auspices of the Federal Council. His book, the first fruit of his pen, will widen the circle of his friends and extend the scope of his influence, for it performs the same helpful ministry, in a more tangible and permanent form, as his radio messages. Both his voice and his pen are devoted to the interpretation of the gospel of Christ in terms that meet the deepest needs of the

soul of man, and that frankly face every mental and moral test of life.

The book consists of ten chapters. Each of them forms a well-rounded whole, centering in some particular aspect of man's life. Yet the volume is not a mosaic of separate parts, mechanically united. Its ten chapters are bound together by the golden thread of a growing experience illuminated, in its heights and depths, its sins and sorrows, its mental perplexities and moral bewilderments, by an intelligent Christian faith. Each chapter of the book is true to its title, *Through Experience to Faith*.

The author begins with life in its formative period, in home and school, and then views it in its maturity. It is the life of Everyman that he depicts, not the cloistered saint nor the abandoned sinner, but the man whose name is legion—hungering for reality, seeking to penetrate through the kaleidoscopic surface of his experience into its hidden meaning, wondering whether it forms a pattern that is truly divine and eternal in its possibilities or just a crazy-quilt. And the great merit of the book is that, at every vital point, it rings true to life. The reader feels that here is food, bread and meat, that gives new strength and hope to the wayfaring man whose goal often seems remote and shrouded with mist.

Mr. Stamm has the gift of simple speech and apt illustration. His literary allusions and references show his wide reading and his familiarity with the scientific and theological problems of our time. His chapter headings are striking, for example, *The Society of Fools*, and *The Useful Hosts of Mediocrity*. And the printer has given the book a form that matches the content.

The useful ministry of such a volume is not limited to any class or group. It may be read with profit by the clergy and by the laity. The former may learn from the author something of the diffi-

cult method of interpreting religion in the terms of experience. The latter may gain new insight and inspiration from his message. Nor does the profitable perusal of the book require any learning, save that of the heart seeking the wisdom of life.

THEODORE F. HERMAN.

Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the United States.
Lancaster, Pa.

The Christian Saga. NORMAN TOWAR BOGGS. New York: The Macmillan Company. Two vols. \$9.00.

The author, a graduate of Princeton and formerly a lecturer in Philosophy at Columbia, but since 1923 a resident in Paris, has attempted a very respectful, yet seriously restricted funeral oration over what he terms "Christendom's Christianity," not making it clear that there is any other Christianity. The Christianity of Christendom is the outcome and but one aspect of European civilization, rather than the determining molding factor. This conception very largely governs in the choice and treatment of materials, especially in those chapters devoted to historical interpretation. There are many chapters which are splendid examples of brilliant narrative. In these, the freshness of the phraseology, the introduction of facts, allusions and analogies not found in most church histories, the drawing upon an evident wealth of tributary knowledge, all result in a very valuable and interesting contribution to the history of Christendom.

The great and glaring weakness of this work lies in the implications, in the interpretations, in the use or non-use of materials and in the conclusions drawn. Even the materials which he does present do not really warrant his conclusion that Christianity is a movement about to make its demise. He declares that it has had "wide social significance" besides being an ecclesiastical entity. Yet he omits

entirely any reference to the great modern social movements initiated and furthered by Christianity, as, for instance, Pietism with its Spener, Francke, Zinzendorf, Nitschmann and Schwartz; Methodism with its Wesleys (John Wesley is given one page to tell of his "explosively emotional religion"), and its connected reforms under Wilberforce, Howard, and the seventh Earl of Shaftesbury; and the entire modern missionary movement with its Xavier, Carey, Duff, Heber, Judson, Butler, Thoburn, Scudders, Morrison, John, Gilmour, Taylor, Hepburn, Brown, Verbeck, Livingstone, Moffat, Paton, and Mott. All these and many more are ignored. He takes no account of the far-reaching movement toward co-operation and unity in world-wide Christendom and neglects altogether the great indigenous churches in lands other than European. So bent is the author on proving his thesis that Christianity is merely a phase of European civilization that he never mentions Neesima, Kagawa, Sun Yat-Sen, Cheng Ching-yi, Lilavati Singh, Sundar Singh, Sarabji, Pandita Ramabai, Azariah, Chitambar and hosts of others than European Christians that he might have extolled.

Perhaps the chief merit of Mr. Boggs' volumes is their revelation as to how biased one must be in order to erect an epitaph over such a lively corpse. At least he provokes thought. European Christianity and every other type of Christianity is in process of change, but that change indicates life, not death.

GAUIS JACKSON SLOSSER.

The Western Theological Seminary,
Pittsburgh, Pa.

Jesus Through the Centuries. By
SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press.
\$3.00.

This book is a historian's attempt at religious evaluation of the central figure

of Christianity by a survey of the appreciations of Jesus throughout the centuries. The uniqueness of the study is that it deals with the vicissitudes of Jesus at the hands of his admirers rather than with the development and re-statement of Christological dogma.

The most valuable contribution of the book is the story of the development of Christological thought in the New Testament. The author traces the various stages of appreciation, showing how first-century ideas were used to express what Jesus meant to men. We do not recall any book in English where these influences have been traced so successfully.

From the practical point of view, the most valuable feature is the broadside against the contemporary utilitarian approach to Jesus as a sponsor for varied modern interests. "Whatever one imagines the ideal Christian to be in one's own area of experience and activity, it is thought natural and proper to make Jesus the supreme example of just that type of person." Doctor Case is right in seeing that a Jesus who is the product of our own interest has only verbal, apologetic importance.

But it is just at this point that the book is least satisfactory. Its Jesus was the unfortunate victim of the misguided enthusiasm of his disciples. Of course, the author's fundamental difficulty comes in explaining the crucifixion since he does not believe that Jesus agreed with Peter that he was to be the "nointed one." Case is too sound a scholar to follow Eisler in his wild fancies of a revolutionary movement led by Jesus. But in their well-meaning enthusiasm, the disciples gave to the police such an impression, and Jesus died an innocent victim. But why, if this reconstruction be correct, did the Jewish rather than the Roman authorities make the arrest? American readers should know that in upholding a modified form of Wrede's thesis of 30 years ago (denying any

messianic consciousness in Jesus) Case does not present the point of view of many younger scholars to-day. (Cp. K. L. Schmidt, article on "Jesus" in *Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*.)

But the greatest weakness does not lie in a particular conclusion on a debatable interpretation of our sources. When the author comes to his own appreciation, the fact stands out amid many beautiful paragraphs and pertinent insights that so far as the author can see nothing really happened in Palestine from 1 to 30 A. D. of any more lasting significance than at many other times and places. Rigid historical objectivity leads him throughout to restrain his own religious feelings. But the obvious sincerity cannot hide the cool aloofness, at times, almost a note of condescension. Doctor Case is not a "revisionist"; he sees no possibility of continuity with past formulations.

What will disturb most readers is the insistence that Jesus cannot be "normative" for us. What the author means, of course, is that many of the words of Jesus (about wealth, to refer to but one example) cannot be taken now as they were originally meant. He rightly appeals to the creative stimuli from Jesus to face our own problems which are entirely different. What justifies the dissatisfaction of the reader, however, is the way in which the ethical radicalism of Jesus seems to evaporate at the touch of the urbane scholar and lose its terrible sting for the conscience of to-day. Doctor Case may believe that ultimate insights lay behind the absolute imperatives of Jesus, but so eager is he to dispel the illusion of "normativeness" that there does not remain enough stimulus to leave the Nazarene much significance.

Doctor Case has performed a valuable service in making clear that many present-day appreciations of Jesus have more in common with modern idealism than the historic figure. If his own evaluation is far from satisfactory, it should be an

occasion not to pillory a book containing much of value but to stimulate his critics to provide one that does better justice to both the facts of history and the religious needs of men.

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Immortality and the Present Mood.

By JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER. Harvard University Press. \$1.00.

The Evidence for Immortality. By DON P. HALSEY. New York: The Macmillan Company. \$2.00.

Here is a learned book, small only in physical size. It is itself a book of "moods"—and is likely intended to be. The present American mood? Scholastic mood? Seventy or more authorities are quoted or referred to (reference is often more potent than quotation). The list is long and varied—from 2000 B. C. to our contemporaries—and the "mood" varies, always. The old difficulties are rehearsed; possibly the mood is not "present" but perpetual.

Architecture and music; astrophysics, astronomy, biology, psychology; all departments of human knowledge and effort contribute evidence pro and contra. Jennings, Jeans, James, Jacks, Freud and Democritus, Tieck, Picasso, Heidegger! It is a learned book (but not pedantic), and sends one hunting up the sources and broadening his knowledge.

It has literary quality; fine diction, lyric beauty. It is a surprising combination of spiritual emphases and skeptical conclusions—"The drift of our thinking is toward a negative view." The author is courageous—"The quality of nature is ruthless. . . . But, though it slay us, we will trust in our own integrity, proving that, at least in the human heart, the universe backs the struggle for value."

Hormones and thyroxine play havoc with the soul—now and forever. Barth,

Augustine, and Paul go to limbo, with miracles and dualism, in two sentences. Kierkegaard is here, but Christ is not mentioned by name. This seems a serious lack, even in this present age—or "present mood." One supposes that a somewhat more vigorous Theism would successfully meet some of these negative moods. But everywhere the "nameless longing" is between the lines.

The Evidence for Immortality is a barrister's brief—and more: a judge's opinion—plus: a lawyer's verdict—logical, but never legalistic. The author evi-

dences deep religious conviction, based on a Christian experience. He is familiar with the older philosophers and knows some of the contemporaries. The great names in contemporary science appear. Psychic phenomena are heard in court. The chapter on "Brain and Being" hardly meets the terror induced in many by the latest biochemistry. Readable, persuasive: intended, by the author, for the "man in the street"; it is well worth reading and study by the parish minister and intelligent layman.

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Bookish Brevities

It is often said that in Europe it is the reviews which determine the demand for a book while in the United States it is the advertising.

Many correspondents have commended the readable reviews of selected books by competent specialists in the initial number of *RELIGION IN LIFE*. Some have insisted that our reviewers should bring out more severely the egregious faults as well as the intrinsic values of the volumes under analysis. "Try rejecting a few of the reviews by those who are excessively complacent," suggests a distinguished friend.

George Jean Nathan used to say that the chief fault of American reviewers is the warm and indiscriminating hospitality they afford to second-rate writing. Let it be understood that the reviewers of *RELIGION IN LIFE* are chosen because it is thought that they can appraise a new volume in relation to similar books which theretofore had been regarded as standards of excellence. They are requested to supply frank and reliable judgments of a book's merits and demerits.

To be sure a "Swinburne" would not be asked to review an "Emerson." Of him he said, "This wrinkled and toothless baboon, who, first hoisted into notoriety on the shoulders of Carlyle, now spits and sputters on a filthier platform of his own fouling and finding."

When it was suggested that such a review might explain the absence of response to two letters he had addressed to Concord, the erratic genius replied, "Oh, no, I kept my temper, I preserved my equanimity."

In his word-pictures Hendrick Van Loon shows some of the artistry of his exemplary fellow-national, Rembrandt. In his total non-mention of John Wesley in *The Story of Mankind* Van Loon

shows a monumental prejudice. For the increasing recognition of John Wesley as a surpassing spiritual genius of all time is evidenced by the many books which have been and are being written about him by all sorts of writers.

Strangely enough there has never appeared any adequate biography of Charles Wesley. Popular estimates of him have created the tradition that he is the master hymn-writer of the ages. Some critics assert that this reputation has been made by the success of the Methodist movement. All are agreed that Charles Wesley wrote six or seven hymns that promise to be immortal; also that his hymns reveal the inwardness of the Methodist revival in their portrayal of the consciousness of the quickening of the human spirit by the mighty Spirit of God, and of the radiant happiness of the transformation which follows the wrestlings after and the acceptance of holiness.

The foremost living authority on Charles Wesley is Dr. F. Luke Wiseman of Great Britain, himself a master in several fields. In his recent lectures at Drew University, he depicted "Brother Charles" as evangelist, theologian, churchman, mystic, saint and poet.

Among non-fiction books those on science had the largest circulation in 1931. Of these the books that deal with mathematical physics have been pre-eminent. Great are the books of Jeans, Eddington, Millikan and others, great enough to confess that their fundamental concepts are not in the clear.

Some preachers have been quick to seize upon these concepts for homiletical usage. The scientists speak of them with less assurance, admitting they may be only artificial constructions for describing nature and not objects which are

existent. Whereas some preachers are using science to support their dogmas, the scientists are more and more modest in their claim to know ultimate reality through physical investigation. May it be that the preacher who in the past has been intimidated by the scientist has come too easily to accept him as an ally?

Now that books which are supposed to exalt orderliness of thought and action are thus ascendant, how shall we account for the prevalence of economic disorder, international discord and chaotic morals? Is it because the social sciences have been relatively neglected that the wellbeing of mankind has not advanced in proportion to man's understanding of and control over material nature? Or is human action capricious because we have more or less unconsciously supposed that knowledge is sufficient and have not laid hold upon the Divine Controls which Christian believers are convinced are available?

In older lands the giants of scholarship and of literature are much oftener selected for administrative posts than with us. Archbishop Söderblom of Sweden was one of the foremost scholars of Europe. Professor H. R. Mackintosh of New College, Edinburgh, whom several American theological professors are proud to regard as their master, is to be the next Moderator of the Church of Scotland. In England it is the redoubtable Dean of Saint Paul's Cathedral who can write terse sentences like these: "Religious excesses bear the appearance of being perversions of something which is not in itself perverse." "Faith begins as an experiment and ends as an experience." "Nothing fails like success." "The soul is dyed the color of its leisure thoughts."

Worthy to be included among these deepeners and heighteners of life's real values is Bishop Francis J. McConnell. Within a year he has given the Barrow

lectures, the Bennett lectures, and the Wilkin lectures, on the Foundations of the University of Chicago, Wesleyan University, and the University of Illinois. The demand for his books as they appear from time to time continues unabated.

With no exultation we note that the impoverishment of Europe consequent upon the war is bringing to the United States invaluable literary treasures. The library of the Marquis of Lothian which was auctioned this year is rated as the best collection that has been marketed in twenty years. In it was the most important illustrated book of early days ever sold by auction, a French translation of Boccaccio printed at Bruges in 1476. Included also was the famous manuscript of the nineteen Blickling Homilies which were written in 971 and which for a time were the property of the city of Lincoln, England. In the collection also was the illustrated Latin Psalter produced about 1310 by an Augustinian monk, Brother John Tikytt. This is esteemed to be a work of superior beauty. It was sold for \$61,000, and has been added to the collection of the New York Public Library.

Editors who live in fear of authors who without compunction lay hold upon another's writing appreciate the report of a conversation between President Nicholas Murray Butler and the late Professor Brander Matthews. "In the first man to make a statement there is originality," said the litterateur; "in the second to make the same or a similar statement there is plagiarism, in the third there is a deficiency of originality and in the fourth there is a drawing from the common stock." "Yes," interrupted the President of Columbia University, "and in the fifth there is research."